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The Phenomenon of Man

by MARTIN BRENNAN

PIERRE TEILHARD DE CHARDIN was born in Auvergne in France in 1881, educated at the Jesuit College of Mongré near Lyons and entered the Society of Jesus at the age of 18. He was ordained priest in 1911. Already as a schoolboy he had developed an interest in mineralogy and geology and during his years of training for the priesthood he became competent in the latter and in palaeontology, the study of pre-existing forms of life as preserved by fossilization. He had the doubtful privilege in 1912 of becoming involved in the Piltdown finds, being responsible the following year for the unearthing of the canine tooth of the supposed 'Dawn Man.' Although deceived at the time like all the other experts, in later years his assessment of the event, as quoted by Weiner in *The Piltdown Forgery*, was eminently sound.

Piltdown probably turned his attention to human evolution ; at all events we find him in the following years studying under the great Marcellin Boule at the Institute of Human Palaeontology in Paris, with an intermission as brancardier with the French forces in World War I. He took his doctorate in 1922. He held the chair of geology at the Institut Catholique of Paris till 1928 ; but already in 1923 he was sent on a French Government mission to China. This is the first of many geological and palaeontological expeditions, some of them famous, in which he took part. He was to remain in China for over twenty years, with brief excursions home, to the U.S.A. and to various countries in Asia. The highlight of his career was probably his participation in the discovery and appraisal of fossil remains of the very primitive type known as Peking Man. He made many other notable contributions to science in the allied fields of palaeontology, anthropology and geology. Returning to France in 1946 he was the recipient of signal honours including the Legion d'Honneur. In 1948 he accepted an invitation to the U.S.A. which led to his settling there in 1951 at the Wenner-Gren Foundation, New York. Here for the four last years of his life he exercised a profound and widespread formative influence on palaeontological and anthropological research. He died on Easter Sunday, 10 April 1955.

Such in brief was the unusual external pattern of his life. But much more striking was the man himself. With the soul of a poet, with a largeness of mind that spurned the mean and the petty and with an unconquerable urge to unify he came to view all things in a *global*

perspective, a dynamic and evolutionary one. In *The Phenomenon of Man* (1) he gathered together the strands of the sciences—strands that others were satisfied to trace singly and in isolation—and wove them into a commanding evolutionary synthesis of the universe in terms of man : man the latest product of evolution, better still the axis and the leading-shoot of evolution as it moves towards God.

This vision he had completed and committed to writing during the years 1938 to 1940 while still in China. Due to the misgivings of his religious superiors his work was not published in his lifetime. After his death it was published at the instance of some of his friends. Its success in the original and in its many translations has been striking ; but there has also been a considerable chorus of dissent. That we may the better on the one hand understand this criticism and his superiors' misgivings, and on the other gain some insight into the book's undoubted appeal we must first try to expose its thought and then subject it to a sympathetic yet objective critique.

* * *

Before dealing with that thought *in extenso* a very brief preview will help to focus the picture. Père Teilhard visualizes the whole evolutionary process up to our times as comprising the organization of primitive matter through stages preparatory to the rise of life. Life culminates in thinking beings. He extends the process into the future to include a stage of super-organization of the whole human species. These four stages he calls pre-life (because somehow it contains the seed of life), life, thought and hyper-life. Even in pre-life, he claims, matter possesses an inner aspect, a *within*, the rudimentary beginning of the consciousness of higher forms. He contrasts this inner aspect with the *without* of things, their tangible, measurable aspect which hitherto has formed the sole stuff of science. Père de Chardin objects to this and proposes his own synthesis, a synthesis in terms of the *within*. Starting with the *within* of crude matter he traces its rise through life (whose *within* is consciousness) to thought, or self-consciousness. Borrowing a figure from mathematics he calls this rise a curve : *the curve of the phenomenon of man*, which even in its earliest, pre-living stages he calls anthropogenesis. The *within* in man rises to the plane of personality. Teilhard projects the curve into the future to show human persons in their ever growing complex interdependences converging in love under the divine influence to form a sort of super-personality (hyper-life) in a self-fulfilling unanimity of mind and wills. The term of this *convergence* he calls Omega point in an obvious echo of the Alpha and Omega, the

(1) *The Phenomenon of Man*. Introduction by Sir Julian Huxley. Translated by Bernard Wall. London : Collins, 1959. Pp. 320. 25s.

First and the Last, of the *Apocalypse*. This brief précis already indicates that in our discussion the *within* of things and Omega point will require special consideration.

Some difficulties that the reader will encounter must be mentioned straightway. In elaborating his thoughts the author coins new words. Geophysics and geology already spoke of the barysphere, the lithosphere, the hydrosphere and atmosphere. Biology already conceived the *layer* of living things as a further envelope of the earth, the biosphere. We are now given a new word, the noosphere to designate the *layer* of thinking beings, man. The raising of animal life and values to the human plane as well as their further spiritualization under Omega is called *hominisation*. Again, he extends and even shifts the meaning of accepted terms. Thus sometimes he uses *phylum* in its technical sense of a primary division of biological classification (e.g. the phylum of reptiles, or of mammals) but he also uses it for lesser groups as the primates or even for man himself. Another striking example is *orthogenesis*. Many biologists fight shy of this word. When used it generally means a limited evolutionary movement *in a straight line* as in the progress from the small foot-high ancestors of the modern horse towards ever greater size and speed. In Teilhard's use it means the obviously *aimed, directed* character of the *whole* evolutionary movement.

Later we shall have occasion to draw attention to the highly analogous nature of his language. It is not always clear how far precisely the author wishes his analogy to extend. But he refers strictly and accurately to man's *within* as self-consciousness or reflexion and such a self-conscious, reflective being and *such only* is intended when he uses the term *centre* (though he unfortunately uses *centreity* in a wider sense). Lastly, he changes early on the analogy of the curve to that of an *ascending spiral*. This is very apt as each stage of anthropogenesis repeats or at least re-echoes the theme of the previous stage, at a higher level. Thus 'involution upon itself' is a keynote recurring in ever higher octaves throughout the spiral's ascent. This denotes that folding in upon itself, that throwing back upon itself, due to the confinement of large numbers in a limited volume or space. It connotes the stresses and strains due to this limitation of free movement or divergence. Thus atoms confined in a planet (planetisation) are thrown in upon themselves ; similarly in man there is a check to divergence due to his rational nature, his power to bend back consciously upon himself in reflexion; in addition, there will be increased tension due to the pressure of rapidly growing numbers on the surface of a dwindling globe. (This condition he will also call a planetisation of man.) In addition it connotes the consequent stresses and strains as a result of which the spiral rises to a new level. Each new *involution*—of matter, of conscious life, of thought—leads by way of a distinct threshold, a change of state, a metamorphosis

to a higher state, a further upward twist of the spiral. This in turn exhausts the potentiality of that state and a further metamorphosis or change of state is necessary if the movement is to continue : and so on.

We can now attempt to synopsize his thought ; but already it is clear that this will be a difficult task.

Science, confronted with the fact of consciousness, has hitherto been content to explain it away as a queer exception in nature. But, Père Teilhard protests, the fact that we experience a conscious centre, a *within* in the depth of our being means that this can only be an *outcrop* of a reality that *lines* all things. Below us we can detect it in progressive attenuation in the lower grades of life till it disappears from our view in brute matter. But it necessarily exists here also ; it must be co-extensive with the *without* of things. Science in constructing its model of the universe has so far neglected this *within* to concentrate on the admittedly more manageable *without*. But Père de Chardin claims that a true science will, and *must*, extend its scope to include the *within* ; and he sets out to substantiate this claim by constructing a synthesis of all things in terms of the *within*.

Left to diffuse indefinitely in space, primordial matter with its contained *definite quantity of consciousness* would have achieved nothing, or at least something very different from the actual result. But being shut up within the closed surface of ' a star ', matter is *thrown in* upon itself. Due to this *involution*, this ' planetisation,' and helped by the resultant tensions, it tends to aggregate, forming atoms and molecules. These in turn combine to form mega-molecules at a sidereal pace : a rate so slow as to demand an astronomical time-scale. *Pari passu* with this continuing growth in structural complexity (complexification) goes a progressive perfecting of the contained consciousness, the *within* : ' a consciousness is that much more perfected according as it lines a richer and better organised material edifice '. This provides him with the ' Law of Complexity-Consciousness ', according to which the level of consciousness of a thing or a being can be gleaned from its degree of complexity.

While still considering pre-life Père Teilhard poses the problem of spiritual energy, of which, as in the case of consciousness, he claims to have direct experience. He expressly rules out its *convertibility* with material energy though admitting their *inter*dependence: ' we must eat to think '. This interdependence ' can in all probability be expressed only by a complex symbolism in which terms of a different order are employed '. So his ' solution ' —' to avoid a fundamental dualism at once impossible and antiscientific '—is to presume that *all* energy is essentially physical. This essentially unitarian energy he divides into two distinct components, a *tangential* energy, the measurable energy of the *without*, of orthodox physics, which links the element with all others

of the same complexity ; and a *radial* energy, the energy of the *within*, which draws it towards ever greater complexity. It is mainly this latter which will occupy us henceforth.

Pre-life, the ascending (' involuting ') series of atoms, molecules and mega-molecules, arrives at a degree of complexification beyond which no progress in the same line is practicable or fruitful so that only a metamorphosis, the appearance of a new thing, *life*, will continue the movement. The ' cellular revolution ' achieves this metamorphosis and the biosphere is born.

The first cells though infinitesimal were already incredibly complex. They achieved prodigious success : life swarmed not merely in the vastness of its numbers but in the richness of its forms. Though obviously directed by an over-all *aiming*, life *gropes* by means of its multitudinous forms—' groping is *directed* chance. It means . . . . trying everything so as to find everything '. It discovers the secret of multiplication, cell division ; by *conjugation*, the fusion of two cells to form a new individual, it achieves the essence of sexual reproduction which has so greatly enriched life subsequently. Dividing cells also will tend to aggregate. But by all these means alone life will incline merely to spread out at the same level. The diversification of life at any such level he attributes to Natural Selection (' the survival of the fittest ') thereby relegating the master idea of Darwinism to an inferior rôle in evolution. But the orthogenetic upward thrust by which new levels are reached is due to ' controlled additivity ' : the rejuvenations made possible by succeeding reproductions achieve something new and these *add* one to the other ' in a predetermined direction '.

Controlled additivity is the ' vertical component ' in evolution. Under its working the Tree of Life grows before us. It consists of an ascending series of fanning branches—' verticils of consolidated forms '—each fan rising above the other without suppressing it. As each phylum fans out ' groping ', ' trying all ', it presents the appearance of a ' forest of exploring antennae '. One antenna finds a ' fissure ', a formula not merely viable but giving the key to a further ascent and the antenna breaks through. A new phylum appears and with the élan of a new discovery, a re-birth, it spreads out ramifying in all directions, forming another fanning verticil above that on which it was born. So life mounts through invertebrates, fish-like forms, fish, amphibia, reptiles and at last mammals ; and from the heart of this latest phylum the primates arise on the final stages of hominisation.

The Tree of Life thus sketched convinces him in its unity (and beauty) that life is a unique thing on earth : it arose once and once only and shall never be achieved again except perhaps artificially in the laboratory. This great intuition is reinforced for him by what he calls the striking fact that many accidental things, many asymmetries in

the basic molecules of living things which could have freely varied (and would inevitably have varied if life had arisen independently a number of times) are yet universally the same. But this unity must be viewed from a distance. Each new group as it arose was necessarily limited in numbers and it was only when reasonably mature and having achieved numerical profusion that it had a pretty good chance of preservation by fossilization. So each new group seems to be born *fully-formed* and isolated. This is the Law of the Suppression of Evolutionary Peduncles : it tends to isolate groups and this isolation is later reinforced by the elimination of straggling intermediate connecting forms.

Man is no exception. At the end of the Tertiary age (approximately a million years ago) at the heart of the group of primates as it fans out there are a large number of anthropoid forms. Many of these are far more man-like than any of the survivors, mean in development and relatively so in numbers, the gorillas, chimpanzees, orang-utang, etc., that we know to-day. Since man's origin the elimination of most of these has increased his isolation. These forms, we are told, were so highly developed in instinctual behaviour (which can often so uncannily mimic intelligence) that only a metamorphosis could lead to further real advance. This must be achieved between two individuals because it is ' a critical transformation, a mutation from zero to everything '. In one we still have only an extremely high degree of animal consciousness ; in the next by a mighty leap consciousness has achieved *self-consciousness*, *reflection*, and the noosphere is born. So man came silently into the world and is spread over the great land mass of Africa and Asia when first we meet him. Science therefore can say nothing for or against strict monogenism—the theory of the origin of the whole human race from a single pair—but it does undoubtedly favour monophyletism or origin from a common genetic stock.

Looking back from our position on the tree of life the author points to that aspect which like Ariadne's thread runs through the whole giving it greater coherence and meaning : it is development of the *within*, which in animals is shown by *cerebralisation*. Diffuse consciousness of the lower forms gives way to the revolutionary development of a single centre of control, the brain, which at each subsequent level of the tree assumes a greater degree of complexity and co-ordination through the progressive expansion of the cerebrum. This is particularly so among the mammals and in these in turn the primates, and particularly the anthropoids, develop it prodigiously so that the step to man with its tremendous psychic gap is associated with the minimum of *anatomical* change. Other groups went aside from the main trend and specialized on a side line, as, for example, the horses developing their limbs for speed and the bats developing theirs for flight. But the

primates specialized along the principal axis of development as shown by Ariadne's thread—they enlarged their brains and, in man, they came to possess the earth. This thread ' provides a direction, and by its consequences *it proves that evolution has a direction* '. It places man, no longer at the centre of a static universe but on the summit of the tree of life, ' the axis and the leading shoot of evolution '.

Like any other new ' phylum ' man tends to ramify, but the cohesion born of thought holds together the nascent branches, so that like the veins of a leaf rather than a verticil of branches they are contained by the webbing of thought, their psychic sheath. Thus man is continually being enriched from within by the very force that would have split other phyla in a comparable period into innumerable species. All through the palaeolithic period the new ' phylum ' was free to spread ; could man have done so indefinitely the outcome would have been different. But by the beginning of the neolithic age he has fully occupied the earth and can freely diffuse no longer. Instead of following his animals and culling the fruits of the earth he must propagate and conserve them on the spot. And so begins an intense phase of ' involution ' with its attendant psychic, social and political stresses which have been rising to our modern crescendo. Man is socializing himself (and it is quite characteristic of Père de Chardin's thought that man's social and socializing activity is within the scope of biology). Social, political and cultural unions have been continually arising, transcending and tending to obliterate the boundaries of merely biological race. Even when individuals, and especially nations, succumbed to egotism and sought for themselves a fuller living at the expense of and apart from the common surge of mankind, the ineluctable unity of the race has won, the vanquished have in turn moulded the conqueror and the simple eliminations of the pre-human struggle for existence have been very rare. Socialization, the author claims, is a property of a mature phylum though he is forced to admit that the most obvious examples below man are freakish in appearance and, in last analysis, are not phyletic but confined to the progeny of one mother, as in the beehive and the ant-hill. In man it is producing such a degree of physical communion and economic interdependence among peoples that they can no longer develop save by interpenetration of one another.

So socialization and the advance of science and technology is unleashing a tremendous upsurge of unused powers ; technical advances enable each one to be virtually present almost simultaneously throughout the known world ; standards, and their consequent material demands have been rising steeply especially in the West through which (including the Mediterranean area) the axis of progress has swept for the last 6,000 years. The consequent 'planetisation' of consciousness and its unity or rather unanimity, the growing all-embracing exigencies and

complex interdependence of the new humanity resembles nothing more than a new giant organism preparing for birth. The involution begun in the neolithic age is about to culminate, through a new change of state, in the hyper-personal.

But man is in crisis : modern malaise and his new realization of the vastness of space-time and his own apparent isolation in it appals him. If he is not to falter he must be assured of success, of the certainty of fulfilment ; as a rational being he cannot choose a road that he knows to be blocked. Endowed with thought, whose nature is to discern infinite horizons ahead, he can only move in the hope of achieving a supreme consummation. He must seek an inexhaustible future. Infallibly —though not absolutely necessarily—he must reach his goal or the whole mighty evolutionary process fails in him and is unintelligible. This goal cannot be on earth nor even in space-time or it will inevitably end with them. Nor can it be an impersonal goal : each conscious centre must seek and be assured of conscious survival.

So man has rational grounds for an act of (natural) faith in his survival, which allows him to bend to his task and take his place in the convergent mass of ' centres '. The collectivity towards which we saw him ' involuting ' cannot be an impersonal All, but a union of consciousnesses, each of which in communicating itself (to Omega and the others focussed on Omega) does not lose itself but is perfected and uplifted in the higher unanimity of the Super-personal. But conscious centres tend to resist ' compression ', they can only be *drawn* together under the power of a great attractive force, and this force is love. We must accept, he says—and science must extend its scope to include—the reality of some *source* and *object* of love ' at the summit of the world above our head ', under whose influence the ' grains of thought ' focus themselves. But if centres at present existing are to achieve their destiny this supremely lovable and loving focus, which is necessarily personal, must be already supremely present. And this focus, this centre of centres, is Omega point. So fully does Père Teilhard find this picture in consonance with the God of Christian Revelation and the whole Christian phenomenon that he confesses he should never have dared to conceive it if he had not already in his consciousness as a believer found its *living reality.*

* * *

Almost every page of this work could call for comment : a résumé, even as apparently full as we have given, necessarily leaves a great deal unsaid. We have already mentioned the vague mould of his thought. This is set in a matrix which is shot through and through with extreme analogy. Unless we bear this in view we shall constantly push the

thought further than was intended ; but even when due allowance is made for it we are frequently jolted by the mode of expression. Thus the *within* is glossed by ' centreity ', freedom, love and expressly equiparated to consciousness, which in the very movement of the curve is shown to be present from crude matter up to, and not excluding, Omega point. Note also his reference to the ' elemental freedoms ' of atoms and molecules, the ' primordial dust of consciousness '. Further, *love* in man is but the hominised version of the attraction that enabled atoms to form molecules. And ' are not the artificial, the moral, and the juridical simply the hominised versions of the natural, the physical and the organic ? ' Yes, of course, in the sense that love and moral and juridical values are based on man's nature just as, analogously, the chemical, physical and organic properties are based on the nature of the element or natural compound. However a much more basic question must be solved before we can rationally discuss the thought in greater detail.

Père Teilhard claims that his work is science which he equiparates practically with phenomenology or the systematic presentation of phenomena which succeed one another, without claiming any relationships of cause and effect between them. No matter how metaphysical it may appear he claims that on closer inspection it will be seen to be only *hyperphysics* (physics in his extended sense is natural science as distinct from metaphysics). We could perhaps gloss this word as a *theoretical biology* and as such it would be legitimate science, though far from being merely phenomenological. But more than once we are presented with arguments that are of the very essence and core of metaphysics, as when he says ' the more man becomes man the less will he be prepared to move except towards that which is interminably and indestructibly new. Some absolute is implied in the very play of his operative activity'. Again when he argues to a personal conscious 'Centre of centres' at Omega point he is not being scientific in any legitimate modern use of the word, he is philosophizing. True, the modern philosopher's *point de départ* will be observation corrected by science, scientific observation. But when he raises his superstructure on this he enters the realm of metaphysics. Teilhard has been so long dealing in strictly scientific terms, accepting them on the basic authorization that only metaphysics can give that one gets the impression that he has unconsciously narrowed the gap between the two orders to the point where insensibly the metaphysical validity is attached to the scientific concept which now seems to stand in its own right. Teilhard crosses and recrosses the frontier with the ease of one who is unaware of its existence. But he is speaking to scientists most of whom likewise philosophize while anathematizing metaphysics ; he is not posing : he genuinely begins speaking their language, because it is his own ; but he manifestly

hopes to win them, through it, to the whole vision which is his. But this initial inconsistency should not deter us from seeking and appraising what is of worth in that vision, whether it is garbed in the language of science, of philosophy, or religion.

And so to the *within* of things. There is a sense in which this concept is perfectly valid ; but it is a metaphysical sense. Some at least of the analogies of Père de Chardin may have been largely figures of speech or analogies of attribution as when we say that a climate, food, exercise or even a complexion is healthy. Here health is properly only in the person in whom the other analogues are either the cause or the sign of health, the primary analogue. But there is an analogy which is of fundamental importance in metaphysics. It arises from the fact that in reality, while things are not perfectly the same nevertheless they are not entirely different. This imperfect similarity can be expressed as a proportion, or proportionality. Thus we can say that there is something in the atom, its *within*, which is to our consciousness as the being of the atom is to our being. (This sort of analogy may seem strange or even trivial at first sight. But without it we could make no positive statements about the nature of God.) So far so good : but one is dismayed when one sees him quoting with relish (though only in a footnote) J. B. S. Haldane's panpsychical materialist claim that if the scientific viewpoint is correct we shall find life and mind at least in rudimentary forms all through the universe. Teilhard thinks metaphysicians should rejoice at this. But metaphysicians are painfully aware that panpsychical theories of this materialistic type are but a bankrupt effort to explain the striking fact of thought without admitting the bogey of a spiritual soul or else being reduced to the patent absurdities of mechanism or behaviourism, no matter how titivated in a modern scientific dress. The former *explains* thought as basically a mere pattern, however sublimated, of the mechanical motions of matter ; the latter reduces it to the muscular modifications that accompany the physical movements of speech, as spoken, heard or read. As Teilhard pleads so eloquently for the spiritual soul we shall take his *within* in the sense of a metaphysical analogy and ignore as a momentary aberration his appeal to Haldane.

This is an appropriate place to note the apparent contradiction in his *solution* of the problem of spiritual energy whereby he assumes that all energy is physical and then assigns it two components, the 'radial' and 'tangential'. It would seem that this could hold for animals, taking 'spiritual' analogously as the Schoolmen would. But in man—and Père Teilhard's position is both a plea and an attempt to bring man into the scientific scheme—it amounts to a *denial* of the problem. In man, it must be emphasized, we have *experience* of an energy, the energy of thought and volition which is utterly and intrinsically irreducible to physical energy, however extrinsically it may depend

on it as on a condition. On the author's own showing this radial in man will escape from the tangential in death, as ' souls break away, carrying upward their incommunicable load of consciousness ' while at the animal's death its radial is reabsorbed in the tangential becoming thereby a prey to entropy. Again, in view of his clear stand on the spirituality of thought and of the soul (reinforced by the above quotation) we must take his predication of radial in their regard as simply analogous.

But there is so much one wants to praise that it is distasteful to have to criticize or to appear, condescendingly, to correct. His description of the rise of thought is pure poetry, and Teilhard shows that he is clear about the abyssal nature of the leap involved—yet even here the unfortunate use of the terms ' threshold ' and ' change of state ' might blur this awareness, implying as they do if taken strictly, a mere change of something pre-existing as when a larva pupates or water becomes ice or steam. And the whole discussion of the Tree of Life, which, with the intuition born of life-long contemplation, he causes to grow and form before our enchanted view in all its beauty and unity and majesty, is a sheer joy to read. This section also underlines by the very vigour and vitality of its movement the claims of finality to a prominent place in any solid theory of biology. It is a portent and a sign of things to come that this finalism has been listened to with respect, if not yet with general acceptance. But like the whole evolutionary process which he evokes with such power, the axis of Teilhard's thought, in this respect at least, points towards the future.

What of the thorough-goingness of his evolutionism ? With the enthusiasm of a reformer he exaggerates its extra-biological validity. That it has invaded all realms of life and often with valuable results is undeniable ; that it has *conquered* all is rhetoric. In particular when he makes this claim, unqualified, for the history of religions, Schmidt and the Vienna School will justly rebel. But within the confines of biology it is quite legitimate (at most excepting Omega point, which in any case is not biology). *Granted* that Divine Wisdom decided on an evolutionary order of creation—with all the evidence accumulating it would be difficult to deny it ; and who does not see, if he wants to see, how much more clearly it impresses the Majesty of Creation on our minds ?—in this evolutionary hypothesis the scientist as such can but chronicle the succession of related forms, gaining thereby on his own plane a great knowledge, a full intuition. But as a scientist the questions the philosophers pose are outside his scope. The latter may posit special interventions, in the origin of life and especially in that of the human soul (and *each* human soul). But for the scientist there can be but a series which is manifestly non-living at one end, dazzlingly alive towards the other : he may not even be able to say which term of the series begins to live. In fact some Scholastics claiming that the modern

dichotomy of *matter* v. *life* is an illegitimately induced shift from the 'classical' dichotomy of the Schools, *matter* v. *spirit*, would deny the need of any special intervention in the origin of life. Be that as it may, these special interventions wherever necessary cannot be anything extrinsic added on to the creative decree. This decree, because eternal, is ever present, simple and indivisible in itself, and the phenomenal series and any 'interventions' are but the working out in time and space of a timeless, extraspatial, and ever-present fiat.

Omega point crowns and closes this evolutionary process, this 'movement of synthesis'. This is by far the most difficult concept of the author, partly because in its formulation he seems to shift his ground. At first we are told that Omega point is the convergence of centres on a focus, a Centre of centres. Then we are fairly warned in a footnote that the term will be thenceforth restricted to this focus, this Centre of centres. In this case it is obviously God, though presumably as known by the light of human reason. Later he identifies this with the God known in revelation. Thus far we can define Omega point as God attracting and drawing all souls, all conscious centres, to Himself; and the state of aggregation produced by this attractive power can in a broad sense be called Omega point. But this aggregation has two facets—the socio-politico-religious unity in process of development here below, and its supernatural aspect which is but the beginning (embryonic, yet of the same essence) of the eternal aggregation in the City of God of all those souls who freely respond to the attraction of Omega. This obviously suggests the Mystical Body of Christ and interpreters have been quick to suggest it.

But the élan with which Père Teilhard argues to Omega point carries him along, and us with him, in such a way that we do not at first see the immensity of the jump involved. This portion could be interpreted as an effort to put the argument for God's existence based on final causes in a form that will not repel the scientist. It may be in the same spirit that he refrains from speaking of God's creative activity. He speaks only of a Prime Mover ahead, therefore one moving finally not efficiently. As he states it the argument may be conceded some cogency but it does not conclude with the rigour of its strictly metaphysical form. But to conclude by reason to a Divine Cause, a Person, and then quietly assume as he does the main data of Christian Revelation, placing Christ at the heart of humanity in its ascent to God is to run the dire peril of making the supernatural the *connatural* term of the evolutionary series. Grace, the supernatural life of man redeemed, as it is in some profound way a sharing in the life of God Himself can not be, cannot even appear to, be the culmination of any natural process: it cannot be in any strict sense required or demanded by any created nature, even angelic. True Christ *did* in fact by His

Incarnation undertake the headship of this supernatural entity by the most stupendous condescension of all time. To refer to this wondrous event as a ' prodigious biological operation ' while true as to its term is more than unhappy : it neglects the utter transcendence of the operation and tends to strengthen the unfortunate impression that he regards the supernatural as the last and greatest of many terms in a single series. Teilhard *never* expressly says so ; in fact he obviously awoke to the danger after his book was complete and expressly said the opposite in a footnote. In effect this note says that at the summit of the world, in line with Omega point but still more elevated than it, is 'something ' which in the text he almost instantly glosses as ' another and Supreme Someone ', surely the God of Revelation. So we must finally correct our idea of Omega point taking it as that perfecting, that 'planetising' of the human species to which God by a supremely free choice imparts the supernatural, the participation of His own Divine Life. By means of this mankind forms ever more and more in and through Christ a supernatural organism, the Mystical Body of Christ.

Thus corrected, as Teilhard did though perhaps not vigorously enough, we have the inspiring vision of God's free creative activity preparing from all eternity the seed-bed to receive the seed of the divine life through no exigence or merit of its own but by a ' supreme condescension '. But what of the human aspect of this supernatural reality, the earthly state of conscious and voluntary socialization with its great increase in the fulness of living, of knowledge, of technical power, and so, in a sense, of being? This is a reasonable hypothesis in view of present trends. And the ' hominisation ' it involves will readily be granted because in spite of wars and injustices, even in the recent past, it is hardly too optimistic to hold that there is a continual increase in the acceptance of truly human values. The lot of the average man to-day, at least in the West, is far higher, his worth and dignity safe-guarded better than at any known period of the past. This is not surprising if we remember the Divine leaven continually at work beneath the surface ; and one has little sympathy for the criticism that man's cultural and moral rise, his ' hominisation,' has not been uniform : the ups and downs of this curve would be inconspicuous on the ' planetary ' or astronomical time-scale postulated. But that that complexification should issue in a new *human* super-person is something that most of us will accept, if at all, only in a very analogous sense of great unanimity in extreme complexity of numbers and interdependence.

Teilhard's work has been criticized for its skimpy treatment of the question of evil. When he touches the question of *moral* evil—and then only fleetingly—he postulates its true kernel, the free refusal by particular ' centres ' of the Centre of centres, culminating in the withdrawal of all such centres to a counter-focus, an antagonistic pole, at the end of

the world. This certainly seems to err by *defect.* Earlier in the work he hints at the possibility of suspecting some primordial aberration in view of the more than expected amount of evil in the world. But this is merely an *obiter dictum* and could hardly mean more than that a naturalist with his knowledge of nature is not surprised when revelation teaches original sin.

We need only mention the word pantheism to exclude it—the author excludes it vigorously and logically and yet, especially before the publication of his works, the word was linked with his name. It is easy to see how some of his phrases, often supercharged with analogy, when remembered or read out of their context could easily give colour to the charge. Note his reference to mankind as 'a mass of hominised substance'. He also speaks of man as knowing 'that he is at one with and responsible to an evolutionary all' and 'that a universal will to live converges and is hominised in him'.

* * *

The extraordinary success of this work is significant. It may partly be due to the adventitious interest of the circumstances of its delayed publication. Even more is it undoubtedly due to that highly analogous mould already commented upon which allows widely differing schools of thought to view it each in its own light. But allowing for all this there is a very solid residuum which can only be due to the answer it offers or tries to give to the perplexity of the times. Rank materialism was eclipsed with the débâcle of positivist progress in two world wars and the post-positivist world still needs and is beginning to want a set of values to ease its Angst, its malaise of soul, which Teilhard recognized. The expected rebound would seem to be towards more human values, particularly, in this context, towards a richer and more humanist science. To us Teilhard's work needs correction or at least clarification and for this he himself humbly appealed. But to the perplexed world he offers a well-grounded optimism, a sane belief in continuing progress all the more effective because directly in line with the natural reaction of the human spirit against determinism and defeatism and towards a clearer realization of the richness and fulness of its own destiny. This reaction still inarticulate seems to be steadily gaining ground : and at this opportune moment in human development the world can accept the priest in the person of an eminent man of science.

Taboo, Ritual and Religion

by E. F. O'DOHERTY

TABOO is a Polynesian word for a phenomenon which is almost universal. A taboo is a prohibition which depends for its enforcement on horror, which itself is a mixture of fear, self-loathing, dread of the unknown, revulsion, desire for punishment, and perhaps other factors. Violation of the taboo is so dreadful that no reason need be given for the taboo itself or for the punishment which follows its violation. Taboo operates at an emotional level so that the consequences of violation are not due to the culprit's being observed, charged, found guilty and punished, as it were from without, but rather the evil result is intrinsic to the act of violation itself. Taboo because of its universality, belongs to a deep level of the psyche, and it can take many forms. Very often in primitive communities one finds a taboo on certain foods either for the community as a whole, or for some section of it. Certain persons may be taboo—the king or priest—or the members of the group may be forbidden to marry within their own group, or to marry outside their own group. The universal incest taboo indicates how deeply this type of taboo can reach into the human psyche. Certain objects such as clothing, weapons, tools, may be taboo to certain people, and their use allowed only to a privileged group.

One can parallel these taboo phenomena to some extent in our own society, in minor and sometimes amusing ways. One can also find behaviour parallels in the practice of religion. A little careful observation of people around one will reveal interesting if sometimes trivial taboos. Thus for example consider snails as an item of diet in our culture. You will find traces of an emotional revulsion against the very idea. Again compare the reaction of a young boy with many adults' reaction on touching a frog. The young boy has not yet learnt the taboo, and so feels no sense of revulsion or horror. Horseflesh is taboo meat in this country. Elderberries are taboo in many parts of rural Ireland. Among actions, I should think that in our society there is a taboo on a girl's whistling in the street, and of course smoking in the street was taboo until comparatively recently. We also operate taboos on words : these taboo words vary from one generation to another. Many taboo words from Victorian times are now matters of everyday speech. Certain subjects are taboo in our society. The Crown perhaps, or more obviously, the Coronation Stone,

is taboo in Britain. These examples are not given as ' pure ' taboos but as areas where a more primitive, pre-rational type of thinking survives intermingled with other, more sophisticated elements.

Taboos are so widespread that it is reasonable to suppose that some very fundamental psychological process is at work. Taboo involves two things : the object or person who is taboo is at once sacred and dangerous. Because the thing or person is sacred, it is placed apart, and because it is dangerous it becomes attractive. Inevitably this generates an ambivalent attitude in the mind of the onlooker. More specifically, desire and aversion arise together in respect of the same object. Desire and aversion can lead at one and the same time to reverence and dread. So you find a deep-seated conflict : on the one hand the movement to grasp or attain the object, because it is sacred and therefore desirable, and at the same time a deep-seated fear of the object and a reluctance to have anything to do with it because it is dangerous. The result is a conflict of motives : on the one hand admiration and at the same time fear. This conflict occurs below the level of rational process, with the result that anxiety is generated. The function of this anxiety is the maintenance of social or public order. One can see modified forms of this taboo mechanism in, for example, the respect one has for a policeman or for a priest, or for the bus or cinema queue. The relation between social control and taboo is roughly something like this : if you can create a thing or symbol which is so sacred as to need no explanation, and which produces horror at its violation, then you have a sufficient mechanism for the maintenance of a stable social organization. The divine right of kings theory was perhaps a survival of a taboo : the sacredness of kingship. Thus there were many revolutions in history, in which a king was overthrown, but not the monarchy itself. It took the French Revolution to overthrow at once the king, the monarchy, and the taboo.

When one looks more closely at taboos one finds that they are in origin irrational—that is to say there is no rational justification for example for a taboo on meat, or, on miscegenation, or on certain words. Nevertheless it is so.

Ritual is standardized overt behaviour of a non-logical sort. Its function is either to purge the guilt incurred in the violation of taboo, or to obtain favours from the deity, for example in fertility rites at the spring sowing. The rite performed is not the result of reflective thinking, nor is it capable of itself of producing the desired result. It is not just repetitive stereotyped behaviour. For example, polishing buttons in the army is not ritualistic behaviour. But saying ' Cheers ' before a drink is. An elaborate stereotyped technological piece of behaviour such as the checking of an aircraft before take-off is not ritual. To be a piece of ritual, the behaviour must be socially imposed, it must satisfy

emotional needs, *it must not of itself in the natural order be capable of achieving its intended result*, and it must involve a sense of control of unknown factors, where the real cause cannot be manipulated. Taboo incurred is cleansed by ritual, anxiety is allayed and security re-achieved. Thus taboo and ritual are complementary, for whereas the function of taboo is to generate anxiety, that of ritual is to produce a feeling of security.

The application of psychoanalytic concepts to anthropological phenomena, particularly in cultural anthropology, has now a history of perhaps fifty years behind it. The application of analytic concepts in this field was made by Freud himself in a series of works, *Totem and Taboo*, *The Future of an Illusion* and *Moses and Monotheism*. In his *Obsessive Acts and Religious Practices* he put forward the theory that religious practice and the compulsive repetitive behaviour of the neurotic were essentially the same phenomenon, and this concept he retained all his life. He was not an anthropologist, nor was he a social psychologist, but it is possible that he has given us here a suggestion, a partial insight into a truth which might well repay careful study by the theologian, the liturgist, and the moralist.

As Freud saw it, the study of primitive cultures, particularly the study of the taboo phenomenon and of ritual performances, threw considerable light on the nature and origins of religion itself, which he assumed was a ' natural ' phenomenon to be accounted for in psychological terms, and in the long run to be explained away as an ' illusion '. Freud used the word ' primitive ' in a sense of his own, and he used it consistently in this sense. He also used the word ' natural ' consistently, and in a sense of his own.

According to Freud, the potential reactions of the unconscious are ' natural ' to the child. When Freud says that something is natural to a child he means that it is a kind of primitive innate response which the child cannot help. Aggression therefore in Freud's sense is ' natural ' to the child. Freud equates the primitive with the natural, but not in the sense of the moral theologian, to whom it means the moral good. The natural primitive impulses of the child spring from the Id. The Id, the unconscious part of us, is unadapted to civilized life, just as the primitive noble savage in Freud's (or Rousseau's) conception, is unadapted to life in society. So the Id has to be shaped or moulded—that means in practice that the primitive material, the potential reactions of the Id, must be banned for two reasons: first, it is incompatible with the state of man living in society (a notion that Freud perhaps learned from Darwinian evolutionary theory), so that the cravings of the Id motivated by the pleasure-pain principle are not suitable to civilized life but must become modified in order to become socially acceptable. This process of moulding or banning the Id is one of the sources of religion. Secondly, the social

group seeks to maintain itself as a group. For this reason the individualistic reactions of the primitive Id have to be socialized and this socialization of the individualistic reactions is one of the sources of ethics. In addition to this the impulses from the Id, according to analytic theory, generate anxiety. And this they do whether they are released or curbed. Anxiety is also generated by the experience of aggression from without.

In order to cope with the anxieties thus generated, man creates for himself certain defences. These defences begin in childhood and last and grow with the growth of the individual. Freud thought that religion had its origin in man's helplessness before his own instinctive fears within and the forces of nature without. (St. Paul also talks of fears within and dangers without.) Freud thought that religion belongs to an early stage of human development before man had learned to control his own internal fears and impulses and the forces of nature outside him. The affective states generated by fears that well up from within and that are provoked by the dangers without are coped with by the production of counter-affects. What this means is that we produce another set of emotions to cope with our fears, instead of coping with them rationally. The function of these counter-affects is to suppress and control the fear-producing elements which man finds he cannot cope with rationally.

At this stage according to Freud, an illusion is developed by man, which is grounded in his own individual experiences as a child. As a child when he experienced danger, or uncontrollable fears, or things he could not understand, he went to his father as a source of strength and comfort. He also experienced his father and his mother as sources of authority and of love and protection. The child discovers he can win the love of his father by a show of affection. He also discovers that he can win affection by obeying the commands of his parents. He knows by experience that he will be rewarded if he is good and punished if he is not good. In Freud's view, 'religion' derives from the fact that the adult regresses to his infantile experience and affective life when he comes up against danger or threats that he cannot cope with. Thus the adult approaches his deity for the same things for which the child approached his father. Freud thought that essentially religion was nothing but that, but he went further. Not only was religion a re-using of infantile patterns of behaviour, but it was also a neurosis. The behaviour of the child in seeking from his father relief from anxiety, or defence against fears, is not neurotic. It is a natural primitive response and, because it is 'natural', it is as it were 'right' for the child. But a child's behaviour is not 'natural' to an adult and if the adult behaves in the child's way, his behaviour is regressive and therefore neurotic. Freud thought therefore two things happened with the adult: in

religion he ran for protection to God, who according to Freud is an illusion which we ourselves have created, and in addition the adult tries to placate his god, and to obey what he thinks are his deity's commands. Underlying this theory of Freud's is a fundamental principle of Freudian thought, which is not made explicit in Freud's own writings, but is tacitly assumed both by him and by many of his followers. We owe its explicit formulation to Zilboorg. The principle can be put like this : where two behaviour patterns are observed to exhibit the same constituents or are reducible to the same component elements they are due to the same psychological mechanisms. (Fromm points out that Freud himself saw the invalidity of this sort of reasoning, but I think it is true that in spite of this he fell into precisely this fallacy.) Zilboorg calls it the fallacy of psycho-mechanistic parallelism. In a different terminology, we could put it this way : Freud thought that if he observed similar or parallel mental processes manifested in similar or parallel patterns of behaviour, therefore these two processes and two patterns of behaviour were essentially identical. This identification of process in different behavioural manifestations can of course be valuable. Thus it is a help to see the dream and the schizophrenic monologue as isomorphic processes, or to identify the same hysterical processes in anorexia, glove paralyses, psychogenic blindness, and the wounds of some stigmatists.

Freud pointed out that one can observe certain parallels between the behaviour of the child, the neurotic, and the religious person. He also believed he had shown that the child's affective factors generating other counter-affects were paralleled in the so-called religious person who generates his own god and then worships him. In addition Freud thought that he had discovered certain parallels between the behaviour of neurotic people and the behaviour of religious people.

These parallels, briefly, were : (a) a sense of guilt is common to both, (b) a sense of dependence is common to both, (c) repetitive stereotyped compulsive pieces of behaviour are common to both.

He drew two conclusions : one, that religion could be explained by the adult's regression to the child's affective states, and second, that the practices of religion were neurotic patterns of behaviour because some of these practices could be paralleled by certain behaviour patterns of neurotic people. Thus a neurotic person will carry out a piece of behaviour in great detail and with great regularity in a repetitive obsessional way and will feel uncomfortable if he does not go through with the action in the same set pattern time and time again. He thought this ritualistic performance of the neurotic individual was the same as the repetitive behaviour of a religious person saying his prayers, for example, or carrying out a rite of religion. And both the neurotic behaviour and the religious behaviour seemed to him to be essentially identical

with the ritualistic performances related to taboos, which characterized ' primitive ' people, whether children or aboriginal Australians. Again religion imposes certain prohibitions on its members and declares certain things, persons, or objects to be sacred, and thus set apart, rendered untouchable, or at any rate separated from the vulgar herd. This process or mechanism resembled in Freud's mind, the taboo mechanism in primitive cultures. Thus we can add ritual and taboo to the initial infantile neurotic regression in which religion according to Freud had its source.

We might perhaps put this more simply by considering for a moment the notion of guilt. For Freud, as for many psychologists and psycho-analysts, guilt is used in a rather special sense—a sense in which apparently it refers always to neurotic guilt, or more accurately, the sense in which guilt is always neurotic. For the Catholic, especially for the Catholic theologian, this of course is not so. The Catholic psychologist distinguishes two kinds of guilt ; on the one hand neurotic guilt, and on the other rational guilt. Neurotic guilt is a complex state of the emotions in which one can distinguish fear, dread, self-loathing, anxiety, desire, sadness, sorrow, and perhaps a tinge of despair. Rational guilt, on the other hand, is the judgment one makes about oneself, in full consciousness, that one did something voluntarily, knowing that it was wrong. This sort of judgment can be and ideally should be devoid of the emotions connected with neurotic guilt. In practice, however, because of the complexity of human nature, and because of the fact that our behaviour is rarely if ever entirely rational, the normal state of affairs for most people is a judgment of rational guilt, plus a carryover of some of the elements of ' neurotic ' guilt, in the form of emotional overtones, in almost infinitely varying degrees of intensity.

On the assumption however that all guilt is neurotic, Freud thought that religion must be considered as a means of getting rid of neurotic guilt, on the one hand by placating ' god '—the projected father image—and on the other hand by ritual cleansing of the guilt incurred by violation of taboo. Our problem here is to see how the processes or mechanisms of taboo and ritual resemble—if they resemble—the processes and practices of true religion, and how they differ—if indeed they do differ—from the practices and processes of true religion.

There is no reason to suppose that all that analytic theory has revealed about the genesis of religion is false. Nevertheless it must be said that some of the conclusions arrived at do not follow from the alleged evidence. If one begins with atheism, of course, no religion is either possible or healthy. But equally clearly if one accepts the possibility of a rational proof of God's existence, the allegation that He is an illusion will be rejected. It is worth noting in this regard that Freud's atheism was

antecedent to his analytic theories, and not a consequence of them. He has however helped us to gain a valuable insight into the child's and the adolescent's attitude to God, and to understand a great deal more about atheism than was possible half-a-century ago. In a similar way, an understanding of ritual and taboo may help us a great deal in understanding many of the phenomena of religion which at first glance may appear unnecessary, incidental, or accidental. Thus, we may ask why do we have ritual in the church ? why sacraments ? why such ceremonies as the ' churching ' of women after childbirth ?

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The study of social psychology, like that of analytic theory, has also a history of more than half a century behind it, and again like analytic theory, it can be a valuable asset to the theologian studying the nature of the Church. Unlike analytic theory, however, it is only in recent years that social psychology has achieved anything like the status of a science. One of the flaws in Freudian theory was the tacit assumption that one could understand both the individual and society through a study of ' individual ' psychology. Social psychology is interested in the functional aspect of the group considered precisely as a group, and not as a collection of individuals. Any form of conduct which occurs in the group, is determined by the group, and is not found outside the group, belongs to the realm of social psychology. There is a sense in which everything one does, except idiosyncratic processes and simple responses, will be socially determined, so that it is difficult sometimes to draw the line between individual and social psychology. Thus a particular work of art is certainly the product of one individual. But the critic or art historian can determine in the individual work certain elements which place it as the work of a particular region, period, or school. These elements are part of a social operation, and not the work of one individual *per se.* Again, the behaviour of an individual in danger, or faced with a threat of war, or in seeking recreation in leisured moments, will be his own individual choice, perhaps, but precisely what he does may be due to the preferred persistent tendencies of the group. The Church is a *coetus hominum*, a group of men. Whatever belongs to the psychological nature of a group as such may be expected to hold therefore of the group which is the Church (excluding such elements, if there are any, which are incompatible with her Divine origin, but including all that is ' natural ' to the group, in the theologian's meaning of natural.) Moreover just as other ' natural ' elements (water, oil, salt) have been taken over by her Divine Founder, and elevated to an efficacy and a function which they could not have had of their own nature, so one might expect to find that the

'natural' elements of society have likewise been taken over and elevated in a similar or analogous way. Thus, in every society one can discern hierarchical structure and differentiation of function. These in turn are found in the Church, in a two-fold way. On the one hand, her essential structure (Pope, bishops, and other orders) is of Divine origin, the necessary hierarchical structure of any organization of men being transmuted into something far higher, while there still remain other structures and differentiations (e.g. sub-groups within the Church, each with its own organization) of human origin.

Ritual and taboo are at once phenomena of psychology, social psychology, and cultural anthropology. They have not so far received the attention they deserve from the theologian. In what follows it will be contended that these 'natural' elements of human conduct so far from proving the 'natural' origin of religion, can throw considerable light on the actuality of the Church divinely constituted 'for us and for our salvation'.

The argument of the psychologist and the cultural anthropologist may now be put in fairly simple terms : We generate our god through projecting our infantile father-image. We need our god because our earthly father has failed us. We have become anxious through violation of taboo (which we think of as moral fault) and so we need a cleansing mechanism to rid ourselves of our intolerable sense of guilt.

This argument is applied to religion in the following form : our religion is only one among many. It involves certain taboos such as food laws(meat on a Friday, fasting regulations) or sexual prohibitions. Objects are declared sacred, so the faithful must not touch a chalice. It involves ritualistic performances : such as the rite of the Holy Sacrifice, the rites of administration of the sacraments, repetitive prayers such as the Rosary. Thus morals become, as with Russell, simply the violation of primitive taboos. And the Mass and the Sacraments become irrational devices for cleansing us of our primitive anxieties generated by our violation of our primitive taboos. Thus the whole of religion becomes a pre-rational, or sub-rational operation, and together with the antecedent wiping out of God, becomes something meaningless and unworthy of adult manhood. This is the doctrine which many of our people and those of other religions are made to imbibe at the hands of many university teachers and popular authors. What is to be said of it ?

Let me try to state some preliminary points first. It is assumed by the exponents of this line of teaching that there is nothing in man, in mature man, that is not sensory or emotional in character. Thus the fact that rational processes of thought differ in kind from those of the emotions and the senses is ignored or denied by those who hold the theory I am examining. But if there are no processes in man other than

irrational ones, what is the point of trying to bring a sick mind from a condition in which it is at the mercy of irrational forces into a condition wherein reason can control these irrational forces ? Yet this is precisely what a deep analysis is aimed at producing, in whatsoever language this idea may be expressed. It is hardly likely that the process of rehabilitation in analysis is simply the substituting of one set of emotional and irrational factors for another. In other words, the practice of analysis belies its theoretical formulation. Again, it is assumed that where two processes parallel each other, they are the same process. This is the fallacy already referred to under the title of psycho-mechanistic parallelism. The *facts* here are that the processes of taboo and of moral prohibition parallel each other in some respects. The *conclusion* is that they are therefore the same process. As well might one argue that the processes of science and magic parallel each other in some respects, and are therefore the same thing. Evans-Prichard has shown in his classic *Witchcraft among the Azande* that the thought processes of those who practise magic and of those who practise science are parallel. Both involve the concept of cause and effect, both involve the logical process of argument from consequences, both involve consistence and coherence, et cetera. But if the argument from parallelism of process holds in the one instance it should hold also in the other, viz., that magic and science are the same thing. But no one would draw this conclusion, I think.

Now if it is agreed that rational processes are not the same as sensory or emotional processes (and if there is any doubt about this, the experimental evidence of the Wurzburg group can be appealed to), and that parallelism of psychological process does not establish identity of content, we can take the next step.

The problem of the existence of God is not a problem in psychology or in cultural anthropology, but in metaphysics. Accepting that God exists, and that He can be shown to exist, can one say that He could not if he so wished communicate with man : that is that He could not have made a revelation to man concerning truths which man could not have known otherwise ? or even concerning truths which he could have come to know through natural means ? This type of question is familiar to the theologian who deals with the *fontes revelationis*, and to the scripture scholar in connection with exegetical problems. The answer, on the plane of man's cognitive processes, has long been familiar. Almighty God could and did communicate with man. He could have done so through sensory channels (Our Divine Lord speaking and preaching) or through the imagination (visions, dreams, etc.), or directly to the intelligence (the prophets, perhaps, or St John). Assuming that such a revelation was in fact made, it would clearly have been made in accordance with man's capacity to receive, as well as in accordance

with God's will to reveal. A true religion would not have been something out of all proportion to man's capacities, and the exigencies and processes of his psyche. On the cognitive plane there is no real difficulty. We must examine the pre-rational, affective plane.

The assumptions of Freud, and of those who follow him in his thinking about the problems under consideration here, are somewhat as follows : if it can be shown that religion, and *a fortiori* our own religion, is related to man's needs, and takes account at once of his rational and sub-rational processes, or that his sub- or pre-rational processes are still catered for and discernible in it, it is not a true religion. Or to put it in another way, the assumption seems to be that if, *per impossible*, there were such a thing as a true religion, it would have to be something wholly removed from the human condition. On the contrary, our argument here is that if there were a true religion, precisely because it was a matter of Divine revelation *to man*, we should expect to find in it just those elements demanded by our needs and constitution.

It is worth trying to make this even more explicit. Suppose it is true, as it very possibly is true, that we need some defences against our infantile fears which stay with us at an unconscious level into adulthood. Suppose moreover that anxiety-generating taboos are in fact universal, and that some cleansing rituals are necessary to restore our primitive emotional security. Suppose moreover that these primitive taboos involve conceptions, such as the incest taboo, which have far-reaching genetic significance which a primitive mind could not formulate explicitly. Suppose that some form of social control is necessary to the survival of primitive society, and that rational factors and controls are not yet sufficient to ensure this (they are not sufficient even in more advanced societies). All these suppositions may in fact be true. Even if individuals may at different times and places have emancipated themselves from such pre-rational processes, it is quite clear that not all men have yet done so, and clear also that many of the processes of society are non-rational. It is further true that since a society is by definition a society of men, and since man is not wholly rational, human society will not be wholly rational either. A revelation made in these circumstances, and a society, even of divine origin founded in these circumstances, will certainly take account of these phenomena. In terms of analytic theory itself, a revelation, if it is made, will be made in accordance with what man is, viz., a creature who needs defences against his infantile fears, who needs to have his taboos reinforced, who needs pre- or sub-rational controls to ensure his successful achievement of full status as a man, and who needs the pre-rational processes of ritual to cleanse from irrational guilt and anxiety. One will expect therefore to find the successful use of these mechanisms, just as one might have expected

the use of other 'natural' material (speech, singing, bodily posture) elevated and transmuted to a higher significance.

These considerations may become clearer, perhaps, if one considers the nature of marriage. Human beings are motivated by the reproductive instinct, whether it be called libido, sex, or concupiscence. This is not removed, but transmuted into something, not divorced from or unrelated to the primitive pre-rational process, by the fact of the sacrament of matrimony. The pre-rational and rational elements remain, both in motivation and behaviour, but elevated into a channel of grace. In a similar way, the cleansing of water, the soothing of oil, remain while the sacramental efficacy in Baptism and Anointing is achieved by the use of these natural objects, plus ritual (the 'form'). If in addition to ritual and taboo, we are so constituted that we need symbols as well (and this is the contention of both Freudian and Jungian theory, as well perhaps as being the result of the interdependence of sense and intellect), we have all three elements taken care of in the *res et sacramentum*.

It is not the formal function of religion as such to relieve us of our anxieties, but rather to glorify God, to enable us to express our finiteness and dependence, to return thanks for the gift of existence. But if we need some means whereby to relieve ourselves of our primitive infantile pre-rational anxieties, and if we would have had recourse in any case to some ritualistic performances in order to do so, if moreover we must needs confess our conscious rational guilt as well, and make atonement for it, as well as protesting (symbolically in sacrifice) our finiteness, is it surprising that in one and the same act, for instance in the Holy Sacrifice, that we should achieve all these purposes simultaneously. This is really Divine economy.

One can perhaps see something of the transmutation of the pre-rational in some of the ritual observances of the Old Testament. Scripture scholars have little difficulty in accepting the code of Hammurabi as a fore-runner of the decalogue: on the one hand a pre-existing code (similar perhaps to Hammurabi's) may have been 'canonized', or perhaps the natural law itself elevated to divine positive law. Similarly, the taboos (unclean animals, menstruating women) of a primitive tribe become part of the law of Moses. Ritual washing, which is enjoined in many religions, may very well represent our need for expiation through cleansing from the horror incurred by violation of taboo, at a pre-rational level. There would appear to be no difficulty in accepting the fact that Almighty God has in these instances subsumed the pre-rational, through the rational, into the supernatural. Can we see anything similar in the Church?

The fact that one finds in religion, or in the practice of it, phenomena which closely parallel the phenomena of ritual and taboo, does not

establish the identity of the two sets of phenomena. Such an identification would involve the fallacy already referred to as psycho-mechanistic parallelism. But that they should be closely related should not be surprising. One should in fact expect such parallels, since Christ in the words of St John, 'knew what was in man', and made provision for it. The taboo element survives in food laws and fasting laws, in not touching the sacred vessels, in bare-headed women in church, in the crime of sacrilege, the inviolability of sacred persons, and in many other respects. But that is not to say that such laws are *mere* taboos, any more than marriage is mere mating-behaviour. They cater for our primitive needs (the horror element), for our rational needs (for order), and for our supernatural needs (discipline, mortification, reverence). The ritual element survives in all our corporate acts of worship. But more to the point here, it survives in ritual washing (Baptism, washing before Mass, and at the *lavabo*), in purification rites (exorcism, churching), in symbolism (candles, incense, sign of the cross), in oral (repetitive) prayer, etc. Again, that is in no sense to say that these processes are *nothing but* primitive rituals : they also, like taboos, have a multiple significance. They serve to reassure, to relieve emotional pressures, to allay anxiety, at the pre-rational level. At the rational level, they are significant means of symbolic expression of our conscious thought processes, which otherwise might approximate to the 'ineffable', and supernaturally, they are blessings, acts of worship, signs of grace. It is this multiple signification which eludes the non-believing psychologist. But we ourselves should be careful not to repudiate such multiple signification. We do not in fact repudiate it, but we sometimes perhaps shy away from calling it what it is : a combination of pre-rational ritual and taboo mechanisms with rational and supernatural elements. Need one add that of course the supernatural elements are the most important, and that one should progressively try to eliminate all that is merely pre-rational from one's personal involvement : this is part of the purification of intention of the spiritual writers. One has met priests who, on occasion of illness or travelling, found it impossible to say Mass. In the uneasy feeling, the sense of non-rational guilt incurred in such circumstances, may one discern something of the pre-rational guilt feeling of primitive thinking ? In the anxiety experienced by a good Catholic who inadvertently eats meat on a Friday and though knowing that no sin was committed, feels constrained to confess the violation ('you feel better after telling the priest') can one not discern a survival of primitive violation of taboo : the guilt incurred even by total innocence, provided only that the taboo is violated. This was the 'guilt' of Oedipus.

We are very close to the irrational in our minds and lives. There is ever-present to Christians individually a danger that they (as distinct

from the body corporate of the Church) may import into the practice of their religion elements even more closely related to primitive ritual and taboo mechanisms. Our attitude to sacred things may regress from reverence to ambivalent fear and dread. Our method of prayer may take on a compulsive repetitive character analogous to neurotic behaviour. Our use of sacramentals, such as medals, holy pictures, even holy water, may resemble all too closely the use of charms, talismans, and sympathetic magic. One can see extreme examples of such regressions in the ' cults ' which spring up from time to time in underdeveloped areas where Christianity, through lack of adequate instruction, deep roots, or sufficient priests, degenerates into superstitution.

I have been arguing that one should expect to find in Christianity some of the elements of primitive taboo and ritual, but transmuted, as the mating of animals is in marriage, or the efficacy of cleansing by water in Baptism. One may now ask how do ritual and taboo in the purely anthropological sense *differ* from the practices of true religion. The answer is fairly simple. First, taboos are *in themselves* non-rational prohibitions, even if *what* they prohibit (e.g. incest) should be prohibited anyway on rational grounds. Moral precepts are however ' ordinances of reason '. Thus some moral precepts and some taboo prohibitions will co-incide, others not. Second, taboo operates through deep irrational horror and fear, morals through conscious judgment. But again, the two may coincide, e.g. in the horror experienced by some souls at the guilt incurred by sexual sin, or they may diverge, so that the horror and dread may exist without actual sin (' neurotic guilt '), or the consciousness of actual ' real ' guilt may exist without any emotional concomitant. Thirdly, ritual performances in the anthropological sense are incapable of achieving the desired result (e.g. a fertility rite and an abundant harvest) while the sacramental rites of the Church by Divine institution are of themselves efficacious.

Clearly there is a great deal more research to be done in this and allied fields. Analytic theory has already done us the great service of helping us to understand why many people reject the faith. It could do us the further great service, if we study it adequately, of enabling us constantly to purify our faith and our practice of it of all unworthy elements.

Wars and Rumours of War—II

DOES TRADITIONAL CHRISTIAN TEACHING STILL APPLY ?

by JOHN MURRAY

IN the Spring number of *Studies* I analysed the traditional Christian teaching on peace and war as it has been formulated since the time of St Augustine and more especially in terms of great Catholic jurists like Vitoria and Suarez. That analysis may be briefly recapitulated as follows :

(a) The use of force is not in itself wrong. History and experience both show us that it is the last restraint of lawlessness in both civic and international law. Its use should be restricted to the bare minimum necessary and adequate to preserve order. War is a penal operation to be resorted to only to repel illegitimate attack or to secure justice which cannot be secured in any less drastic manner and only for as long as is required to secure that justice.

(b) Only proper authority can have recourse to war. The ruler (or government) attacked or suffering injustice who has to take the momentous decision is more than a victim. The justice of his position makes him also a judge. Were there a higher court of authority or appeal to which the question could be taken, he would be obliged—except in the case of direct attack—to have recourse to it. Since, when Vitoria and Suarez wrote, there was no such higher authority, he was empowered to take that decision because of the justice of his position.

(c) This authority arising out of justice really derives from society, that is the human family, as a whole, from the fact that men form a natural commonwealth, the guiding principles of which are found in the *jus gentium*, based upon the *lex naturalis*.

(d) Aggressive war is always wrong. The aggressor is the man or nation that resorts to violence to secure what does not belong to it or more than belong to it by right or, in anger or embitterment, seeks to inflict grave injury upon a neighbour. It is sometimes urged that the term ' aggression ' is no longer suitable on the grounds that actions like motives are often very complicated and it is by no means easy to decide what are the real and full issues. Yet this is the term regularly employed by Pius XII and it is found in documents like the Treaty of Versailles and the Charter of the United Nations.

(e) Defensive war can be justified either as resistance to direct attack or as a last measure to prevent or remedy injustice or to secure justice. Christian teaching recognizes an inherent right of self-defence as it also insists that nations, like individuals, have definite obligations to protect and assist one another.

(f) But there are some important and severe limiting conditions which here may be reduced to two. Since war is justified only as a last resort, other available methods must be used first. The dispute in question must be submitted to peaceful negotiation or arbitration. A refusal to consider peaceful settlement would invalidate the moral status of a nation that had suffered genuine wrong. There is little need to add that to-day the possibilities of arbitration and generally of the settlement of international disputes are far more developed and could be made far more effective than in the time of the jurists who formulated these principles.

(g) The second of these conditions is one of proportion. There has to be a proportion between the justice of a cause and the likely consequences of a decision to employ force to settle it. Christian teaching which respects heroism points nevertheless to the wrongness even of heroic warfare when the effects are certain or almost certain to be disastrous, and, it declares that such a proportion should exist between the harm inflicted upon the injured party and the damage and destruction that will follow from the use of force to put this right. A difficult problem at any period, and teeming with exceptional difficulties to-day !

(h) In addition to this *jus ad bellum*, Christian teaching has always laid stress upon a *jus in bello* : that, for instance, only necessary force should be used to secure its object, that the effects of war should be restricted as far as possible, and in general, that the conduct of war should correspond to man's status as a rational and responsible person. Total war, as envisaged and partly practised during the twentieth century, is totally foreign to this Christian teaching.

(i) And finally, this doctrine of peace and war includes the basic notion of a human commonwealth of which peoples are members and are subject to moral principles which should be given their more detailed expression in international law. Suarez and Vitoria argue from the analogy between the State and this commonwealth and the order between individuals and groups under the State's authority and justice and peace as the relationship among peoples under international law. This traditional attitude certainly leads us towards a more closely patterned international association, in which States will collaborate to remedy injustices and preserve

peace, or even towards a supranational institution. The problem of force would then, ideally speaking, be resolved as it has been in a properly organized political community. The use of force within the State is denied to individuals and groups and made a State responsibility ; ideally speaking, it would be removed from the competence of individual States and reserved to the international or supranational authority.

In my previous article I tried to show how much of this traditional approach is found in the post-war attitude towards these highly important questions : and this in various forms, among them, the emphasis upon negotiation and peaceful settlement of disputes, the notion of a *just war* at least as readiness to comply with the demands and instructions of the United Nations, the importance of dealing not only with ' acts of aggression ' but also with threats and dangers to world peace, the admission that international conflicts have to be solved, so far as possible, ' in conformity with the principles of justice and international law ', and finally, the implicit claim, maybe not yet capable of realization, that the use of force in international matters should be restricted to action undertaken by U.N.O. or on its behalf.

MORE RECENT QUESTIONING

At this point a new slant has recently been given to this problem. It might have seemed a notable gain that Western countries have reached a position close to this traditional doctrine and have abandoned war as an instrument of pure national advancement or a normal method of international policy. And indeed, it is a very considerable advance. But the objection is being urged that conditions have so radically altered since 1945, especially through the development of atomic weapons, that the doctrine is out of date or, more precisely, that it can be proved from the doctrine itself that because such weapons exist and *might* or *would* be employed, no war could conceivably be justified. There is no proportion at all—so runs the objection—between the justice of any cause or the injustice any nation might have to sustain and the appalling consequences which *might* or *would* result from modern warfare on a large scale. In Britain this view is expressed at different levels and with a varying blend of argument and sentiment, and, it is reflected in a movement in certain Christian circles towards a mitigated or conditional pacifism which has influenced a number of Catholics. We have to distinguish between the doctrinaire pacifist who rejects every exercise of force as wrong and this conditional pacifist in whose judgment warfare under to-day's circumstances can never be justified and therefore a Christian ought in practice to adopt the pacifist attitude.

The objection is a very serious one and calls for respectful consideration. I make no claim that it can be completely answered or that I can answer it. But I think that Catholics, at any rate, have to study it against a much wider background, that of the whole problem of the relations of States to one another and their common responsibility of providing peace and security and of dealing with international aggression and injustice. This is only another way of saying that it must be examined in the light of the traditional teaching, as analysed in my earlier article. The teaching will then be seen to be not less practical and relevant in to-day's circumstances but even more relevant. It supposes the same horror and dread of war as does the objection, the same wish to be rid of the causes and occasions of war with a stronger insistence upon justice as the only foundation of genuine peace. For peace is its guiding spirit and its objective ; but it does not consider that pacifism is the best or even a true approach to it.

THE CHRISTIAN WILL TO PEACE

Few men have spoken of the disasters of war and the benefits of peace as earnestly and eloquently as Pius XII, and few have expressed deeper sympathy with its victims. The pontificate of Pius XII spanned the years of the second world war and the post-war years that brought nothing more satisfactory than what the Pope called at best the *pace fredda*, the cold peace. His mind was thus preoccupied, as few if any Pontiffs have been before him, with these crucial problems and with the proper Christian answer to and attitude towards them.

The second half of his broadcast allocution on Christmas Eve of 1948 took as its theme a Catholic's position in the post-war world. Being a Christian did not involve a ' cold reserve ' or a ' chilly indifference ' with regard to urgent social and international questions. The example of Christ, the grand precept of charity and our sense of social obligations make this very clear and make it imperative that we have an interest in and concern for them. A Christian cannot shut himself up in a comfortable and self-concentrated isolation.

> The Christian and Catholic [continued the Holy Father] believing that every man is his neighbour and that every nation is a member, with equal rights, of the family of nations, associates himself very warmly with the generous efforts—though their first results may prove very modest and they may often meet with formidable obstacles and fierce opposition—to bring individual States out of a narrow and self-centred mentality: a mentality that has been largely responsible for past wars and unless it be finally overcome or at least brought under control, can lead to further outbursts that might well be fatal for human civilization.

In the widespread anxiety and the dread of war two positions, he noted, had been adopted. The first puts its trust in its own strength on the

principle of *si vis pacem, para bellum* : the second stands for peace at any price. Both parties desire peace and yet both endanger it : the first, because they arouse mistrust and suspicions in other countries ; the second, because they encourage a feeling of security in countries that are meditating aggression.[1]

The elements of a genuine Christian will to peace are next suggested. To begin with, it must derive from God, accepting God as heavenly Father, embracing all men and all peoples in His sovereignty and providence and creating the bond of brotherhood among all human beings. It will be recognized as Christian because it will make no use of force for national prestige or even to press its own rights at the cost of great harm or damage to other countries. It is also practical and realistic, seeking to remove the causes of international tension, to deal with problems arising from the unequal distribution of natural resources and, as far as possible, to open up the world so that all peoples may have access to these resources and closer association with one another.

But this Christian attitude is one of strength, not of weakness or weary indifference. Every war of aggression against what the Pope calls those objects or values (*quei beni*) which the divine precept of peace obliges us unconditionally to respect and guarantee, and therefore also to protect and defend (*che l' ordinamento divino della pace obbliga incondizionatamente a rispettare e a garantire, e quindi a proteggere e a difendere*) is a sin, a crime, an affront to the majesty of God, Creator and Lord of the world. A people threatened by or made the victim of unjust aggression, if it desires to think or act in a Christian manner, cannot remain passively indifferent ; and further, the solidarity of the family of peoples forbids other countries to adopt the attitude of spectators, that of passive neutrality. Such a neutrality has had the most disastrous effects in the past. It has allowed free rein and provided encouragement for aggression and it was one of the major factors in national programmes of armaments.

The Pope finally differentiates between the Christian attitude and other views with which, at first hearing, it might seem to have much in common.

> Relying upon God and the divine order He has established, the Christian will to peace is therefore strong like steel. It is of a quite different temper from a pure feeling for humanity . . . which detests war for its horrors and atrocities, its destruction and its consequences but not because of its injustice. Such a feeling, hedonist and utilitarian

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[1] *Gli altri, perchè incoraggiano la sicurezza di chi prepara l' aggressione.* (*Acta Apostolicae Sedis*, vol. xiv, p. 14).

[2] *Ciò è così vero, che nè la sola considerazione dei dolori e dei mali derivanti dalla guerra, nè l' accurata dosatura dell' azione e del vantaggio, valgono finalmente a determinare, se è moralmente lecito, od anche in talune circostanze concrete obbligatorio (sempre che vi sia probabilità fondata di buon successo) di rispingere con la forza l' aggressore.* *A.A.S.*, vol. xiv, p. 13.

and of materialistic origin, lacks the solid basis of a firm and unconditional obligation. It creates that terrain on which we find the illusion of sterile compromise and the technique of saving oneself at the expense of others, and in every case it is the aggressor who reaps the advantage.

It is therefore true that neither the sole consideration of the sufferings and evils that derive from war nor the exact balance of action and advantage can be the ultimate determinants whether it is morally licit or in certain circumstances morally obligatory to use force to repel the aggressor, (provided always, there exists a reasonable probability of success.)

In the forefront of the Pope's mind is the problem of aggression and, in its modern form, it can be aggression against what he calls in more than one document 'the absolute values of man and of society' (*i valori assoluti dell' uomo e della società*). Aggression must not be accepted as a horrible fact to which we have to resign ourselves because we lack the courage to confront it or the nations of the world are not sufficiently united to deal with it. There is an inherent right of self-defence and even a duty to defend ourselves when these essential values are at stake. And other countries have the obligation of resisting this aggression. For, even if it is not pointed directly at themselves, they are all affected by it and harmed by any success it may achieve. Aggression will be halted only in the following ways that are complementary and not exclusive. Either an international authority, U.N.O in the concrete, must have the right and power to deal with threats to peace and be backed in this by individual nations or there must be mutual and controlled disarmament or finally, till one or both of these possibilities have been realized, the free peoples in effect must unite against 'an enemy resolved to impose on all peoples, in one way or another, one particular and intolerable form of life'. 'Only the unanimous and firm attitude of all who respect truth and goodness can and will save the peace.'[1]

The Pope makes this point very forcibly in a discourse addressed to the sixth Congress on penal law in October 1953. He speaks of the *crime* of modern war except where it has been imposed by the absolute necessity of self-defence. But he insists that the community of nations has to reckon with criminals without conscience who would resort to total war for their own ambitions. And in consequence, if other nations desire to protect themselves and their most precious possessions and if they have no wish to leave the room clear for international criminals, the only thing they can do is to prepare for the day when they will have to defend themselves.[2]

[1] Broadcast allocution, Christmas Eve, 1956. *A.A.S.*, vol xxiv, p. 18.

[2] *C'est pourquoi, si les autres peuples désirent protéger leur existence et leurs biens les plus précieux et s' ils ne veulent pas laisser les coudées franches aux malfaiteurs internationaux, il ne leur reste qu' à se préparer pour le jour où ils devront se défendre. A. A. S.*, vol. xx, p. 733.

He adds that even in the concrete circumstances of to-day no State can be refused the right *à se tenir sur la défensive*, that is, not merely to defend itself if attacked but to maintain its readiness, both material and moral, for self-defence. The aggressor remains guilty of one of the most serious of crimes that should be visited with the severest of penalties.

Speaking to army medical men in 1953, the Pope referred to a suggestion he had made a few days previously that every war should be treated as an international crime except where it arose from the absolute need of self-defence. And even this right of self-defence had its limitations. It must not be a defence of any and every right, the attempt to remedy any sort of injustice. There must exist a proportion between the injustice and the likely consequences of war. Where the balance was heavily weighted on the side of destruction, it might be necessary—the Pope goes further and stresses that it might become a positive obligation—to suffer the burden of injustice. But he clearly envisages cases in which defence would be not only a right but also a duty. One thinks at once of the ' absolute values of man and society ' (*i valori assoluti dell' uomo e della società*). Here the only alternative would be to capitulate to the forces of brute violence and immorality in international affairs : and that, one may fairly conclude, would be to abandon human responsibility altogether.[1]

He concludes with the remark that what he has been saying is applicable in the first place to atomic, biological and chemical warfare. He has put the question whether it could ever become a simple necessity to defend oneself thus against an A. B. C. attack. The answer, he adds, is to be found in the very same principles which apply to war in general.

The right of self-defence and to make preparations for that defence is stressed again in the Christmas Eve broadcast for 1956. Where there is a popular assembly and a government elected and properly constituted that passes and implements measures for defence and security in a situation of real danger, it is not acting wrongly ; hence a Catholic citizen cannot appeal to his individual conscience and refuse to provide the services and fulfil the duties fixed by law.[2]

THE UNITED NATIONS AND DISARMAMENT

Pius XII placed his main hope and emphasis in these problems upon the United Nations Organization and on an agreed programme of disarmament. Ideally, the great deterrent for the aggressor must

[1] (all war to be regarded as crime) *qui n' est pas exigée par la necessité absolue de se défendre contre une injustice très grave atteignant la communauté, lorsqu' on ne peut l'empêcher par d' autres moyens et qu' il faut le faire cependant, sous peine d' accorder libre champ dans les relations internationales à la violence brutale et au manque de conscience. A. A. S.*, vol xxii, p. 587.

[2] *Essi* (that is, assembly and government) *si comportano egualmente in maniera non immorale, di guisa che un cittadino cattolico non può appellarsi alla propria coscienza per rifiutar di prestare i servizi e adempiere i doveri fissati per legge. A. A. S.*, vol. xxiv, p. 19.

be the peoples of the world united in a determination to maintain peace and to solve all disputes and dissipate threats to peace through negotiation and arbitration or, in the last resort, through firm pressure. At the present time, this ideal is incapable of practical achievement since the main line of cleavage is between the Communist countries and the Western powers. The Pope has clearly no illusion, in this same broadcast, about the aims and methods behind the entry of Russian tanks into Hungary or the threat of atomic intervention during the Suez campaign. He welcomes, at the same time, a growing acceptance among countries of human values and moral principles in international affairs and regrets that at times U.N.O. has acted pragmatically, with what he terms a 'false realism' in issues where those principles have been at stake. He regrets too the fact that U.N.O. observers have not been present or have been prevented from being present at places where threats to peace have occurred, since U.N.O. should have the right and power to anticipate military interference by one State with another and sufficient police force to protect the State that is being threatened. His criticism is not meant to be destructive, he insists, but on the contrary it springs from his desire to see its authority invigorated, with particular reference to the question of disarmament. Only within the ambit of an institution such as U.N.O. can the obligation of individual countries to reduce armaments and especially to renounce the production and use of certain kinds of weapons be agreed upon and transformed into a binding obligation in international law. And only U.N.O. is in the position to insist upon the observance of this obligation. Disarmament must be honest and mutual but it must also be subject to control. 'The acceptance of control ; that is the crucial point to settle, that is where every country will show whether it has a genuine wish for peace.'

The 1955 Christmas Eve broadcast urged three stages in disarmament : first, the suspension of nuclear tests ; then, the renunciation of nuclear weapons ; and finally, the general control of armaments. These tests could have most serious and dangerous consequences, and Pius XII continued : 'We do not hesitate to declare, in harmony with our previous allocutions, that it is a duty of conscience on the part of peoples and their governments to make these three proposals a joint objective of international agreement. We repeat : the three proposals taken together, for the ethical motive behind them is also to establish security for all peoples in the world.' If only the first of the three were realized, there would still linger the suspicion that the Powers in possession of such weapons had no real will to proceed to stages two and three.

Stage three was that of general and not merely nuclear disarmament. This too must be by common agreement, phased and also controlled.

In the 1956 Christmas Eve allocution Pius XII referred to precedents set by his predecessors, Leo XIII and Benedict XV. Mention of the latter Pontiff forcibly reminds us that this grave insistence upon disarmament is by no means a personal outlook of Pius XII but part of the traditional Catholic approach. Pius XII entered into the public life of the Church when he was consecrated archbishop in 1917 and sent as an emissary from the Pope, Benedict XV, to the heads of the Central Powers. Benedict's letter, which the new archbishop presented to those rulers, laid down conditions for a genuine peace. Its initial condition was the following :

> First of all, the fundamental point must be that *the moral force of right must be substituted for the material force of arms :* from this must follow a just agreement of all for the simultaneous reduction of armaments, in accordance with rules and guarantees hereafter to be considered, in a measure sufficient and necessary for the maintenance of public order in each State ; next, as a substitute for armies, the institution of arbitration, with its high peace-making function, subject to regulations to be agreed on and sanctions to be determined against the State which should refuse to submit international questions to arbitration or to accept its decisions. [1]

The paragraph is an epitome of the Papal teaching. The moral force of justice must replace material power as the principle and arbiter of international affairs. There must be mutual, agreed and controlled disarmament, and in future, international disputes must be settled by arbitration—this means by peaceful methods and, at least ideally, in accord with the principles of justice. Finally, a central authority, backed by the nations of the world, must insist on this method of reasonable arbitration, and of course its only possible form is a League or Society of Nations. The paragraph is at the same time a charter in miniature of this League or Society.

These measures of disarmament require to be supplemented by positive efforts to create a more co-operative and confident atmosphere in international relations. What must be aimed at is a policy of justice and generosity but within the limits of what the Pope calls a ' sane realism '. He is speaking here, it would appear, of the relations between Western countries and their joint relation to the newer States and peoples emerging into independence in Asia and Africa. Complaints about colonialism were not enough and turbulent national feeling among the new peoples might prove sadly disastrous, and indeed differences might develop between the two groups to the eventual advantage of a third party that neither of the groups wants. Western countries should give of their plenty to underdeveloped countries—it is only fair to say that very great material assistance has been given in the past

[1] *A.A.S.*, vol. vii, p. 10.

twelve years—and make available to them Western civilization at its best, especially 'the genuine values' (*i valori genuini*) of Europe and the West.

EAST AND WEST

It might be suggested that, where at least the majority of Western Powers are concerned, the Pope is preaching to the converted. They do, in the main, recognize the value and necessity of U.N.O., would be ready for a large measure of disarmament had they only their own mutual relations to consider, and have gone a long way in rejecting war as an instrument of national policy. The problem does not lie here but in the relation of the free to the Communist world, that of the West to Russia and China. How can you have a genuine society of nations which includes representatives of officially Communist countries whose principles differ totally from those of the other members and where those differences are not merely in tone or emphasis but concern the foundation on which the society is established? How can a society of nations be effective when one great Power can veto action by its executive arm, the Security Council, as Russia has so frequently done? How can one expect an agreement on disarmament without some mutual trust on both sides—a trust extremely difficult to stimulate in view both of Communist theory and Russian practice? In other words, what sort of coexistence is possible between West and East? Would it be sufficient to permit mutual and controlled disarmament and, on the practical plane at least, to promote better relationship?

The Christmas Eve broadcast of 1954 dealt with this theme of *coexistence*. The Pope had hoped that the war would have been followed by an era of concord and security. Instead we now had the cold war (*guerra fredda*) which was a truce and hardly a state of peace at all. Many people were now suggesting that the cold war was gradually turning into a cold peace (*pace fredda*); but this also was no real peace and it rested upon mutual fear and a balance of military forces. It was, in effect, *coexistence in fear*. The peoples were not *living* but *existing together*. They looked upon war as the greatest of catastrophes and at the same time they were relying on war as the one safeguard. The fear in question must be transformed into a fear of God which sees how wrong is the belief that war is only a form of political action and that it escapes moral responsibility. Coexistence in fear must become either coexistence in the fear of God and therefore a genuine *convivenza* (and no mere coexistence) in peace, inspired by the moral law, or an icy paralysis of international life.

Although *coexistence in error* cannot be a sound basis for peace, none the less much can be done through mutual association. Economic relations can be a factor for peace, in so far as they operate in the spirit

of the Natural Law, in honesty and justice, and are influenced by respect for and good intentions towards other peoples. The Pope distinguishes between the Communist world, the basis of which is a false idea that rejects primary human and divine rights, but yet gives effective coherence, and the free world, often negative and disunited. Common opposition to the Communist world is no adequate principle of unity ; it could be purely negative. It requires to be strengthened by a positive attachment, an attachment to freedom as designed by God and blended with a sense of the common good and of charity, or to the ideal of natural right as the foundation of human conduct. The Holy Father is here emphasizing what has been so often stated by Christian speakers, namely, that materialism can provide no proper answer to Communism. It is not sufficient to oppose Communism on economic or political grounds. The point is not that Soviet production methods are worse than ours or that their political methods are more repressive but that the human relationships which they impose are wrong because they are based upon a false and indeed a horrible philosophy of man. In the last resort, a false philosophy can be overcome only by a sound and true philosophy, which must include the recognition of God as creator and overlord of the world, of stable and absolute moral principles in individual and official life, and of the bond of human fellowship in good will and charity. In effect, the Pope is declaring that there would be a greater chance of *practical coexistence* if Western peoples acknowledged these spiritual values more consistently and if their responsible statesmen were sincere and practising Christians or, as a minimum, men who believed in God, accepted absolute ethical standards and had a sense of human dignity and fellowship.

There comes back to memory the fifth of the well known peace points enunciated in the 1939 Christmas Eve allocution. Even well made schemes and systems—we were reminded—lose validity and vigour unless they are continually penetrated by the spirit of keen and sensitive responsibility which measures all enactments by the norms of God's law, inspired by that hunger and thirst for justice proclaimed as a beatitude in the Sermon on the Mount and that has as its natural counterpart moral justice, and finally warmed by the universal love that is the supreme incarnation and fulfilment of the Christian ideal.[1]

TOTAL WAR

In an address to members of the World Medical Association on 30 September 1954, Pius XII treated expressly of total war and the employment of atomic weapons. Before answering the question whether doctors could morally assist in the development of means of warfare,

[1] *A.A.S.*, vol. vii, p. 11.

he must first put the question whether total war, in the modern sense, and in particular atomic, biological and chemical (A.B.C.) warfare could be in principle permitted. There is absolutely no doubt—states the Holy Father — in view of the horrors and immense sufferings occasioned by modern war—that *to launch such a war without a just motive, that is to say, without having it imposed by a manifest and extremely serious injustice, that only war could deal with,* would constitute a crime, worthy of the severest national and international sanctions. As to the lawfulness of an A.B.C. war, it cannot be discussed in principle *except in the case where it must be judged indispensable for self-defence under the circumstances that have been explained.* Even then, every conceivable effort must be made to avoid it through international agreements or to place exact and narrow limitations upon its use in order that its consequences may be confined to the strict necessities of defence.

But—the Pope continues—if the employment of this means *involves such an extension of disaster that it completely escapes man's control,* its use must be rejected as immoral. It would be no longer a case of ' defence ' against injustice and of the necessary ' safeguarding ' of legitimate possessions but of the annihilation, pure and simple, of all human life within the radius of action. That is not permitted at any price.[9]

CONCLUSIONS

From this brief analysis of documents from Pius XII a number of conclusions can be drawn which reveal his view of these urgent world problems and a representative Catholic view. They are already discovered in the traditional teaching on war and peace but there is a new variety of significance and stress.

To begin with, aggression, the fact and reality of aggression, is at the centre of the Pope's thinking. It is the fact from which all war ultimately stems. To accept it, with its modern possibilities of attack and destruction, as inevitable, to adopt towards it an attitude of fatalism and resignation would be totally wrong and an abandonment of individual and collective responsibility. On the national as on the civic level men have the obligation to protect the weak and resist the evildoer. Besides, among to-day's circumstances there are several very encouraging factors. There is a central world authority in U.N.O., not yet wholly effective but wielding a rapidly growing influence and creating a world opinion, the importance of which should not be underestimated. Aggression to-day needs its publicity agents to justify itself

[9] The italicized clauses are as follows in the original text : . . . . *déclancher celle-ci sans juste motif, c'est-à-dire sans qu' elle soit imposée par une injustice évidente et extrêmement grave, autrement inévitable . . . . sinon dans le cas où elle doit etre jugée indispensable pour se défendre dans les conditions indiquées . . . entraîne une extension telle du mal qu' il échappe entièrement au controle de l' homme*— *A.A.S.*, vol. xxii, p. 587.

before the world, and this technique masks in the aggressor a certain sense of shame and at least a recognition that he is condemned. There are many more, and many more efficient means of negotiation and arbitration left, before we have reached a position in which we can envisage nothing but warfare between Western Powers. These Powers have now a fuller sense of ethical standards in international relations and are more ready to settle difficulties along lines of justice rather than of mere expediency. There exists a genuine feeling that countries are inter-dependent, and that richer countries have a collective responsibility for their poorer and less developed neighbours. The lessons taught so severely by two world wars and the post-war emergencies have by no means been ignored. Much remains to be done : to lessen national onesidedness and pretentions, to weave even more closely the new fabric of international interest and co-operation, to banish fears and encourage mutual confidence.

In the second place, until aggression can be dealt with by the world authority, there remains the inherent right of self-defence, which, under certain circumstances, may become a positive duty, and this is coupled with a more clearly recognized duty in other countries to defend the victim and repel the aggressor. The limiting conditions are still there, to wit, a proportion between the effects of the aggression and the likely consequences of resistance. The problem will never be adequately resolved till it is made the responsibility of the world as a whole, the world society, expressing itself in the *jus gentium*, with the backing of individual nations. This central authority now assumes a larger significance than it had or could have had in the traditional teaching, as outlined by Suarez and Vitoria.

Thirdly, aggression must be tackled through disarmament. Ideally, this calls for a suspension of nuclear tests and nuclear disarmament but it must embrace every kind of weapon. It must be mutual, honestly agreed and carried through, and subject to effective control. Only so can suspicion slowly give way to understanding and co-operation. Such a disarmament project would gradually transfer the use of force to U.N.O. or reserve it for operations carried out on U.N.O's behalf. It is no doubt a far cry from this vision to the limited possibilities of disarmament being discussed at Geneva. All one can hope for from these is an agreement on the practical level between Powers whose outlook and background so radically diverge but who could understand that it is in their individual interest and advantage to avoid a major war. It *would seem* (it is prudent to write about Russia conditionally) that Mr Krushchev does want a *modus vivendi* with the West despite his peculiar behaviour in Paris; that he would like to switch rivalry with the West on to the economic from the military plane ; and it is conceivable that this change of attitude is being forced upon him by changes within Russia

itself and perhaps also on account of the rapid development of China. The failure of the Summit conference has not removed all hopes of a *détente* that would be very welcome if only Western statesmen remained discreet and encouraged no empty hopes. Even a limited programme of disarmament with adequate safeguards would be a notable step in the direction which Pius XII has so continually emphasized.

But here a further question arises with which I have not dealt and can only mention. Disarmament of this kind would presumably stabilize a particular *status quo*, for instance in Europe, which happens to be thoroughly unsatisfactory and unjust. The peoples of Eastern Europe must not be sacrificed as one of its requisite conditions. The only final basis of peace is justice that would guarantee national rights, liberties and independence. A *status quo* lacking this foundation can be only a temporary expedient. It must be the task of world society to see that these peoples do recover these rights. It is a useful pointer to world opinion on this subject that at U.N.O. not only Afro-Asian and Latin American members but Europeans also are sympathetic to the movements towards independence in Africa. World opinion must be at least equally sympathetic towards movements for its recovery by these older, historic nations.

In the fourth place, as has been remarked, Pius XII stresses the right to self-defence and the obligation of other nations to assist in it. The exercise of defence ought to be less necessary to-day since there exist so many ways of settling disputes through negotiation and there is a far stronger corporate will to maintain peace. However, the right remains—not only to defend oneself at the moment of attack but also to prepare defensive armaments. Until international society can assume this responsibility, a nation cannot be denied the right *à se tenir sur la défensive*. Till armaments can be reserved to U.N.O. or limited through disarmament agreements, a nation may possess them for defensive purposes. In fact, that is the only answer. *Il ne leur reste qu' à se préparer pour le jour où ils devront se défendre*. Unilateral disarmament offers no practical solution, and this applies to the unilateral nuclear disarmament proposed by certain sections in Britain. There are sound arguments for discouraging non-nuclear Powers from manufacturing nuclear weapons but there is little to say for throwing away under present circumstances weapons you already possess.

Fifthly, the Pope lays emphasis on the limiting conditions of the traditional doctrine. There must be a proportion between *cause* and *consequences*. Otherwise, what would have been a just employment of force could become *unjustified*. The Pope says in effect that this condition has to be interpreted more stringently to-day. But he does not suggest that modern weapons have so transformed the situation that recourse to force is out of the question. On the contrary, he insists on the right

and even the duty of self-defence and the obligation incumbent on other nations to assist the country attacked ; on the need for closer unity among nations, precisely that they may show a united front to aggression ; on the risk of encouraging aggression by disunity and self-interest. He has deplored the false spirit of neutrality that led countries to stand aside when their neighbours were being attacked by Nazi Germany, till in the end they were themselves attacked and conquered. To interpret this limiting clause as meaning that the requisite proportion is automatically ruled out under to-day's conditions is to misinterpret and make nonsense of the Pope's words. It would also offer that encouragement to violence which he has so often and vigorously censured.

In his address to the World Medical Association, already mentioned, he leaves open the possibility of defence through atomic weapons in the *one* case where it is judged indispensable for defence. But every effort must be made to set strict and narrow limitations to their use so that the effects can be reduced to the strict needs of defence. If their use should create such widespread destruction that it *entirely escapes human control*, that use would have to be rejected as immoral. For, in that case, it would be no longer a question of defence in the recognized sense but of the annihilation, pure and simple, of all human life within the radius of action.

At this point, critics have again commented that the distinction introduced by the Pope is merely academic on the ground that any use of atomic weapons would bring about the annihilation of which he was speaking. They argue therefore that he is equivalently condemning even the defensive use of such arms. But the fact remains that he does not say so, and has drawn this distinction, and drawn it carefully. He speaks of such an extension of destruction so as *entirely to escape man's control*. It could be argued, and I think on very sound grounds, that this does apply to megaton or hydrogen bombs since it would appear impossible to set strict and narrow limits to their effects. They are not in fact military weapons but instruments of mass destruction. But if military weapon, by definition, means a weapon that can be employed against a military target, there would seem to be atomic weapons that could be used legitimately, such as guided missiles to destroy enemy missiles or artillery for certain objectives. I shall not go into detail ; that would be a question of fact, not principle. But, if megaton bombs be excluded, it seems evident that atomic arms as such have not been excluded by this Papal teaching ; it has been expressly stated that their use, should it provide the sole effective possibility against aggression, must be regulated by the ordinary principles and conditions applied in the traditional teaching.

It should be remembered that this proportion between *cause* and *consequences* is not a pure balance of material advantage and disadvantage.

There are fundamental rights and liberties—the absolute values of man and society, as Pius XII describes them—which it is man's particular duty to protect and maintain. It is always difficult, and at times impossible, to weigh them in any such balance of loss or gain. If they are lost, then—we say very humanly—everything is lost with them.

In the modern world the Catholic is faced with many a crucial and heart-rending problem. Desiring peace, he lives with the threat and dread of war ; striving to love his neighbour, he senses everywhere mistrust and suspicion ; longing for unity among nations based upon justice and law, he is confronted by the two worlds of East and West tensely set against one another. The lines his thought should follow and his efforts should sustain are set forth admirably in these documents of Pius XII.

The Age of Rococo

by CYRIL BARRETT

THE age of rococo covers a period of not more than fifty years of the eighteenth century (1720–70). During that short period Europe was united socially and culturally as it had not been since the Middle Ages and as it has not been down to our own day. Politically it was an age of enlightened despotism; socially it was marked by the ascendancy of the aristocracy; culturally it falls between the generous classicism of the baroque and the austere, antiquarian classicism which we call neo-classicism. In the German states and in the Austrian Empire rococo is a phase in the development of baroque. Its cultural centre and place of origin was France; French replaced Latin as the diplomatic and cultural language of Europe about this time.

The rise of the French aristocracy, the cultural *élite* from which the rococo sprang, came about in two stages. In the previous century Louis XIV brought the nobles to Versailles to have them under his eye and so prevent them from fomenting rebellion in the provinces. During the Regency which followed his death, however, they reasserted themselves and when Louis XV was of an age to rule they were already socially dominant. Louis XV had no particular desire to keep them at court, but they remained there all the same; they had lost interest in the provinces. In fact, banishment to the provinces was now one of the forms of punishment they most resented. So, for most of the remaining years of the century they remained about the king, and they, rather than he, set the tone. Their example was followed by every principality and petty kingdom in Europe, and when the monarchy fell, it was the aristocracy as much as any other group which brought about its downfall—thus they avenged themselves on Louis XIV.

Years of enforced idleness at court with its rigid etiquette, its intrigue, its round of elaborate entertainment, its endless conversation and all the arts and devices for passing the empty hours as amusingly as possible, had left the aristocracy with very little sense of responsibility but with the graces and accomplishments of civilized society: manners, taste, wit and all that Burke understood by 'chivalry', brought to a fine point of perfection. Under Louis XIV life at court imposed restrictions on individual liberty and private pleasure, but with his death these restrictions were removed and the aristocracy celebrated their new-found freedom in a life of unrestrained, if refined, enjoyment. In this they were abetted by the Regent, a man as gifted, elegant and irresponsible as themselves. For two generations Europe was dazzled by the

brilliance and extravagance of their display ; it rang with their laughter, their wit and their music. Then quite suddenly it all ceased. Echoes might still be heard in Vienna right into the present century—in their own vulgar way the ballyhoo years of the twenties were a faint and grossly distorted image of those earlier days—but that age died, as Burke rightly said, when the living embodiment of it all, Marie Antoinette, was led to the scaffold.

To recapture the age of rococo we must turn to art. Not just to one art but to them all : to painting, sculpture, architecture, furniture, tapestry and ceramics ; and not to the visual arts alone, but to music, the music of Mozart and Haydn, to the theatre, literature and the dance. The rococo spirit touched them all. Never has an age so completely expressed itself in art as the age of rococo. It touched nothing which it did not adorn—that to many critics was its great weakness : it adorned everything, but it did nothing more than adorn.

In 1958 the Council of Europe decided to devote one of its international exhibitions to the age of rococo. The Committee responsible for the exhibition were inspired. With an imaginative grasp of the requirements of their subject which is all too rare, they restored the lovely rococo Residency of Munich, one of the earliest buildings of its kind, and housed the exhibition in the tiny rooms which surround the inner courtyard ; with its large, ornate fountain making music in the sun. The setting was perfect, and the exhibition was worthy of it. One special delight was the restored rococo theatre, a work of art to house art. But all was not delight. The exhibition was planned to instruct ; or rather to suggest to the spectator the essentials of the rococo spirit, which inspired this art, and the sources from which it sprang.

Two years have passed since the exhibition and now Dr Arno Schönberger, chief curator of the Bavarian National Museum, and Dr Hallor Soehner, curator of the Bavarian State Galleries, Munich, two o :the original Committee responsible for mounting the exhibition, have brought out a book in which they develop the ideas which lay behind it.[1] With that instinct for the proper setting which they had already displayed they (or their publishers) have designed a book as sumptuous as the age itself : over 350 unusually large, beautifully printed plates, with an introduction divided into two parts : the mental background (' The Enlightened Mind ') and an analysis of the main aspects of the culture of the age. In the pages which follow I shall single out some of these aspects for special comment in the hope that the essential features of the rococo spirit may emerge.

[1] *The Age of Rococo.* London : Thames and Hudson. 1960. pp. 394, 7 gns. Admirably translated from the German by D. Woodward. For an account of Irish rococo interior decoration—the best example of rococo art in these islands—the reader is referred to Dr C. P. Curran's articles in *Studies* Vol. 28 and 29.

Even before the death of Louis XIV there are signs of a reaction against the stiff, artificial classicism of French baroque. For too long art had ministered to the grandiose pretensions of absolute monarchy, and people were beginning to weary of the monumental splendours of Versailles and the monumental banalities of Le Brun. The art which was about to supersede them was no less artificial but it was gay and, in its own fashion, spontaneous and natural. It in turn would be succeeded by a naturalism which knew no restraint, which gave way to excess of feeling as the baroque had allowed itself to be carried away by an excess of pomp. The rococo took the middle way, avoiding excess of any kind, whether in thought, in feeling or in expression. Excess was vulgar and irrational ; rococo stood for refinement and sweet reasonableness, a sort of studied naturalism and natural artifice.

We see this most clearly in the portraits of the period. In a baroque portrait the sitter was a public figure, a symbol of rank and office, now he becomes a private individual, distinguished by his charm and elegance of bearing. Even the outward trappings of rank are discarded in favour of something more natural, more personal. Marie Leczinska, wife of Louis XV, sat for her portrait in *robe de ville*, and Marie Antoinette was hardly ever painted in court dress. The art of appearing simple had become a special form of elegance. A woman liked to be painted leaning on her husband's arm and surrounded by her children. Family portraits become increasingly numerous and there is also a marked increase in the number of portraits of women and children, alone or in pairs. Gainsborough and Hogarth were especially happy in their handling of these subjects ; a delightful example is *The Mackinnon Family* by Hogarth in our own National Gallery. It was an age when women played a dominant place in society and one can detect a certain femininity in the portraits of men by La Tour, Longhi and Gainsborough. But for all their simplicity and charm these portraits remain artificial. They may be portraits of private persons but they lack individuality. Not only in France but all over Europe you encounter ' the same good-natured smile, the same pleasant but unmemorable features '.

Another characteristic of the portraiture of the period is the intimacy with which the sitter regards the spectator, a look of intimacy which varies from friendliness to complicity. To achieve intimacy, to break down the barrier which courtly etiquette had erected between individuals, while at the same time retaining a measure of reserve, this was one of the fundamental principles of rococo society and of the culture it evolved. It was this which prompted the aristocracy, when it moved from Versailles to Paris on the death of Louis XIV, to abandon the spacious halls and stately rooms that a previous age had considered indispensable to rank and dignity, and to build instead salons and boudoirs where a small and exclusive gathering could meet for intimate conversation and

entertainment. On the return of the Court to Versailles, Louis XV followed the example of the aristocracy and had small apartments built there ; Marie Antoinette's Petit Trianon is a perfect example of architecture in the intimate manner.

The most perfect expression of intimacy, however, is the ' rocaille ' or pebble-work decoration from which rococo takes its name. This form of decoration, playful, elegant, highly artificial yet with the grace of natural vegetation, curling itself into C curves and S counter-curves and whorls, fondly entangled every architectural member in its delicate web of tendrils and imitated the light and graceful gestures of the company which moved within its sphere. Not only architecture but furniture and even scientific instruments (fig. 1) were entwined in its elegant convolutions. Less obviously, perhaps, but no less surely, did it affect the other visual arts, sculpture and painting. It is to be found in the soft spiral of garments (fig. 2)—their gentle folds are in contrast to the billowing, stiff, wind-blown garments of baroque art—in the curls of the hair, the flickering wisps of cloud. The rocaille bound together all the arts into an art of arts, more unified and all-embracing than even the baroque. It was the product of an impeccable, if superficial, taste, which excluded no detail of civilized living and at times amounted in its total effect to something unquestionably great, transcending the intimate (fig. 4).

The spirit of playful, carefree elegancy, so perfectly symbolized by the rocaille, animated every aspect of life and informed it with an air of unreality, fantasy and make-believe The world became, indeed, a stage, a pleasure-garden. The boundaries between nature and art were broken down, or rather society and nature met in a dream-world. Life was neither wholly natural nor wholly artificial; stepping across the threshold of one world, you did not leave the other behind, but found it again slightly modified.

It is not surprising, then, that of all forms of culture the rococo theatre should best express the spirit of the age. Here convention imitates nature and the spectator willingly allows himself to be persuaded that what he sees is real. In serious drama the unreality of the stage is ignored for the sake of the action which the play enfolds, but in the rococo theatre every device was used to make the unreal as life-like as possible, to make the spectator enter into the world of fantasy. This he was only too willing to do. The classical drama of the previous age, high tragedy and serious comedy, had very little appeal to a society which lived for the fleeting moment, and for the light-hearted gaiety and witty exchanges which could make the hours pass swiftly and pleasantly. The type of entertainment which had the greatest appeal was the high-spirited, fancy-dress comedy provided by the *Commedia dell' Arte*, forerunner of pantomime, with its Harlequin and Columbine (fig. 3), Puncinello and

Mezzetino ; not the crude *Commedia* of the sixteenth century, but a refined and domesticated version. Satire, too, made its appeal to a society which loved wit and intrigue, and liked to see traditional institutions ridiculed with finesse. *Mariage de Figaro* by Beaumarchais was a particular favourite. We are accustomed to see rococo comedy through the eyes of Watteau who transfused his figures with a wistful poetry, but the slightly malevolent and satirical Puncinellos of Goya and the Tiepolos (in the Ca' Rezzonico, Venice, for instance) are probably closer to what their contemporaries saw.

The rococo theatre found its most complete expression, however, in two forms of dramatic presentation which came to maturity during this period : the opera and the ballet. Here was a combination of all arts, architecture, ' trompe l'oeil ' scenery-painting, costume and fancy-dress, mime or speech and song, the dance, and, of course, music ; all were designed to carry the spectator into a dream-world ; not, it must be insisted, a romantic world—the age of rococo was too securely anchored to the earth, too cynical, too ' worldly ' to be carried away by the idealist visions of true romanticism—but a highly stylized dream-world, as formal as the music which gently ministered to its sensibility. It cannot be denied that in the parts of Europe directly under Italian influence ' opera seria ' (as indeed the oratorio and other forms of serious music) were popular, but in France and wherever the French influence was strong it was the ' opera buffa ', the operatic equivalent of the plays of the *Commedia* and in some cases drawing its inspiration from it, that prevailed. Before leaving the subject of music it may be remarked that out of the incidental music of the opera a new musical form, ideally suited to the taste for intimate pleasures, had developed—chamber music.

But theatrical splendours were not confined to the theatre. The world, as has been said, was for the age of rococo a stage to play on. Any public event, the wedding of a princess or the birth of an heir, was an opportunity for elaborate outdoor entertainments often lasting for weeks and costing enormous sums (a firework display in St James's Park in 1749 cost £100,000). Incredible ingenuity was employed in devising pageants for these festivities. The renaissance ' tronfi ' were ransacked for allegorical and mythological themes. When they failed, the possibilities of oriental legend were explored. But a never failing source of delight was the water festival or ' Venetian Night ' : water parties in boats decked with lanterns (further tribute from the ' exotic ' East), music and pageantry on floating stages, aquatic monsters and, as a final and crowning glory, the fireworks, rising like fountains of light from the waters.

Fantasy, light-hearted gaiety, the unreality of the theatrical world, the intimate, all, in fact, that the age of rococo stood for or desired,

met and fused in a form of entertainment that epitomizes the whole rococo way of life—the *fêtes galantes* or garden festivals of love. The stage was the park laid out in the English manner, less formal than the French gardens of the previous age, though no less artificial. Here, among trees and shrubs planted with studied carelessness, under a grey-green statue of a reclining Venus or Diana, a brilliant company would stroll idly about talking of love or would prepare to leave for some Isle of Cytherea, Isle of Bliss (as Watteau, with his incomparable felicity and delicate poetry, presents them to us) or dance the minuet, 'the most refined, lightest and most perfect stylization of love the world has ever created'. (Gregor) We cannot fail to admire the charm and elegance of the scene—for, whether it is painted with Watteau's delicacy or with the heavier touch of Lancret and Pater, the scene never lacks these qualities—but neither can we fail to notice its true significance.

For all its simplicity this age was corrupt at its core—'*un siècle absolument corrompu*'. Under the refinement we meet an all-pervasive eroticism. This whole dream-world of '*bergerie galante*', with its pleasure pavilions and shaded walks and Isle of Bliss, was designed to stimulate in the most discreet possible way what had come to be regarded as the supreme object in life. 'While other ages had said their say about sensual pleasures bluntly, grossly or even brutally, everything was now expressed in nuance. Wantonness and frivolity had an almost discreet fascination.' (p. 90) Artists—Boucher and Fragonard who was worthy of better things—pandered to this spirit in a most shameless way by a sophisticated invention known as the '*suprise d'amour*' by which the spectator is allowed to pry into the intimacies of private lives from a place of concealment in the boudoir or the shrubbery.

Nothing escaped the influence of this spirit of genteel eroticism; not even the Gods of Olympus. It is a curious fact, as the authors of the book under review point out, that the Olympian era 'coincided with a powerful upsurge of art in support of the Christian faith, and that the imaginative world of Olympus declined in appeal only when Christian art, too, began to falter in its power of expression.' (p. 78) In the age of baroque, Jupiter, Juno and the sun-god Apollo, maintained their supreme position as symbols of divine, imperial and absolute power. In the age of rococo they are replaced by Venus, Diana, Eros and Pan, and Olympus itself comes to look like a boudoir or drawing-room. Art no longer celebrates divine power but rather the divine beauty of women and 'the gallant peccadillos of the gods'—we make the gods in our own likeness! In Germany, however, where, as we shall see, Christian art had not entirely lost its power of expression and where the Italian baroque tradition, represented principally by Tiepolo, was still alive, the Olympians fared better. They were not unaffected by the emasculating influence of the rococo age and their function as

reception committees welcoming some exalted personage from Earth is not perhaps a glorious one, but at least they are still conceived in the heroic manner and one cannot imagine them fitting easily into the life of the boudoir (fig. 4). (The Italians continued to treat the human figure with a certain sculptural monumentality ; a striking instance of this in the book is a study of a seated nude by Piazzetta—it is like something out of another epoch.) Ironically, it was Winklemann and the neo-classicists who finally toppled the Olympians. Their antiquarian interests led them to disassociate the genuine myth from the allegorical interpretation which had been placed upon it and ' Olympus veiled itself from the eye of history which began to exert its withering effect upon the happy fantasies of art. '

If we now pursue our analysis a little further and consider the mentality which lay behind rococo culture we find the same brilliance and sparkle, but the ideas, clever and polished though they may be, are totally lacking in depth. The contrast between the age of baroque and the age of rococo is as marked here as in art. There was no one during the middle decades of the eighteenth century of the stature of Descartes, Pascal, Leibnitz, Newton or Bossuet. It was not that the age lacked men of intelligence but rather that they were not encouraged to think deeply. In every age there must be some meeting place where ideas are exchanged and the ideas that are exchanged there may be determined by the nature of the place and of the company who meet. In the age of rococo the meeting places were the ' salons ' of the aristocracy and these were presided over by fashionable literary hostesses. No serious conversation was possible in such a gathering ; to arouse interest an idea had to be novel, witty and superficial. The few great men that the age produced were lionized but not listened to. The treatment of Hume, the one man who perhaps would not seem out of place in the company of those enumerated above, was typical : he amused society by his ' unspoiled ' manners and made it feel in some way superior to uncouth genius. ' I have read your book [*An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*] ', one hostess told him, ' and found it—fascinating '.

The most exciting ideas were those which centred around the notion of ' enlightenment '. The ' light ' in this case was the light of reason, or, to be precise, of common sense, and it was to shine in the darkness of obscurantism, superstition and mystery whether the mystery was the mystique of divine right, or the Christian faith, or the speculations of metaphysicians from which both these ancient, or rather, antiquated institutions drew support. The risk involved in criticizing the established order gave an additional thrill to the pursuit of ' enlightenment ' and, as it is always easy to be clever when being destructively critical, a

subject for witty and satirical conversation was assured. The most accomplished spokesman of the Enlightenment was, of course, Voltaire ; the ablest was Montesquieu whose *L' Esprit des Lois* attempted to place the legal system on an empirical rather than a speculative basis. Political freedom, religious toleration and emancipation from metaphysics were its fundamental aims ; its method was empirical, the collection and verification of observable facts. In place of Christianity it proposed Deism, that is, belief in God, Virtue and Immortality, the only doctrines, in fact, which remained intelligible under the penetrating gaze of common sense ; to satisfy their desire for ritual, men had to turn to pietistic sects and secret societies. It only remained for Kant to apply reason to reason itself ; with that, the whole enterprise reached its consummation and destruction.

While it lasted, the age of Enlightenment gave a stimulus to scientific inquiry. It was hoped that science would solve the ' mysteries ' of the universe without the aid of speculation, and the remarkable discoveries of the age encouraged that hope. No one was troubled when science uncovered as many mysteries as it explained. If Lavoisier's discovery of oxygen and hydrogen ' liberated science from speculative philosophy by disposing once and for all of the " four elements " ', and Magny's microscope (fig. 1) opened up the wonders of organic life, the discovery of electricity increased, rather then lessened, the mystery of the universe. To the Enlightened society it raised no problem, it was a ' thrilling phenomenon ', a drawing-room diversion.

There is something poignant and at the same time awe-inspiring in the way this society was furthering its own destruction. These very ideas which the Enlightened aristocrats fostered with such light-hearted irresponsibility—a ' gambler's flippancy ' the authors of the book call it—were directed against the order to which they themselves belonged. The new age of liberty and scientific progress could only come about by the destruction of their own. Had they reflected on this for a moment, it is doubtful if they would have cared—in this, too, we are reminded of the ballyhoo years. They thought only of the transient, the passing moment. Almost as soon as the age began it seemed headed for destruction—the sense of impending disaster is never absent from Watteau's pictures, often suggested by a hint of coming storm ; that they should hasten that disaster would not be out of keeping with their way of life.

This account of the age of rococo would not be complete without a word about the signs of the coming of the new era which are already discernible about the middle of the century. In 1754 Rousseau, in a spirit of rational inquiry but also in reaction against the artificiality of Enlightened society, published his *Discourse on Inequality*, an appeal to mankind to return to the simple life, the life of natural innocence

as practised by the Noble Savage. In *Emile* he applied the principles of life according to nature to the education of children, and in his *Confessions* he flaunted his own immoral brand of naturalism. This appeal to nature and to 'sensibility' generated the emotional heat which helped eventually to bring about the French Revolution and introduce the Romantic era, but even in the age of rococo its effects can be seen. 'Arcadia suddenly began to smell of fresh-turned soil and hay, and real sheep browsed in its fields instead of the beribboned lambs strayed from some French salon.' (p. 85) The new sensibility and naturalism first appears in the work of British artists, Ramsay and Gainsborough—it was from the Britain of Richardson's *Clarissa* (1750–51) that the first intimations of the new spirit came — but for all that it is a refined sensibility. By the end of the century some of the refinement has been removed by the searing realism and mockery of Goya, and a monarch would soon be painted as an individual—a new and franker era is at hand. But even in the age of rococo there were painters who could combine refinement with realism and see people as individuals with thoughts and feelings of their own. I am thinking of Chardin above all. His servants, milkmaids and governesses are real people, and his children have a sincerity and innocence from which all trace of sentimentality is absent. He was inspired, as Diderot said, with 'la recherche de la vérité, la philosophie'. This feeling for the individuality of things extended to inanimate objects, to the objects, for instance, left on the table when a meal is over—'different objects have a life of their own in a world from which human beings have departed.' (p. 96)

That, then, in very brief outline is the age of rococo. It was essentially a secular culture, the product of a society that was basically immoral or at least indifferent to morality, and vaguely anti-religious. Yet a very large part of the art of the period is, in fact, religious. Is this religious art to be taken as an expression of the age, and if so, to what extent did it express a spirit seemingly so alien to its own ? The answer which Dr Schönberger and Dr Soehner give is not entirely satisfactory. They suggest that the Church was, in a sense, trying to beat or rather win over the Enlightenment on its own terms, that is, by appealing to its love of novelty and display. They wish to explain the obvious theatricality of rococo churches as 'an imperative summons to the observer, as it were, to bear witness to the events depicted.' (p. 105) For support they appeal to the words of the Abbé André (*Génie du Christianisme*) : 'nothing more admirable, nothing more awe inspiring, than divinity presented, as it were, in a play.' But long before the age of rococo theatrical effects were sought by church architects. If we consider the ecclesiastical rococo of South Germany and Austria we find that it is only a phase in the development of baroque art, and the baroque church was designed

to express in dramatic form the triumph of the Counter-Reformation Church. The influence of French rococo greatly modified the German baroque, but it remained true to its original inspiration; and the presence of Italian artists ensured this.

It is a great, though understandable mistake to conclude that because artists or cultural groups use the same mode of expression their art is therefore animated by the same spirit. Of course there must be some similarity between them, otherwise one would not be likely to borrow from the other. But great care must be taken to discover where the similarity lies. When we are dealing with a form of expression such as rococo, we must remember that 'rococo' is not an exclusively historical term. We might speak with propriety about the late medieval or flamboyant architecture as 'rococo', and we might also speak of abstract painting, not the geometrical abstracts but the more fluent colour harmonies, as 'rococo'. In other words, a tendency towards decorative effects might be described as rococo. Now it would be absurd to say that the same mentality lay behind flamboyant architecture as lies behind modern abstract art, and I would suggest that it is quite as absurd, though not as obviously so, to say that secular and ecclesiastical art in the eighteenth century were expressions of the same spirit.

Of course the authors do not say that, nor even suggest it, but they do not, on the other hand, make a clear distinction between these very different branches of rococo art—a distinction which is all the more necessary on account of their superficial similarity. That distinction is based on the difference of artistic aims. To understand these aims the reader will have to supplement *The Age of Rococo* by two other books, *From Baroque to Rococo* (1959) by Nicolas Powell and *Baroque Churches of Central Europe* (1958) by John Bourke[1]; the first gives the history of rococo (secular and ecclesiastical), the second deals exclusively with churches and their architects; both authors, it may be added, have an appreciation for the inner religious significance of this art without which it is impossible to understand its artistic purpose.

The aim of the builder of a German rococo church was, quite simply, to create an image of heaven on earth. 'The Church is heaven', said a preacher at a consecration ceremony at Diessen, and every rococo church was designed to make the worshipper feel that only a thin veil separated the visible world from the invisible and celestial world which was his home. Every church was a symbol of the Church Triumphant,

[1] Both published by Faber and Faber. 50s. and 35s. respectively. Mr Bourke's book was the first methodical study of Central European baroque churches to appear in English. From this it may be judged how little has been known of the period. There is no reference to the Asam brothers, Neumann or von Erlach in the latest edition of Bannister-Fletcher's standard work on architecture. Between the wars Mr Sacheverell Sitwell tried to interest the English-speaking world in this art (*German Baroque Sculpture*). The present interest is due no doubt to improved travel facilities, and visitors to Oberammergau might take time off to see the rococo pilgrimage churches in the immediate vicinity.

but whereas the baroque celebrated the triumph of the Church over her enemies here on earth, the rococo proclaims the glories of the Church Triumphant in heaven. Saints and angels pass freely between the two worlds, and the vault opens on a vision of the Assumption of the Virgin or the Blessed Trinity surrounded by the heavenly court. The whole scene is a testimony to the last articles of the Creed : ' the Communion of Saints, the resurrection of the body, and life everlasting '.

It is not hard to see how the rococo style enabled this artistic aim to be realized with breath-taking success. It gave the church that air of unreality which suggested the proximity of another world. The pomp and splendours of the profane world became a mirror of heavenly splendours and glories. Unlike the heavier baroque, it had that delicacy and élan which mounts lightly upwards and carries the eye and all else upwards with it—' the last and greatest embodiment of all the arts '. Clearly this is a very different function from that which rococo style played in the profane world. It is still intimate but the intimacy is between heaven and earth—heaven no longer seems remote ; it is still an art of make-belief yet the illusion it creates is not a world of fantasy but a symbol of invisible realities ; it is still light-hearted and gay, but with the innocent gaiety of the children of God.

Artistic and religious aims are so perfectly blended that to appreciate the difference between ecclesiastical and secular rococo one has to keep both in mind all the time. To the spectator who does not know that the church is a symbol of heaven on earth it will appear as a collection of decorative effects without unity or meaning. But behind the rich profusion of ornament there is order ; the wayward, asymmetrical structure achieves symmetry in a higher synthesis ; and the unprecedented use of colour makes an important emotional and symbolic contribution to the total effect. If the church is properly constructed the underlying unity and order will become apparent as one moves through it—if it is not properly constructed it will continue to look like a Victorian tropical conservatory. The effect of a rococo church demands movement on the part of the spectator (as Mr Powell remarks, it cannot be captured by a still picture but needs the eye of the cinema camera) because, in order to suggest the infinite, ' it is so constructed and decorated that the eye can never take it in completely as a spatial whole, although, and this is the point, it is ceaselessly driven to do so.' (Bourke p. 52) The rococo may, as Alan Pryce-Jones says, fulfil a need for significant decoration, but the significance of the decoration comes from its place in the total movement and rhythm of the building. This movement starts in the very ground-plan and is carried on by the sway and surge of the walls, balconies and pillars ; it is caught up by the drapery and gestures of the statues ; and finally bursts forth exuberantly in the aspiring motifs of the rocaille, until it is lost in the swirl of heavenly figures that fill the space above our heads.

Perhaps enough has now been said to make clear the points at which religious and secular rococo meet and where they differ profoundly. In 1770 the Elector of Bavaria, under pressure from the Enlightenment and the neo-classical spirit which was then appearing for the first time, forbade the use of the rococo style in churches. He imposed instead ' a noble simplicity appropriate to divine worship ', and the churches, as Schönberger and Soehner laconically remark, ' became sombre places and the Deity, no longer presented as on a stage, withdrew into the further reaches of Heaven '. But there are many people, especially in the English-speaking world, who would probably agree with the Elector ; they feel that there is something indecorous about representing the Deity as on a stage, even when that representation is as refined and delicate as the rococo. Indeed, that very refinement adds a touch of effeminacy that is unsuitable to religious worship.

To some extent these criticisms are justified, but not entirely.[1] They are based in some measure on prejudice, both religious and artistic. Rococo, and for that matter, baroque art offends against our modern preference for an art which is, as we say, ' true to materials'. The word which readily comes to the pen of a modern critic of rococo is ' illusionism '. Art should not pretend to be what it is not, nor should it be used for ends beyond its own—' to use art is to abuse art ' (Sir Herbert Read). That rococo art is designed to create an illusion no one would deny ; its aim is to raise the mind to heavenly realities by inducing a suspension of disbelief. But this is not an abuse of art nor a deception ; the artist does not create an illusion for its own sake nor in order to make the spectator think that he was actually looking into heaven ! If he did, the artistic effect would be lost (as it is lost when over-elaborate realism is used on the stage). All art is artificial, and most of the visual arts achieve their effect by some form of illusionism. If ' truth to materials ' (whatever that means in practice) is to be taken as an absolute norm, then, as Henry Moore (surely no illusionist) once said, ' a snowman made by a child will have to be praised at the expense of a Rodin or a Bernini '. But one would have thought that this matter had been conclusively settled as long ago as 1914 by Geoffrey Scott in his *The Architecture of Humanism.*

A sounder and more common objection to baroque and rococo art is that it is theatrical, which, of course, it is. But one has not said the last word by calling a form of religious art theatrical. There is no reason, either artistic or religious, why the mysteries of the faith should not be represented dramatically ; they are, after all, dramatic. ' To the

[1] To discuss these criticisms adequately is beyond the scope of the present article, the purpose of which is to describe the culture of the age as a whole. However, they cannot be completely ignored, and what follows is intended to point the way for further discussion and to offer what I consider might be a solid basis for such a discussion.

objection that baroque church art is theatrical [writes Mr Bourke] one is tempted to reply by asking when the association of religion with drama became something unusual or unjustifiable. It is in fact a very ancient association, one that goes back to the origins of religious expression.' (p. 66) But the objection is not, or at least should not be, directed against the whole notion of the 'theatrum sacrum'. What is meant by theatrical in the objection is a sort of exaggerated emotionalism, elaborate and empty display, vapid and insincere gesticulating which one associates with the worst forms of theatrical expression and, to some extent, with secular rococo art. But is ecclesiastical rococo theatrical in that sense ? To anyone who thinks it is I would be inclined to say : look again.

There is no denying that first impressions, especially the first impressions of anyone who has not grown up with this kind of art, may not be favourable. The superficial resemblance of rococo churches to salons and theatres is quite remarkable. But we are led to doubt the sincerity of the feeling behind this form of expression chiefly, I think, because, as David Sylvester said of a certain Pietà, it all looks 'so frightfully well-bred'. Yet the elegance, charm and breeding do not suppress 'the intimations of a serenity and purity beyond the human plane'. One has only to compare a rococo Madonna or saint with its counterpart in the secular world to see this (fig. 2). The discreet eroticism which a sly look suggests is totally lacking. And what is true of the statues is true also of the building as a whole. Every aspect of it breathes innocence and purity and joy. No shadow rests over the gatherings of the Blessed, no threat of impending disaster : all is peace and security. The art of the salons and the festal gardens was the art of an erotic dream-world and of the fleeting moment ; the art of the rococo churches is the art of eternal realities and of the unchanging moment.

Yet there is something about these rococo churches which, with the best will imaginable, a Christian of the twentieth century finds hard to accept. For all its innocence and joy rococo religious art stands aside from the harsher realities of the Christian life. It is an art full of the innocence of childhood and of the joys of First Communion when heaven is very near. But one cannot nourish one's piety on this kind of art alone. The question is, should one nourish one's piety on it at all ? To say that one should not, seems rather too severe and puritanical (or should we say purist). There is surely room for religious exuberance, even sophisticated exuberance. In an age '*absolument corrompu*' this art testified to Christian purity and serenity beyond the human plane. Why should its message be any less relevant to this present age, no less corrupt ? Perhaps its urbane spirituality might act as a corrective to our own neurotic pessimism.



1. A. Magny. *Microscope*

2. I. Günther. *St Kunigunde*. Limewood. Rott am Inn

3. J. J. Kändler : *Harlequin and Colombine*. Meissen

1. *Staircase of the Würzburg Residency* by B. Neumann; 1750-53
Ceiling by G. B. Tiepolo

James Stephens: Lyric Poet

by AUGUSTINE MARTIN

TIME has taken a subtle revenge on James Stephens. In his lifetime, from the moment he published his first volume of poems, at the age of twenty, he was taken very seriously as a poet. He was treated with respect and frequently with concern, for he had new things to say and a vigorous, uncompromising way of saying them. But in his later years critics and anthologists seem to have conspired to represent him as a slight whimsical poet who agonized over rabbits caught in snares. Even his *Crock of Gold* has come to be regarded as mere golden fantasy, spinning its way into being from a gay, uncomplicated, elfin imagination. Its rich philosophical overtones have gradually been ignored. The slow, painful journey that brought him to this point of apparent placidity and which was later to take him far beyond its philosophical conclusions has been similarly neglected. In fact, Stephens spent his life struggling with the great universal questions of good and evil, God, man and the devil, and the fundamental sources of human laughter and pain. It is in his poetry that this intense struggle is dramatized, and a study of that poetry reveals a continuous development in his thinking and in his art that is quite fascinating to trace. When one becomes aware of this central moral anxiety that is at the back of his poetry, every poem, even ' The Snare ', falls into place and makes its contribution to the constantly evolving pattern of his sensibility.

Another common misunderstanding is that Stephens was another of the Celtic Twilight poets. This can be said of his prose with some justice, but in his poetry he accepted none of their themes or conventions. There is at least one very distinguished Irish critic who constantly dismisses his poetry with the epithet Georgian—or is it Edwardian ?—an entirely false charge, as can be easily demonstrated. In 1909 Yeats certainly merited this description. It was then that Stephens wrote :

> I will not dance!
> I say I will not dance.
> Your audience! Pah! Let them go home again,
> Sleek ugly pigs! Am I to hop and prance
> As long as they will pay ?
> And posture for their eyes! And lay
> My womanhood before them! Let them drain
> Their porter-pots and snuffle—I'll not stay!

This was indeed a shock to a reading public that had been conditioned by the stately mysticism of *The Wind Among the Reeds ;* and this first volume *Insurrections* by an unknown twenty-year-old poet did cause considerable shock and even distaste in Dublin at that time. This was a new voice, aggressively original and personal ; here was anger and bitterness, a diction adapted uncompromisingly from colloquial speech, themes earthy and realistic. The very title of the book marked Stephens out as a literary insurgent, making a complete break with the Edwardian conventions and the tapestry-weaving of the pre-Raphaelites. Yeats had not yet begun to extricate himself from these influences, and the hard colloquial note was not to echo in his verse with any resonance for another fifteen years. Eliot was born a year before Stephens but ' Prufrock ' was another eight years in the offing. However, it was not so much his diction that startled Dublin most, but the anger and rebelliousness and apparent irreverence of his attitudes. (The sacrosanctity of angry young men was not properly appreciated in those days.)

Take the stanza above for instance ; it is a dramatic lyric called ' The Dancer ', and its tone and burden is typical of the early Stephens. The girl's lover has died, but she is expected to go on capering for the the whims of the rich and the powerful and the cruel instead of going home to mourn for him. Here is the human being stripping her teeth against society, determined to fight for her inner sense of dignity and importance. One can sense the vital indignant energy of the young poet who is speaking through her mouth ; the energy and indignation that is to be tuned and modulated under his developing artistry. There are many other of his early poems constructed along the same lines and carrying a similar rebellious attitude. ' Bessie Bobtail ', ' Where Demons Grin ', ' What the Tramp Said ', and finally ' Auld Snarly Gob ' are excellent and memorable character sketches, but they all carry the same load of grim bitterness. Side by side with these we get such tender and humorous sketches as ' Mad Patsy ', ' Danny Murphy ' and ' Seamus Beg '. But at this stage the anger predominates and though these dramatic lyrics can be enjoyed very much for their own sake, they are best seen as variations on the same theme played on different human instruments.

Then there were his alleged blasphemies of which Robert Farren has since written :

> I judge that his rather repellent poems about God and Satan fail, fail to be anything really, even blasphemy. They are made-up ; Stephens not as the child but as the book-born ' *enfant terrible* '.

From a frank admirer of Stephens this is certainly an extreme and—if I may say so—a wrong-headed view. To my mind there is no attempt, successful or otherwise, to be blasphemous in these poems. And to

dismiss them as frauds, as Mr Farren does, is to ignore the whole central moral conflict that absorbed Stephens's consciousness through the greater part of his life. It is precisely this that most modern readers seem to have done; they are, apparently, happier with the Leprechaun than the Philosopher. But let us examine some of these poems in detail and try to expose their roots. 'What the Devil Said' seems a fair choice. I might begin by saying that I think the poem succeeds in its object, an object that has certainly none of the intentional blasphemy that Mr Farren attributes to it.

It describes how 'God the Father Good' was aroused from his throne, where he sat 'weary of praises', by the cry of a child that has come to him from the distant earth. There follows a splendid passage descriptive of the universe as the eye of God probes 'the slant of space', seeking out the child and the cause of its suffering. He passes the

> Whistling stars, bright as a wizard's day,

and further the mountains

> Squatting tremendous on the broad-backed earth,'

till eventually

> He found it in a ditch outside a town
> A tattered hungry woman, bending down
> By a dead babe. — So there was nought to do,
> For what is done is done! And sad he drew
> Back to his heaven of ivory and gold;
> And as he sat all suddenly there rolled
> From where the woman wept upon the sod
> Satan's deep voice —Oh thou unhappy God!

This poem yields a great deal in terms of thought and technique. The first three stanzas—which I haven't space to quote—give a vivid, impressionistic account of the cosmos as the point of pain is localized. It is not just description for description's sake. It emphasizes the apparent void between this 'Good God' and his creatures; it provides an ironical comment on the disproportion that allows inanimate nature such splendour and human nature such misery. The phrase 'bright as a wizard's day', though finely evocative, has very potent overtones of emptiness and vainglory; above all, the 'surgent energy' of this colossal system suggests powerfully that the creation has somehow got beyond the control of the Creator. (A suggestion that is reinforced when it is found that He cannot relieve the child's pain.)

This is a further development of Stephens's initial bitterness and perplexity. He finds himself up against the oldest problem in the world, the apparently insoluble contradiction of great pain existing in a world

created and watched over by a good and benevolent God. It is a problem for which he found only a partial solution as I hope to show. But all of these poems are sincere if unsuccessful attempts to resolve his difficulty. It is his old method of setting out the problem from a variety of viewpoints in hope of eventually seeing it all in a revealing angle of vision. God—who is really not the God of traditional Christianity but a colourless abstraction from some imperfectly absorbed Protestant education—is constantly represented as a sad distant figure unhappy at the refractory world he has created. In ' What Thomas said in a Pub ', He is seen raising His hand over the earth to destroy it,

> He lifted up his hand
> I say he heaved a dreadful hand
> Over the spinning earth ! Then I said stay !
> You must not strike it God — I'm in the way
> And I will never move from where I stand !
> He said — Dear Child — I feared that you were dead,
> And stayed his hand.

Here the world is dramatically saved, because one man wants to go on living in it. Some of the poet's treatments of this theme are humorous like ' Mac Doul ' and others are grim and desperate like ' Bessie Bobtail '. This latter concerns a poor, mad old creature who mumbles as she shuffles along—

> Oh, God He knows ! And God He knows ;
> And surely God Almighty knows !

Everywhere, in these early poems, there is this note of sincere moral perplexity that sometimes finds expression in a rebellious questioning of Providence. The values of Christianity seem to gradually lose their meaning for him and the movement of his thought slowly turns from the attempt to reconcile these apparent contradictions towards a gay uncomplicated paganism. Frequently we get the impression that he is systematically dislodging this now meaningless set of values from his mind to make way for his new concept of truth. (This new concept is to be later reinforced by the theosophical doctrines of Æ and Madame Blavatsky.)

It can be remarked at this stage that when Stephens rejects Christianity it is not because he has tested it and found it wanting. It is painfully obvious that he never understood it properly in the first place. And while his poems express his agonies and doubts with beauty and eloquence, lyric poetry was hardly the medium in which to solve theological perplexity. However it is not my function here to disprove his theological opinions, but to try to understand them as they operate in his poetry.

His new attitude is really epitomized in Omar Khayam's stanza :

> Ah Love ! could thou and I with Fate conspire
> To grasp this sorry state of things entire
> Would not we shatter it to bits — and then
> Remould it nearer to the Heart's Desire.

Allied to this is the problem of right and wrong which is constantly giving him trouble, and which he also tries to resolve in terms of his poetry. His search for the truth begins on a note of vague uncertainty and unhappiness with this moral concept and ends up also in a sort of pagan rejection of the whole idea. In a fine little poem ' A Wish ' the phase of his uncertainty is clearly and rather poignantly shown. In the earlier verses of it he expresses a vague regret that he has grown up and left behind his childhood when he was unhampered by the notion of good and evil ; a time when his guesses and intuitions appear to have been nearer to the truth than the formal sanctions that adulthood has erected around the question : it ends :

> Of good or ill ! When it so often seems
> There is no good at all, but only ill.
> Alas ! The sunny summertime of dreams
> The dragons I had nerved my hand to kill
> The maid I might have rescued, and the queen
> Whose champion long ago I might have been.

Read casually, this lyric might be taken as mere whimsical nostalgy of the kind that every adult feels from time to time. But under scrutiny, and taken in conjunction with the trend of a great number of his other poems of this period it is obviously more than this. To Stephens the cramping canons of good and evil have robbed the world of half its wonder, and have made all joy seem guilty joy. How much of this attitude can be attributed to his childhood is a matter for the psychiatrist, but the poverty and misery of his youth and early manhood would certainly account for much of his initial bitterness.

In the end he rejects the whole idea of good and evil and a sense of pure pagan ecstasy comes in to replace it. Eventually at some stage between 1915 and 1926, in the poem ' Dance ', we find him bouncing airily to the words

> Good and bad and right and wrong !
> Wave the silly words away !
> This is wisdom — to be strong.
> This is virtue — to be gay.
>
> Let us sing and dance until
> We have found the hidden art
> How to banish good and ill
> With the laughter of the heart.

Strangely it is with this gradual discovery that his gay lyric genius catches fire. The anxiety and bitterness evaporate and his laughter is emancipated.

In the strict sense, of course, he has not found a real answer ; he has not discovered why God who is good permits evil and hatred ; he has not solved the problem of Bessie Bobtail in her twisted wretchedness, for laughter and song do not abolish the painful realities of poverty and deformity. They do not really explain

> . . . the viper and the toad
> And the blind beggar glaring down the road.

Stephens was not a thinker but a singer. Instead of an answer he had discovered an attitude, a stance, and for his purposes as singer this is just as good. He can now, like his Philosopher, turn his back on barren philosophical disputation and revel in the primaeval pagan glee of Pan and of Aengus Óg.

* * *

Stephens's individuality expressed itself even in his choice of poetic models. The only one of the Victorians who might have influenced him was Browning, from whom he may have derived some of his unceremonious abruptness. But the real influences in his poetry were Blake and the Elizabethans. Both influences were salutary, for he had the independence to absorb what suited his muse and to reject what might impair his freshness and originality. The Elizabethans seem to have shown him the way in his delightful love lyrics, 'The Daisies', ' Lesbia ', ' Sweet Apple ', ' Green Weeds ' in ' Woods and Meadows '— all these care-free songs of the open air, reminiscent of Herrick and Campion :

> In the scented bud of the morning O,
> When the windy grass went rippling far,
> I saw my dear one walking slow
> In the field where the daisies are.

This is pure song ; a lovely evocation of the fresh morning air, and the innocent elation of young love. Consider the graceful vowel correspondence of, for instance, the second line. And yet the whole impression is one of unstudied naturalness, the ' wanton heed and giddy cunning ' of Elizabethan lyricism, re-created with absolute originality.

' Green Weeds ' is nearer to the courtly love tradition :

> That lily hand, those lips of fire
> Those dewy eyes that spill desire
> Those mounds of lambent snow may be
> Found anywhere it pleaseth thee.

Here he echoes the melodic sensuousness of Carew and Lodge. It was a sound poetic instinct that guided Stephens in his choice of models. He realized that his talent was uniquely lyrical and back he went over the heads of the Romantics and Pre-Raphaelites—like another rebel Irishman, James Joyce—to the hey-day of the English lyric and his true masters, the Elizabethans.

The influence of Blake was even stronger and more enduring. Stephens admired Blake enormously and sought the same kind of excellence in his own poetry. In one of his broadcast talks he said of Blake's poetry :

> Quite a quantity of his verse was written between his twelfth year and his twentieth. This is the greatest poetry ever written by a young person; and this and much more is the best and largest collection of what we call ' pure poetry ' in the language. Blake is the master of that lovely, almost unearthly metric and that simple and unreasonable elation which we call pure.

It was this elusive quality of poetic purity that Stephens most admired in Blake and cultivated in his own verse. T. S. Eliot remarks on this same quality in Blake, his extraordinarily unclouded mind that could see the world with a child's eye, free from all bookish associations ; the simplicity and terrifying honesty of his vision. Stephens had this quality by natural right, and he could easily learn from Blake, for he had no formal literary education either and could share the spontaneity of his response to the created world. This realization will help us to understand a large number of his poems that seem to have puzzled and at times enraged his critics. It was found that he frequently described a scene or an object, described it with strange fidelity and then left it at that. No message could be extracted ; there was a sense of contemplation conveyed but no moral or conclusion arising out of the contemplation. His impressionistic little poem ' The Main Deep ' he retains in his collected edition despite the universal outcry of his critics. It begins :

> The long rólling
> Steady póuring
> Deep trenchéd
> Green billów.

and goes on in this fashion. He explains in one of his poetry recitals that he was trying to get a rhythm and a verbal music to convey ' the roll, rush and march of great waters '. (God knows he had a poor shot at it.) He complains of Byron's apostrophe to the Ocean that it gives only two lines to the ocean and the rest to meditations on human ambition and the transience of life. But Stephens wants to behold—there is no other word for it—the wonders of nature with Blakean wonder

and simplicity. He goes further, he wants to think himself into the object in the hope of absorbing its essence. It is a process like Hopkins's 'inscape'; a sort of empathetic method. A friend once came upon the poet sitting on the grass and looking solemnly into the eyes of a cow, as if in an effort to absorb its 'cowness'. The contemplation resulted—I presume—in an eccentric little piece, wisely excluded from his collected edition. It opens:

> Cow, cow
> I and thou
> Are looking in each other's eyes.

These considerations, I think, help us to understand a whole section of his poems. He sees the moon and the stars, and the swaying rose as it were through a child's eye, bringing to his vision all the spontaneous wonder and praise of a child. Sometimes this method betrayed him into nonsense like the above, but mostly it payed off. Where has there been a more accurate and exciting impression of the blustering rapacity of the Autumn wind than this?

> The wind stood up, and gave a shout
> And whistled in his fingers, and
> Kicked the withered leaves about,
> And thumped the branches with his hand,
> And said, he'll kill, and kill, and kill;
> And so he will, and so he will!

Here his method is successful because he is not self-consciously striving after effect; the effect sought in 'The Main Deep' is too studiously sought. His was a natural sympathy with created things and it operated best when it was not strained.

* * *

In the years before 1920 the theosophical system of thought was getting a strong hold on Stephens. He is somewhere described as Æ's first disciple. As he dislodged the Christian view of life from his thinking he slowly replaced it with the vague Theosophist idea of mystical union with the supreme Being who appears as *Love*, *Joy*, *the Will*, *the Demiurge*, and under a series of other appellations in his poems. I have not the space to trace this development in full and shall only sketch it as it arises in some of his better poems of this middle period. I hope to define it more fully in a future essay when I study his later poems together with his fine volume of translations from the Irish, *Reincarnations*. His two pieces, based on the Vedas, 'Thy Soul' and 'The Crest Jewel', 'The Breath of Life' and his greatest single poem, 'The Pit of Bliss'

show an emerging mysticism that becomes elaborated in his final period. A glance at ' The Breath of Life ' will prepare us for the view of poetry and of life expressed in ' The Pit of Bliss '.

In it the poet flies in horror from an arid debate where the inevitable problem of good and evil is being discussed. He becomes caught up by the Breath of Life and lifted beyond time and space ; he sees no standard of good and evil in the world : the sole standard is love, and union with that love means supreme harmony with the world. (It is, of course, his earlier conclusion being formalized and reinforced by a positive doctrinal system.) This is a crude summary of a fine lyric, but the notion re-appears in ' The Pit of Bliss ', where we can give it a closer scrutiny. Here this state of mystical union is seen as the inspiring source of song. Stephens sees himself as having reached this ideal spiritual condition and from this eminence he can look back on his past life and poetry and see it—with approval—in a new universal perspective :

> When I was young
> I dared to sing
> Of everything, and anything ;
> Of joy and woe, of fate and God
> Of dreaming cloud and teeming sod.

Even though he didn't realize fully the divine source of his inspiration, he was acting under its benevolent influence. And even though he has now attained to a deeper understanding of things he continues to celebrate the wonders and the mysteries of creation :

> And tho' an older wight I be,
> My soul has still such ecstasy
> That, on a pulse, I sing and sing
> Of everything and anything.

This seemingly banal refrain comes swinging in at the end of each movement, and gains extraordinary significance as the thought of the poem develops. In the second stanza he tries to find the nature of this inspiration. He dismisses ' thinking ' as inadequate ; it is rather a divine infusion—

> An hurricane of Knowing, that
> Could whelm the soul . . .

Then in the third movement the soaring, whirling speed of the poem reaches its peak, and he sees the poetic frenzy as similar to that of an eagle who, in the pure joy of flight reaches a stage when it must fall

And sink, and whirl, and scream, thro' all
Its dizzy heaven-hell of pit
In mile a minute flight from it
That he had dared ! From height to height,
So the poet takes his flight
And tumble in the Pit of Bliss !
And, in the roar of that abyss,
And falling, he will sing and sing
Of everything and anything !

The last stanza, by a fine progression of conceptual and imagistic thought arrives at the conclusion that pure poetry is divinely inspired when the poet allows himself ' to be a Pour, an avalanche of Being ' ; that it has the whole world for its subject-matter and that its object is to celebrate the splendour of God and man and creation. It is a splendid poem ; in fact, it seems to me to be the best poetic statement of poetic theory in the language, for it is itself the supreme exemplar of what it says by the very manner in which it says it. Why it was not included in *The Oxford Book of Irish Verse* is beyond me. However, to appreciate the poem fully, one must hear the poet's own recording of it, which is altogether compelling in its soaring spiritual vitality.

This essay covers very briefly the poet's earlier original poetry, and perhaps suggests in outline the philosophical trend of the poet's thought. It has been necessary to exclude many of his best poems and to deal cursorily with many others. There remain his volume *Insurrections* and the three books of mystical poetry that he published before his death in January 1951.

These books, apart from from their very substantial literary merit, throw very interesting light on 1) his attitude towards his Irish tradition, and 2) the subsequent development of his philosophic thought. I hope to deal with them in a second essay.

Second Language Teaching and the Problem of Bilingualism

by JOHN WILSON

AT first sight you may suspect me, almost totally ignorant of the Irish language as I am, of being a somewhat odd choice to deliver this lecture.[1] Let me hasten to establish my *bona fides*. As no doubt you already hear I am a Scot. My mother tongue would scarcely be recognized by the Southern English and it has been moulded by deep Celtic influences. So conscious am I of the rich linguistic inheritance of these islands of ours that even after a twenty years absence from them plus ten years residence in London, I belong to an active vernacular group in London to promote the languages of Scotland as living languages. In all modesty I may perhaps claim that I share your interests and feelings in these matters of language and am anxious to share with you in your knowledge.

On a more tangible plane—though let me say here that the intangible in language is no less important than the tangible—I have behind me some thirty-three years in education as teacher, headmaster, administrator, broadcaster, college principal and university lecturer, most of the time wrestling with the practical problem of teaching English as second language to indigenous African languages. During my time in Africa the economic and social changes were such that English, from a language second in status, became a language in a bilingual partnership and I found that teaching language in a situation of bilingualism was a very different matter from anything I had previously experienced. I was called upon to make profound changes in my educational approaches and methods. Indeed I found that I had to develop a new view of languages. Now I take it that your aim here in Ireland is, at least, to arrive at a stable equal bilingual partnership of Irish and English. This I bear in mind in what follows for it is important, and in my view profoundly affects how we proceed in school in language teaching. To acquire, say, reading knowledge of a foreign language, as a scientist might, for access to texts in his field of study or to acquire, say, tourist knowledge of a foreign language are legitimate aims, but limited. It is quite another matter to become equally skilled in two languages so that,

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[1] Delivered to An Comhchaidreamh in the Hibernian Hotel, Dublin, on 5th May 1960.

The lecturer wishes to thank the Oxford University Press for permission to use some of the material in his article which was published in *Teacher Education* Vol. 1, No. 1. (May, 1960)

first, both are equally available as a means of communication in everyday affairs and, second, so that both lead to a penetration of the cultures to which they give access. It is in this sense that I understand bilingualism.

Now let me begin by placing before you some of the results, important to teaching, of recent enquiry into general linguistics. I have found it most handily gathered together in : *Language : a modern synthesis* by Joshua Whatmough (Secker and Warburg) and, in particular, Chapters II to IV.

Whatmough first reminds us of something so simple and self-evident that we are apt to lose sight of it, namely that there is no substance called language, there are only languages. From this it follows that in teaching language we are not teaching a body of knowledge as in history, but we are teaching control of a means of communication, skill in a signalling system.

Now, as we all know, learning control of anything, i.e. learning a skill, be it the skill of cycling, of wood-carving or of anything else, takes place only in continued attempts at doing. In the case of the control and skill of a language this implies that the learner listens to the language, i.e. tries to receive it. At the same time the learner speaks the language, i.e. tries to produce it. This hearing and speaking, of course, must not be mere parrotting. It must be related to receiving and conveying meaning. Thus teaching grammar does not teach control and skill of a language. This prime element of receiving and producing language in relation to meaning must be present at all stages in the teaching and learning of any language and is the foundation of the practical suggestions I have to make later.

Second, Whatmough underlines the fact that meaning in language is not only a matter of vocabulary. It is much more fundamentally bound up with order of language, i.e. with how language is structured.

Thus: ' The horse ran away with the man ' is very different from ' The man ran away with the horse ' though exactly the same words appear in both sentences.

Third, Whatmough insists that habit in languages varies totally from language to language, i.e. the way in which we say what we have to say is entirely different from language to language and this is bound up with the structures of languages which therefore also differ totally from language to language. A clear illustration of this emerges when we compare the hightly inflected manner in which the Latin language is constructed and the all important word-order or word-grouping mode by which English is constructed. This is not a mere matter of difference in time between these languages. We have only to think of the structural differences between English, French and German languages of to-day, which at least have a common root, to realize the over-ruling importance of this consideration in language teaching.

Modern language teachers present will realize the depth of confusion that arises in the minds of their pupils because of the simple contrast between the English 'I have given him' and 'Je lui ai donné'.

Fourth, the meaning of a language construction is bound up with sound. I am not here thinking of the more analytical side of phonetics. I am here referring to sound in this connection as the over-all tune of structures, i.e. intonation and stress. We all know that some foreigners speaking English are difficult, even impossible, to understand even when they are using the right words. The barrier in communication is because the words though correct are not composed into the over-all tune of stress and intonation to which our ears are accustomed, i.e. the tune inherent in our language habits and from which over-all meaning is grasped.

Much that is of basic importance in teaching any language flows from this. The structural arrangements and the tunes of the structure of the mother-tongue begin to exercise their habit-forming influences in the mind, upon the neural-motor system, upon the ear, upon the speech organs very early. They are well set by the time the child comes to school and very hardened by ten years of age. Thus many linguists and psychologists conclude that if bilingualism in the terms I indicated earlier is to be achieved, a start with the so-called second language must be made before ten so that the learner gets a double set of entirely different language habits, one for one language, one for the other, the second set as strong or approximately as strong as the first. This means, of course, that to gain control of two languages, i.e. true bilingualism, a beginning should be made with the so-called second language in the primary and even in the infant school. Further, it follows that, in infant and primary school, in teaching the so-called second language, the teacher has to induce the learner to recapitulate for the second language, in a shorter space of time, all he has done from infancy in the first language. A tall order and probably beyond the best teaching were it not that nature is on the teachers' side and has endowed children with a remarkable capacity of and a remarkable flexibility in acquiring language particularly between infancy and the age of ten—but it takes highly skilled and highly knowledgeable teaching and here the skill of really good teachers rather than the expert knowledge of the linguist is required.

True the linguistic experts tell the teachers what is the structural nature of the language they are to teach—perhaps even give some indication, by and large, of what structures might be expected to be within the control of children at any given stage. Unfortunately, however, there has been a tendency to allow the undoubted authority of the linguistic expert within his own field to invade the practical field of actual learning and teaching. Thus, on a linguistic basis, it has sometimes been indicated that the children should learn language structures

in some pre-determined order from assumed simplicity to what is assumed to be more difficult linguistically. Such orders are usually referred to as gradings. Undoubtedly these have their uses, but too frequently they embody purely linguistic considerations, whereas children want to acquire the language that will signal their wants and needs, their physical and social environment and their reactions to it. From these things flow the interests of children. This is the source of their experience and learning. The language they need is the language that signals these things; and that language, needed, wanted and used by children, takes no account whatsoever of orders of difficulty of linguistic structures. Children make their wants, feelings and interests known even if they garble the linguistic structure. So also do adults who give up the attempt and take to swearing. The first requirements then are teachers who know these things, have a flair for what children want to say and hear and who understand how the language experience of children accumulates and is brought under control. A basic quality in teachers for teaching and learning of this nature is a sympathetic and encouraging approach to children. It will be noted that children learn to speak correctly, i.e. to control the speech habits or the language structure of their society only gradually. They acquire it only in using the language, as has already been noted ; thus, it is of the first importance that the speaking of children with all its incorrectness must never be inhibited by over-anxiety about correctness. The teacher's aim is, while maintaining readiness of speaking on the part of the children, to present unobtrusively what is correct and to induce correctness almost, as it were, subsconsciously, until correctness emerges in the skill of the language as something automatic.

From all this, it is immediately obvious that in the education of teachers in training colleges it is most important that a major part of child study should be concentrated on the language of children and this is doubly important where bilingualism is the aim. Each student could, with great advantage, collect, classify and study what children say and this habit of practical study of living language should remain with them throughout professional life. The content and method of language teaching should grow out of this continued first-hand experience of teachers, and on this empirical basis the work of the linguists and psychologists will, I feel sure, be much more fruitful. When the preparation of teachers is viewed from this angle, it can be seen that so-called training colleges could, with advantage, think of their work more in terms of constructive professional education than in terms of training.

Again, from all that has been said, it is immediately obvious that, basically, to learn languages means listening and speaking in relation to meaning. The reality of a language is its spoken production and its reception in hearing, both in relationship to meaning. Only in these

things spoken and heard will the learner develop first, spontaneity and, in due course, correctness with spontaneity, leading at last to automatic control. Reading and writing are only photographs of a language, not the basic reality. At least two of the three R's and perhaps even the third of them are impossible without the reality of listening and speaking in relation to meaning. Where bilingualism is the aim, this is true of both languages. Thus the aural-oral beginning of the learning of a language should be tackled vigorously and at first without the added complication of reading and writing. Reading and writing, when it comes, must be of things over which the learners have complete control in terms of hearing and speaking. It is dangerous to hurry on to reading and writing; a long time spent in thoroughness of hearing and speaking means faster progress in the long run. My collaborator in the writing of books for learners of English as a second language was that noted linguistic expert and language teacher, H. E. Palmer. Of the oral-aural approach to the teaching and learning of a second language he writes thus :

> The oral method is a necessary feature or phase of the ' complete ' method. The oral method is of the ideological order ; it is a means to an end ; it is an essential preliminary step towards an ultimate complete mastery of a language. The oral method will re-awaken and re-educate those spontaneous capacities for language study which are inherent in the human race ; those innate powers manifested in the earliest years of childhood.

It is clear that in using the term ' oral method ', H. E. Palmer had in mind something of what we now call the direct or the natural method for he goes on thus :

> It means learning to use a . . . language without reading, without writing, and without translating by dint of listening to the teacher speaking and responding to what he says . . . without any unnecessary recourse to the mother-tongue as a vehicle of instruction.

Palmer insists that this requires very great teaching skill. He continues thus :

> . . . far from being easy, the conversation course or direct method is extremely difficult ; only after having gained much experience can anyone call himself qualified to conduct that sort of work. . . . The conversation lesson requires alertness and resourcefulness on the part of the teacher ; he (and not the book) is conducting the lesson. It must be added that if the teacher is one who has studied the art, who has applied himself to mastering the technique and who possesses a natural gift for teaching, no form of language work is more delightful.

Now all this is, perhaps, a little uncomprising, labouring, perhaps, the technique of teaching, whereas I have stressed the sympathy and understanding of the teacher with the children learning language. Nevertheless it makes this point, namely that language teaching needs good teachers well educated to the job in their professional education, continuing in their study of children and their language and continually helped by continued professional education. I, of course, take it for granted that the teachers teaching any given language are thoroughly acquainted with that language, otherwise everything falls down ; for their eventual aim is to induce correctness in the uninhibited use of the language. This matter of a high order of oral direct teaching of the language by well-chosen teachers of sympathy and understanding, thoroughly at home in the language is of first importance. Out of my own experience, sometimes frustrating and even bitter, I would suggest that, if you in Ireland wish to be bilingual in the sense in which I have indicated, the resources of preparatory teacher-education as well as refresher or in-service-teacher-education should be seriously bent to the task.

It is by no means enough to turn out a cadre of teachers who will merely repeat patterns of teaching inculcated in the college. What is wanted is a teacher who takes the language children really use, builds upon it, extends it, enriches it and gradually introduces correctness while preserving spontaneity and confidence.

We might pause here to note that the language in school books is not necessarily the language children really use and, of course, there is sporadic correspondence in the educational press from time to time of the imagined middle-class norms, patterns and situations so often included between the covers of school books, which to so many of our children convey so little reality. Similarly many of the compositions and expression exercises set in schools have little relation to the children's actual experience nor to the kind of language which they use or for which they are likely to find use. This is usually even more true in the case of second languages.

Language for which the child has no use will not be used by them outside the classroom. It will remain inert, never to be mastered and, eventually, will be forgotten. The right kind of language that will frequently be used outside the classroom will gradually flow over into outside interests and other subjects and here there is something which requires encouragement and organization. I do not see how bilingualism can come about unless each of the two languages has the whole school time fairly apportioned between the languages, so that both of them can equally flow over into interests and subjects other than are comprised in language periods. Obviously in Ireland the music lesson may be a natural opening for Irish. Drama and all work of a literary nature

should have a fair proportion of time in the two languages. French West Africa, teaching French as the second language, seems to me to have shown acumen here, for most French lessons are used to prepare pupils in the French required in an arithmetic or other lesson due to follow and, linguistically, there is no perceptible break between the two lessons. It appears to me that bilingualism will not be effective unless the whole curriculum is affected by arrangements such as I have here glanced at. Certainly if either of the two languages involved is confined by tyranny of the timetable, school organization or examination system to a few set periods, then the school situation is not bilingual and bilingualism will not emerge from it.

I am here well aware that I am challenging the examination system and the sacrosanct nature of promotion systems, 11 Plus, school certificate and all that. Deeper still, I am raising the whole issue of the suspected danger of backwardness due to bilingualism. We are, I think, sure enough by now that only retardation is involved in bilingualism and that not for all learners. Whatmough, to whom I have already referred, takes the view that, if retardation *is* involved, it will be temporary and in the end will be more than compensated for by the control which the genuine bilingualist has of two signalling systems with their access to and penetration into two cultures. This seems to suggest that the danger really lies in bilingualism in half-measures. As I have indicated, the first requirement in full measure of bilingualism so far as schools are concerned is first-rate teaching and second, a genuine bilingual sharing of the time table and curriculum. This as I have already said will affect examinations. Now I am no abolisher of examinations. Where examinations go astray is in their content and so in what they examine. Properly adapted examinations should aid and encourage bilingualism not hamper it.

I have already suggested that the two languages involved in bilingualism should flow out from language periods into the other subjects of the school, and even to interests outside the school. Thus they should flow out into the home. This will only take place if, as I have indicated, the school by good teaching is giving the learners spontaneity and confidence as well as a real, living language that can be used in the real situation at home in which the learners find themselves. A report, which I read only a week or two ago on the teaching of English in an African area, records that teaching of this kind in African schools in Rhodesia caused a spread of English speech amongst illiterate parents. This kind of thing needs fostering if bilingualism is to come about, not only by good teaching inside the school but also by some action outside school, say through parents' associations and other contacts between school and home. The daily practice at home of each of the two languages being used in turns at meal times, and on other homely

occasions is of the greatest help. The more the home becomes and remains bilingual, the stronger the interest and motivation in school. Again, similarly, the more the society at large becomes bilingual the stronger again does interest and motivation become. When the workaday world has adopted bilingualism then interest and motivation are at a maximum. Of this I shall have more to say later.

In the meantime in the schools the contribution lies in a high order of teaching language that will be anything but inert. This is the only kind of language teaching in the school which will have an effect on the other areas of the curriculum, on the home and on the world outside. It seems to me that this is what is to be read into some of the research into questions of bilingualism in Wales. I have in mind especially what is reported by Mr W. R. Jones in his paper 'Attitude towards Welsh as a second language' in Volume XIX and XX of *The British Journal of Educational Psychology*. And this affects in particular the secondary school. What I said earlier about the preparation and continued education of teachers and of the content and method of language teaching was intended to apply to both primary and secondary schools.

It seems to me, however, that the secondary school has three problems of its own to consider and these are :

1. That the content and teaching of the second language in the bilingual partnership may be adversely influenced by the content and method used in teaching classical and continental languages.

2. That it might be wrongly assumed that older children do not require the same sympathy, understanding and encouragement in language learning as younger children.

3. That the lack of encouragement of bilingualism in the social environment and in the workaday world works adversely more strongly in the secondary than in the primary stage.

As far as the first of these, the adverse influence of content and teaching used in classical and continental language, let us first of all observe that there is here an academic tradition. It is not my business in this lecture to debate the content and teaching of these languages, but merely to point out that academic considerations are not of the first importance in teaching the second language of effective bilingualism. The basic need in both primary and secondary schools where bilingualism is involved is spontaneity and confidence in the use of the language through abundant aural-oral work involving the use of the direct method. To re-echo H. A. Palmer's words :

This means learning to use a language by dint of listening to the teacher speaking and responding to what he says without any unnecessary recourse to the mother tongue and also without translation,

which is in fact an advanced literary exercise but not productive of spontaneity and confidence. It means not only listening and responding to the teacher but it means the learners listening and responding to one another and here I would remind you that some of the research into these matters in Wales revealed that some secondary school pupils stated that they would like to be able to do this very thing, and resented that language teaching did not bring this about. All this means a very subordinate place for grammar—indeed it means only the use of that grammar which will help advanced learners to analyse their own errors. That is done not by memorizing rules but by skilled though infrequent reference to grammar books. Behind the memorization of grammar rules is the fallacy that correct usage will be so induced. This is not true. Correct usage comes through hearing and use of the right structure in many varied applications, until the ear and speech organs will not tolerate error. As Whatmough says: Usage is fixed by the habitual speech of the speakers.

Indeed, Whatmough suggests that much of our British and American teaching of ancient and modern languages requires fundamental change. He says :

> Those who are convinced that to learn at least one ancient or modern language is a valuable educational experience . . . . should see to it that the experience is initiated not later than the age of ten, that it is continued uninterrupted for at least four years, and that it is given a fitting amount of time in the weekly time schedule.

The second problem I referred to is indeed a difficult one. Many good language teachers in secondary schools, anxious to use every form of directness in their teaching, are driven to despair by the unresponsiveness and apparent lack of purposiveness that seems to afflict adolescent learners somewhere in the 2nd and 3rd year of the course. Such unresponsiveness remains until the 5th and 6th forms as a barrier, and especially a speech barrier between adolescents and grown-ups including, more especially, teachers and parents. Teachers at this stage envy teachers in primary schools for so much more is known of the psychology of childhood than of adolescence, and young learners are noted for what W. G. Wells called ' the nice little curiosities and willingness of a child '.

Let me say, straightaway, that sometimes secondary teachers are here inheriting mishandling in the primary school. The curiosity and willingness of primary school children, by and large, resembles the appetite of the all-consuming ostrich, to the extent that the livelier and more intelligent younger children will attempt, and often succeed in collecting any kind of knowledge by any kind of method. Now, if as a result of this, primary teachers are tempted into over-stuffing the young learners with knowledge about language, including grammatical

rules and other linguistic *tours de force* instead of inducing the skill and sound habits of language, then the deleterious effects will plague the secondary school language teachers. Sometimes the secondary school teachers have themselves to blame, for they tend to complain that children come up from the primary school with an insufficient knowledge of grammar and the like. What they really should ask for is children ready and willing to speak, confident in self-expression even if there is a residuum of incorrectness. These virtues the secondary school should struggle to preserve, for, as in the primary school so in the secondary school, only in the use of the language will correctness be induced. But even allowing for all that, the teacher of language in the secondary school has need of sympathy, understanding and patience with learners, at least the equal of that in the primary school, engendered by the same personal study of children of the appropriate age. The emphasis is still on encouraging speech. It is still important not to inhibit speech by over-anxiety about perfect correctness. It is still important to induce correctness as a matter of growth. In saying all this I, both as a parent and as a teacher, am well aware of the kind of paragon I am asking for, for only a paragon, indeed, could find the way through the conflicting moods, emotions, fits, starts and inhibitions of adolescence. Nevertheless something must be done about it.

The third problem in secondary school teaching of either of the languages of bilingualism I referred to was lack of encouragement in the social environment in the workaday world. On this I have already touched but I venture at this point to say more; for it has very special importance at the secondary school stage where, as research in Wales has pointed out, the motivation of pupils in learning Welsh was seriously weakened throughout the Secondary Modern School because pupils could see no future utilitarian value in the language. Now weak motivation in language learning is a very serious matter. If it can ever be fully offset at all, it will, I suggest, be offset only by efficiency in teaching and learning, probably along lines such as I have tried to indicate, for if learners feel they can really use a language, then not only do they enjoy satisfaction in their proficiency, but they can see uses for it and even devise growing and new uses for it. Indeed, I venture to suggest that satisfaction in proficient exercise of skill, rather than its utilitarian value is powerful motivation to youth. Language is, of course a skill. Let us who are teachers see to it that we so teach it that the learners obtain satisfaction in proficient use of it. Nevertheless serious intentions about bilingualism behoves us to look outside the school. Mr R. W. Jones suggests that pupils learning Welsh should be taken to Welsh-speaking areas. From experience in Africa in teaching English I can personally vouch for the beneficial effects of such measures. Here such action 'would seem easy by means of camping holidays,

long visits and the like to appropriate areas, to festivals, rallies and the like. Educational visits of all kinds might be led and conducted in Irish, particularly where heritage, history, literature and music were involved ; and all should be done really vigourously and extensively. For not only does it all lie more or less on your doorstep, so to speak, but it would probably have a two-way effect, namely on the pupils and on the outside society.

The workaday use of both the languages of bilingualism in fair shares is, in my view, to be encouraged. How far the world of business and commerce can be influenced in this direction it would be hard to say and is the subject of another lecture of a rather different kind. Suffice it is to say that any move in this direction would be a powerful stimulus to bilingualism and would undoubtedly help motivation in the school.

To sum up then :

For purposes of this lecture it is assumed that a bilingualism at least is aimed at; the partners being Irish and English. Education must then aim at making learners equally skilled in the two languages so that, first, both are equally available as a means of communication in everyday affairs, and, second, so that both lead to a penetration of the cultures to which they give access.

To teach a language is to teach a skill, not a body of knowledge, and the essential basis of skill in any language is to produce it and receive it fluently all in relationship to conveying and receiving meaning. Further each language has its own structures and its meaning is conveyed by these structures being communicated and received as sound patterns of intonation and stress.

From these facts of language it follows that basically to teach it for purposes of bilingualism as defined is to concentrate on the oral-aural and to teach the second language of the partnership by a direct or natural method in such a way that the same experience is communicated as in learning a mother tongue. Thus an early start must be made and the infant and primary school is involved as well as the secondary school. Teachers require careful preparation and continued refreshment and bringing up to date. Teaching skill and understanding of the learners are the basic requirements and to this linguistic knowledge is second. The secondary schools rather than follow accepted tradition in language teaching as in ancient and modern languages should continue and develop the approaches and methods begun in the primary school.

Reality and usefulness of the languages learnt and giving to the learners genuine practical skill of the languages is likely to lead to their using the languages in other subjects and in interests outside of school including spread to the home and elsewhere.

Finally, special measures were suggested in the home, in areas of culture and in the workaday world to assist bilingualism.

Opportunity for Rural Youth

by MAURICE KENNEDY

'I PLEDGE my head to clearer thinking; my heart to greater loyalty; my hands to larger service; and my health to better living for my club, my community and my country.' Behind this motto lies one of the most significant if least publicized developments in the post World War II period. It is the emergence of rural youth organizations in many parts of the world. These organizations were and still are purely educational in character and bear no relationship to the quasi-military youth organizations created by Hitler and his fellow dictators in the 1930's. Many of them are heavily influenced by the 4-H rural youth pattern in the United States and have in most cases adopted the 4-H four leaf clover symbol and working technique. As part of their technical aid missions around the world, the Americans sent experienced agricultural extension specialists to many countries where they set up complete working models of the 4-H Organization before they left. Colonel Charles Anderson of the U.S. Armed Forces, for example, started clubs in Korea at the end of World War II and in 1954 a nation-wide campaign to organize 4-H clubs was initiated with the assistance of the Korean Foundation to which Colonel Anderson had meanwhile returned as adviser in civilian life. Recently in America, I had the opportunity of meeting Mr Myong Ha Kwon, the South Korean National 4-H Leader. He told me that in spite of the disruption caused by the Communist invasion, South Korea now had 7,300 clubs with a total membership of 300,000 boys and girls in a population of 21 millions.

In Japan, 4-H began in August 1948 and was introduced to the U.S. Zone of Austria in early 1949. Indonesia has 102 4-H clubs and the movement appeared in the Philippines in 1952. The same year saw the emergence of the Four Sounds Clubs of Free China and the Yuwa Kasikorn clubs begun in Thailand by an F.A.O. official. Egypt has rural youth clubs also and there are the Three F. clubs (Food for Family Fitness) of Jamaica. South American countries like Brazil, Panama and Peru have also borrowed heavily from the 4-H pattern of their Northern neighbours.

A recent survey showed that excluding Western countries, membership in rural youth organizations in 33 countries adds up to about 650,000 boys and girls in 36,000 clubs. This aspect of Marshall Aid and Technical Assistance Programs has probably created more goodwill for the American people and tangible improvement in human welfare for the so-called neutral or uncommitted nations than all the billions of military aid dollars appropriated by U.S. Congress.

Ireland, too, has become involved in this emerging pattern of a world wide rural youth organization clearly defined in its aims and working methods. Macra na Feirme, since its own inception in 1944, has stressed the need for informal group education and has trained leaders drawn from the farming community itself. In the early 1950's, some rural Science Instructors, working under Vocational Education Committees, had introduced the idea of home projects in agriculture to link the work of the vocational school with the farming background of the boys. The Department of Education took up the idea with enthusiasm and Macra na Feirme National Council later formed a special section of their organization known as Macra na Tuaithe to take charge of the whole movement. Progress was slow mainly due to the lack of technical staff at national level to co-ordinate all the activities and provide local volunteer club leaders with necessary educational materials. Then in June 1958, in line with the international pattern, the Irish youth movement received much needed financial assistance from American sources. A substantial grant was awarded by the Kellogg Foundation of America for the specific purpose of developing Macra na Tuaithe. This grant will continue until June 1963 and by that time it is confidently expected that the educational results of Macra na Tuaithe will be impressive enough to justify permanent financial support from Irish sponsors.

As the 4-H club movement in America has been the source of inspiration for rural youth work in widely varying national conditions, a brief look at it will, I think, produce the key to its phenomenal success. Its impressive results are not entirely due to membership strength because the current enrolment of $2\frac{1}{4}$ million boys and girls between ten and twenty-one years is only about 20% of possible strength among rural youth. A powerful factor, however, is the 20 million adults who have passed through 4-H ranks and constitute a well informed and sympathetic public opinion on rural youth work. 4-H alumni can be found in all walks of American life from Cabinet level down to industrial workers who grew up on farms.

In 1908, President Theodore Roosevelt appointed the Country Life Commission to study the whole rural situation in America to find out what was holding back rural progress. It was common knowledge that the most ambitious youths were leaving the farms and those who went to college were not returning to live in home neighbourhoods. Public hearings were held in all parts of the country and the findings stimulated the passage of the Smith-Lever Act (1914) creating the Agricultural Extension Service to provide rural education for adults and youths. With subsequent legislation, this law provided a legal basis for 4-H club work and my recent experiences in working with County Agents (Agricultural Instructors) in various U.S. States suggests that most of them now spend 50% of their official time working with rural youngsters

and supervising their 4-H club activities. Some counties, which can afford a second agent, have him working full time on youth work with the assistance of the Home Economics lady advisor who operates in all counties and works with women and the young girls in 4-H club work. Shortly before final approval of the Act, the Colleges and Federal Government agreed that 25% of Smith-Lever funds should be earmarked for 'movable schools, study clubs or boys and girls clubs' and for printing.

Probably 4-H and Macra na Tuaithe work is explained most often by the traditional slogan 'learning to do by doing' which remains educationally sound today. It implies that a member has not fully learned a practice until he performs it. This is a simple expression of the philosophy objectives and procedures used in youth club work, whether it be a boy raising a calf or growing a plot of vegetables or a girl learning to redecorate the living room. Of course, this slogan does not state all the principles of learning because there are some things that cannot be learned by doing. Man himself would have remained primitive if he had not also learned to 'do' by study. The objectives of Macra na Tuaithe have been interpreted in many different ways. Many people have yet to grasp its full meaning because their contact with it has been limited to one particular aspect of club work. Some have thought the chief objective is to make money with the project ; others, to improve livestock or make better clothing ; and still others to keep boys and girls interested in rural life. Perhaps this is the best statement of its primary objective : 'To provide opportunity for the youngster to develop into the best adult he or she is capable of becoming'.

Under present policy, Macra na Tuaithe is devoting all its time and programme to rural youth. If justification for this limited horizon were needed, it is that the field of rural youth in Ireland is lying fallow. Boys and girls in our towns and cities have their boy scouts and girl guides, their secondary school clubs and societies, sports teams and diocesan youth organizations. The majority of our youngsters in the rural areas have not the social advantages of secondary schools because out of some 400,000 teenagers in the Republic between 12 and 19 years (*Economic Development*[1] page 110), less than one quarter attend any Secondary or fulltime Day Vocational School. They go through an absolutely barren social period in their life before they qualify for the weekly 'car-load' heading for the dance hall in the nearest big town. This is fast becoming the exclusive social pastime in rural parishes for teenage boys and girls. If ever it should be thought necessary or desirable to bring urban youth into the Macra na Tuaithe programme, no fundamental change of structure will be necessary because the programme is geared to develop the 'whole' boy or girl and not just to produce technically excellent farmers.

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[1] *Statistical Abstract*, 1958, pages 214, 215.

Much of Western culture in the home, in school and in social life is necessarily transmitted to immature and developing youth by indoctrination. This procedure includes the establishment of such ideas and practices as personal cleanliness, health habits, honesty, loyalty, courtesy and the dignity of labour. Methods of indoctrination are used almost exclusively by some teachers who are in reality authoritarians. They try to standardize procedures in order to make their own position more secure or to cover up their own inability to lead with sound educational methods. As an educational procedure, indoctrination may be good or bad depending on how it is used. However, it has too many limitations to be successful as a method of teaching youth in Macra na Tuaithe which is a voluntary mobile educational movement. It is a movement catering for the fundamental needs of adolescents to ' belong ' and to be ' recognized ' and tackle worthwhile and challenging tasks. By electing their own club officers, they learn democratic self government and by shouldering responsibility through ownership of project animals and materials, they spark off a personal chain reaction to farming and farm life in general.

It is interesting to note that in its short history Macra na Tuaithe is developing along the original lines taken by its American counterpart. 4-H in its early days had the bulk of its clubs located in the grade schools and high schools but it has now moved out of the classroom to become community clubs led by members of the rural community. Here in Ireland we find that 90% of Macra na Tuaithe clubs are organized in vocational schools with rural science and domestic science teachers serving as leaders. Saturation point has almost been reached in locating a branch in each rural vocational school and further development of the movement must be geared to reach those boys and girls who, through lack of educational ambition in the family or lack of a suitably convenient school, do not attend vocational school classes. In any event, it is of extreme importance that such a rural youth programme should not become inseparable from classroom and teacher in the minds of rural children.

Group work as exemplified by Macra na Tuaithe and its parent Macra na Feirme is an informal voluntary educational process set up by the local people. Its purpose is to help them solve some of the recognized problems common to all or most members of the group. It is based on the assumption that learning should be continued through life but does not necessarily take place in school or at home. However, it supplements the work of the school and the home both for adults and youth. The project method of Macra na Tuaithe procedure follows the group work pattern and, characteristically, it must be planned and executed by the members and have meaning and purpose in their minds. All of these steps in club procedures must be carried out under the guidance of local voluntary leaders and advisers. In fact, Macra na

Tuaithe cannot be offered to the community with confidence as a serious educational medium unless trained personnel are available to guide, advise on and inspect the work of all projects. Vocational teachers, agricultural advisory officers and national teachers are best equipped and strategically placed in rural Ireland to fill this need and the recent emergence of a concrete policy of co-operation between the government Departments of Education and Agriculture as evidenced by the new 'Farm School' plan will strengthen the efforts of Macra na Tuaithe.

I make the distinction here between the rôle of adviser and that of club leader in youth club work. The present rôle of the vocational teacher must change from club leader to adviser to conform with the true concept of a voluntary group educational movement which is 'of' 'by' and 'for' the people, as one might put it. The rate of change-over will entirely depend on the availability of trained 'lay' leaders to replace them. Failing this, the alternative is the costly one of appointing additional technical personnel in the two rural educational services to act as leaders to an expanding number of youth clubs. Here again there is the additional complication that none of the university graduates going into the agricultural advisory services or vocational education system receive any training in youth work because their study courses stress subject matter and subject matter technique far more than the technique of dealing democratically with people.

Forty years of club work in America have clearly shown that parents make the best club leaders. Dr C. B. Smith, one of the early extension leaders in U.S. has said: 'National agents and local leaders may kindle the flame in youth to take up club work but it takes good will and the help of parents to keep the fire burning'. Good parents have the right attitude to be good youth leaders. They are likely to be respected in the community, they love their children and they are eager for their success. Once they know the programme and its results, they quickly develop enthusiasm. However, it is often true that the farm man or woman feels unqualified to undertake the duties of youth leadership and the recruiting administration must use ingenuity to convince the prospect that he or she possesses the qualities necessary or can easily acquire them. Good training for local leaders varies from the basic fundamentals of club organization and project work to the psychology of working with youth. When members, parents and community representatives together select a leader on the basis of his or her qualifications for the job, that is the most satisfactory method of all. Where youth leadership is a mark of pride and recognition in a community, good leaders are willing to serve.

The secret of success in rural youth work is its close relationship to living on the farm, in the home and neighbourhood. Members become enthusiastic about farm, home and neighbourhood projects. Work becomes a kind of game because the objectives are understood and

desirable. Club activities promote physical vigour, develop manual dexterity and help to form regular habits of labour. Because of the elasticity of the programme each member is encouraged to develop to his full capacity and as rapidly as he wishes or can do his work. In the end, the experience of club work will cause members to feel more attached to the land, to their homes and communities. This is one of the first 'steps' in developing better citizens.

The term project in Macra na Tuaithe covers an extensive range of activities. As might be expected, agriculture and general farming projects are most popular and there are hundreds of boys—and girls—rearing calves and lambs, fattening pigs for market, growing a rood of sugar beet, raising turkeys, broilers, laying fowl and so on. This particular type of project requires an appreciable amount of capital for juveniles and a powerful incentive was provided when all the Irish Banks, without exception, agreed to a request by the Macra na Tuaithe administration that small interest-bearing bank loans of £10 and under be made available for the specific purposes of Macra na Tuaithe project work. The scheme was initiated in early 1959 and thousands of pounds have already been loaned and repaid on a wide variety of agricultural and non-agricultural projects. This is ample justification of the act of faith in our rural teenagers by all concerned and modern Irish history is surely made of no greater events than this revolutionary effort to channel the ambitions of rural youth into educational activities linked closely with the home.

The experiences of 4-H in America afford good reasons for believing that Macra na Tuaithe farm projects properly costed and using sound farming technique can have a more profound effect on adult farming practice by sheer force of youthful example than the most intensive coverage of Agricultural Advisory Services. Indeed it may yet prove to be the most powerful argument for gearing the advisory service to youth work by the employment of official wholetime club instructors. A few examples here will suffice to show the potential of such youth work. Peter Curran of Maynooth is only thirteen years, but his approach to project work marks him out as the ideal future farmer. He financed his project through various cash prizes won as an outstanding junior ploughman in various county competitions and climaxed it by taking fifth place in the 'under 21' division of the all-Ireland ploughing competitions. He then bought a pig for £5 and sold it fat at factory weight for £17 4s. 6d. A valuable piece of local research in the new farming line of broiler production was one of the achievements of sixteen-year-old Patrick Duffy of Ballaghaderreen club in Roscommon. Paddy made a profit of 2/9½d. per bird on a White Cornish and Light Sussex cross. Further west in Newport, Pat Kilroy earned £6 5s. 0d. by the intelligent breeding and feeding of Blackface mountain sheep in his native Mayo. Initiative is the hallmark of young Monica

McCann of Ballyboughal branch in Co. Dublin, who spent her summer working in the fruit fields to obtain money for leather work tools. She now has a steady local market for her leather goods. In like manner, Paddy Regan of Newbridge club in Kildare scraped together five shillings and taught himself the art of moulding and baking a variety of religious statues and wall plaques with simple equipment. He then went into pet rabbit breeding, constructed his own hutches and worked for a local farmer in return for rabbit feed. He now averages about £2 11s. 0d. profit for a normal litter of twelve and has a steady local market.

Many clubs undertake group projects which provide a training in citizenship and youthful co-operation. Swinford branch in Mayo undertook a warble fly eradication scheme for cattle. Their irresistible enthusiasm persuaded shopkeepers to run window displays of cattle dressing materials and they even went so far as to fetch the material for lukewarm farmers. Ballyshannon Macra na Tuaithe erected a Christmas Tree in the Diamond and brought Santa Claus to town on Christmas Eve where he distributed sweets. A number of clubs have made Christmas toys for poor children, planted forest trees and tidied up the local village and graveyard.

That a predominantly agricultural country like Ireland can benefit from a rural youth movement of this kind is hardly in question. Because of the unique social pattern of rural Ireland with its chronic ills of late marriages and a steady draining away of population it would be true to say that we stand to gain far more than most nations from a constructive youth programme. Yet, were Macra na Tuaithe to load its appeal to youth with a heavy dose of propaganda about the evils of emigration and the superiority of rural living it would probably be no more successful than other well meaning efforts to solve our problems. Rather will Macra na Tuaithe reach these national objectives as a side effect by catering for the basic desire of farm youth to be recognized and given opportunity and responsibility. If a young farm boy freely selecting say a calf project, is given the necessary guidance and responsibility in raising it and can look forward to the fruits of his labour, then there is every reason to believe that a sound love of farming will come naturally to him. This type of approach multiplied many times over in club work and co-educational activities can do more to increase early marriages and stop emigration by providing social contacts and a necessary farming outlet to ambitious youngsters than any scheme of subsidized farming. Even those boys or girls who must inevitably exchange Macra na Tuaithe project work for a job in our cities and towns will have benefited from a real life educational experience which no school or classroom can offer.

Book Reviews

ART

A CONCISE HISTORY OF MODERN PAINTING. By Herbert Read. London : Thames and Hudson. 1959. 485 plates of which 100 in colour. Pp. 376. 32s. 6d.

LIVING BIOGRAPHIES OF GREAT PAINTERS. By Henry Thomas and Dana Lee Thomas. London : W. H. Allen. 1959. Pp. 312. 15s.

A DICTIONARY OF ART AND ARTISTS. By Peter and Linda Murray. Penguin Books. Pp. 355. 5s.

Sir Herbert Read's authoritative pen has in his latest work gone enthusiastically native among the loaded blob-drip brushes of contemporary painting. The reader who expects to find an ordered survey of the conventional type, beginning with the rejection of Manet's *Absinthe Drinker* and ending with a convenient example or two of Mondrian or Sutherland, must be undeceived. Sir Herbert does not shirk the *Tache*, the most elusive blot of colour perhaps of all times but, quite on the contrary, has chosen to view what has gone before, from within its very contours.

What we are shown is the origin and growth of the ' modern movement ', the term having been limited to such art as is determined by ' the intention, not to reflect the visible, but to make visible.' (Klee) Cézanne's structural objectivity contains the seed of the new life (ch. 1) which we watch unfolding itself, first in Matisse *à la plus fauve*, then more confidently in German Expressionism through groups such as *Die Bruecke* and *Der Blaue Reiter* (ch. 2). After Kandinsky this growth pursues a twofold pattern (ch. 6 and 7) : an art of determined relations leads through Mondrian and the Constructivism of the *Bauhaus* to the Abstract Art of Ben Nicholson ; and on the other hand an art of internal necessity, very competently and extensively analysed, brings us via Kokoschka and Pollock's abstract Expressionism to the Action Painting of unexpressed feeling, adopted by Sam Francis and his many fellows. Intervening sections treat of Cubism, of Futurism, Dada and Surrealism, of the three pre-eminent philosophizing artists : Picasso, Kandinsky and Klee.

Sir Herbert is so perfectly *au courant* with his material, literally so, that he has become part of the irresistible movement he analyses. Consequently he does not judge. He does not communicate his likes (or dislikes), nor does he disclose what he regards as good or bad. He writes neither as judge nor as connoisseur, but rather as the counsel for the defense in an intricate case ; and therefore his book is essentially a logical justification, personal and well-documented. The witnesses called are in the main the artists rather than their art, and their evidence is grouped to a large extent around Worringer's *Abstraction und Einfuehlung* and Kandinsky's *Ueber das Geistige in der Kunst.* The author's thesis, as it emerges, is this : the true art of our times, inaugurated

by Kandinsky, is a communication of non-figurative symbols. The meaning can hardly matter.

The attitude of 'moving with the stream' adopted by Sir Herbert has its drawbacks : in vain does one look for a static landmark, for achievement, for the lasting values of art, for a crumb to feed disinterested contemplation. The all too close companionship has begotten, moreover, several inaccuracies and lists of minor-artists which serve only to distract. (One misses Yeats.) After a study of this book, which contains useful text-references, bibliography and index, the reader will find himself up-to-date ; but is he really old-fashioned, one wonders, if he is not in the least convinced that Barlach and Rouault are now surely hopelessly outdated or that Braque is simply boring?

Imperfections, however, in a pioneering work such as this, are to be suffered gladly, for Sir Herbert has given us, as so often before, an invaluable synthesis which even the specialist cannot afford to ignore. He has succeeded in tracing a consistent line of development through the seemingly chaotic mass of modern pictorial endeavour, and in the closing pages of his book (which incidentally must be one of the bargains on the art-market) one is comforted to find a reassuring note of faith and confidence in the art of our time. The author believes unwaveringly, not unlike the late Father Couturier, in its purifying influence, its consistent recognition of moral issues and its faithful performance of the ungrateful task of showing us how we feel.

A volume, of the genre historical novel, describing the lives and personalities of twenty colourful and well-known artists, will be popular. This publication in the series of 'Living Biographies' makes fascinating reading. Many interesting and startling details are woven into the narrative, and even though inaccuracies could be pointed out on almost every page, these chapters should serve to stimulate further enquiry into the lives and achievements of men who deserve our attention. It is clear that the artist cannot be explained without reference to his art, and even the reverse, the authors feel, must be true. They are willing, in accordance with a time-honoured convention, to equiperate, in essentials, artist's art and artist's life. And after all, there is the story of the great Wu Tao-tze, who at the end of his life stepped quietly into the cave of a landscape he had just painted, and was never seen again.

In the hands of the wise, good dictionaries have ever been potent tools, and Mr and Mrs Murray's Penguin Reference Book will prove itself no less serviceable. It furnishes quick and well-presented information, and provides a happy hunting-ground for the idle browser. The greater part consists of about 700 short biographies, treating of Western painters, sculptors and engravers of the last seven centuries, and including a summary of their style, the essential dates, and galleries where their work may be seen. Movements, phases and styles are accurately and interestingly described in articles of various length, and finally there are given the necessary definitions of technical terms and processes. The authors are evidently abreast of current thought and scholarship, and have, within their self-imposed limits, achieved a remarkable and very commendable feat. Their dictionary is a clear and pleasant guide, to the staid as to the very latest, and will not only open eyes, but promote better-informed talk, writing and reading about the arts.

ANTHONY MILLS

ENGLISH LITERATURE

ENGLISH LITERATURE IN THE EARLY EIGHTEENTH CENTURY, 1700–1740. By Bonamy Dobrée. Oxford : Clarendon Press. 1959. 42s.
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ENGLISH LITERATURE. Modern Essays in Criticism. Edited by James L. Clifford. New York : Oxford University Press. 1960. $2.65/23s.

The eighteenth century seems to be coming into fashion again, partly because some sort of saturation point has been reached in examination of the metaphysicals, partly because of suggested parallels between late Augustan experience and our own in the second half of the twentieth century. Donald Davie is the pioneer in this latter approach with his *Purity of Diction in English Verse*, and more recently, his excellent anthology *The Late Augustans*, which illustrated a line of sensibility from Shenstone's enjoyable imitation of Spenser, *The School-Mistress*, to early Wordsworth. He has even tried to put theory into practice ; his recent long poem *The Forest of Lithuania*, which has puzzled many reviewers, might be profitably compared with a mid-Augustan ' philosophico-contemplative ' poem (to use a phrase of Professor Dobrée's) like Dyer's *The Ruins of Rome*. Old ways, new boredoms, the hostile might feel ; and indeed, one might be forgiven for thinking that if eighteenth century example is to be followed one should go first to Swift (both prose and verse) and Pope, rather than to even the best of the later Augustans. But the problem is more complicated than that, and affinity of sensibility is the only real guide in such a choice.

Professor Dobrée's book deals with the first half of the eighteenth century, the period which produced Swift, Pope, Defoe and Berkeley, as well as Thomson, Gay, Addison, Parnell, Prior and (a favourite of mine) Matthew Green. Volume VII in the Oxford History of English Literature, it discharges its function of capable summary fairly well, creating a context for discussion of the more important works. One understands the nearly paranoic anti-pastoralism of Swift (and later, Johnson) better after being introduced to the Golden Age pastoralists at the beginning of the century, including Ambrose Phillips, Pope's rival. And one sees how the Succession and the return of the Whigs to power created a watershed of ideas and ideals, returning Swift to Ireland, encouraging Pope in his withdrawal at Twickenham. As Pope says in his letters (one of the best commentaries on the period, and a revelation of dedicated artistic effort) :

> I find by dear experience, we live in an age, where it is criminal to be moderate ; and where no man can be allowed to be just to all men. The notions of right and wrong are so far strain'd that perhaps to be in the right so very violently, may be of worse consequence than to be easily and quietly in the wrong.

The other main theme of the period, besides ' madness and political fury ', is the extraordinary pullulation of writers, not merely in prose but in verse. It was the period when the newspaper and magazine came into existence to provide a rising middle class with reading matter ; Defoe's career, for example, is a product of this turmoil, an astonishing manifestation of pure

energetic ' scribbling '. And many writers turned to verse, not as an art-form, but as a natural medium : Defoe's *True Born Englishman* is only one example from a dim forest of long political poems, mock-heroic (like William King's *The Furmetary*); ' the descriptive philosophic nature-poem ' (John Phillip's *Cider*); the anti-nature poem (Diaper's *Dryades*) etc., etc. The general student acquainted with only the better examples, like Thomson's *Seasons*, or Young's *Night Thoughts* (both of which, in any case, are pretty tough going), will be pleased to gain a circumscribed and controlled knowledge of names previously unknown outside *The Dunciad* and Johnson's *Lives of the Poets*. When one adds to the numerous bad poets the host of interfering critics like Dennis and Tickell, the mood of the Scriblerus Club becomes clearer; the efforts of a few genuinely talented men to preserve some standards by laughing dullness out of existence. Allowing its incidental crudities and cruelties, *The Dunciad* rises over the whole period, a monument and, in its savagery, a redeeming vision. There, surely, if anywhere in the eighteenth century, is a moral and example for our time.

The heroic effort to bring order out of this chaos very nearly sinks Professor Dobrée's book. But, in a way, the brute unreadability of much of his material demonstrates the merit of Swift and Pope more clearly than any other presentation. ' I cannot but conclude ', says the King of the Brobdingnagians, ' the Bulk of your Natives, to be the most pernicious Race of little Vermin that Nature ever suffered to crawl upon the Surface of the Earth '. It is the merit of Professor Dobrée's book that it exposes us directly to the impact of Swift and Pope in their literary, political and social context : the letters exchanged by these two isolated masters take on a terrible poignance against this background. ' The two summers we past together ' wrote Pope from Twickenham to Dublin in 1734, ' dwell always on my mind, like a vision which gave me a glimpse of a better life and better company, than this world otherwise afforded '.

What one misses in *English Literature in the Early Eighteenth Century*, however, is the coherence of a definite approach ; it is, of its nature, survey rather than criticism. Some of the essays in the new Oxford Galaxy collection *Eighteenth Century English Literature* fulfil that need. Herbert Davis on Swift and Sutherland on Gay (a very enjoyable and neglected poet) represent an honest orthodoxy. Marjorie Hope Nicolson's brilliant ' Aesthetic Implications of Newton's Opticks ' illuminates, to use an appropriate pun, a whole area of eighteenth century art, and is indispensable for an understanding of Thomson and his lesser poetic-scientific brethren, like Blackmore (*The Creation*) Moses Browne, and Mallet (*The Excursion*). But the two great challenges of the period are the Augustan essay-poem, and the novel. Maynard Mack's controversial ' Wit and Poetry and Pope ' is one of the best attempts yet to find a critical approach which will do justice to a poem like *The Rape of the Lock*, with its great verbal and technical skills, which are so obviously different from those of the Metaphysicals. It joins Empson's analysis of ' wit ' in the ' Essay on Criticism ', and, from a syntactical point of view, MacLuhan's remarks on the Popeian couplet in his essay ' Tennyson and Picturesque Poetry ', as among the most valuable writing on eighteenth century poetry. What it says, in effect, is that a responsible writer uses as

many means in his power to say as much as he can : there is always a fear of the initial axiom being lost in the hectic brilliance of the demonstration. And there is also the danger that uncovering what are, in fact, subliminal techniques (even to the poet lost in the second natures of skill), may damage the general depth-charge effect of the poem. And how would such techniques work with later Augustan poems, Johnson's *London* or Goldsmith's *Deserted Village*, where broader effects are achieved with less delicacies of couplet irony ? The latter is an astonishing blend of feeling and artifice ; Mr Graves describes it (almost alone among the English Augustan poems) as a ' true poem ', which ' glows with sorrowful anger ', while Mr Eliot recommends it, even above the work of Pope, for its skilful construction and paragraphing. Seeking an analogy for the series of landscapes and portraits grouped around a central theme which is the technique of *The Traveller* and *The Deserted Village* one comes to other arts of the period ; painting and the Palladianism of Robert Adams, with rooms en suite, each related in a graceful flowing structure :

> *Movement* is meant to express the rise and fall, the advance and recess, with other diversity of form, in the different parts of a building, so as to add greatly to the picturesque of the composition.

Generalizing blithely, one might say that the art of the later Augustans (Johnson, Goldsmith and Crabbe) is more general than that of Pope ; how and why is a problem which has not yet been satisfactorily demonstrated, at least not in the collection of essays under review.

JOHN MONTAGUE

THE MATURITY OF DICKENS. By Monroe Engel. Harvard University Press. London : Oxford University Press. 1959. 25s.

CHARLES DICKENS. THE WORLD OF HIS NOVELS. By J. Hillis Miller. Harvard University Press. London : Oxford University Press. 1959. 30s.

DICKENS was the last of the great popular writers in English. He was a popular writer not only by inclination but by ambition. In one of his letters to the actor Macready he wrote :

> The more we see of life and its brevity, and the world and its varieties, the more we know that no exercise of our abilities in any art, but the addressing of it to the great ocean of humanity in which we are drops, and not to bye-ponds (very stagnant) here and there, ever can or ever will lay the foundations of an endurable retrospect.

This grand pattern in his work has been, to some extent, responsible for his neglect in modern times ; it has focused attention of critics on to his faults ; his sentimentality, his violent appeals to the emotions, his weakness for the grotesque and the melodramatic. Added to this there has been a damnable snobbery of late against any kind of art that appeals directly and comprehensibly to the general public, instead of addressing itself to ' bye-ponds ', the coteries of sophisticated society. It is one of the ironies of our times that the increase of literacy among all classes has not brought about any corresponding improvement in literary taste.

Dickens not only appealed to every level of his own society, but he had that immensity of genius to comprehend that society in all its forms, to re-create it in his novels with compelling and meaningful intensity and to make it recognizable to his vast public. The only modern English novelist who seems to have this comprehensiveness of grasp is Angus Wilson ; but he can never hope to reach such a wide public, simply because large areas of that public have been long since abandoned by serious writers—abandoned to Kathleen Windsor, and Frank Yerby and Grace Metallious.

But Dickens is back in favour. Responsible critics have slowly come to realize that he succeeded in being not only a great popular writer but a great artist as well. That his faults are really inconsequential when seen against the vast canvas of his merits. Here are two American books that accept him as a great writer and which approach him without any of that patronage we have been used to from critics as disparate as T. S. Eliot and Mario Praz.

Mr Engel, himself a novelist, concerns himself with tracing the growth of Dickens as an artist from the earlier, more amorphous novels to the highly controlled and conscious artistry of *Great Expectations* and *Edwin Drood.*

He spends a great deal of time in the first section of this book in analysing and defining Dickens's attitude towards his novels. Dickens left virtually no formal literary theory behind him in the way that Henry James did. Consequently there is a great deal of learned rummaging among his letters, speeches and lectures and the magazines that he edited. Inevitably there is that formidable marshalling of footnotes at the bottom of every page that seems to delight the scholarly. But Mr Engel has the gift of judicious selection and the picture he builds of Dickens's attitude towards his craft is coherent and authoritative.

His second chapter on Social and Political Issues is again illuminating, but it is too long. Most of it is merely confirmatory of the view an alert reader would extract from the internal evidence of the novels themselves. The only point on which I take issue with him is his description of Dickens as a subversive. The epithet, I think, was first applied to him by George Orwell—who applied it in a rather qualified sense—but it seems to me unwarranted. Dickens did hate the social evils of his time; he despised the exploitation of the poor, the autonomous power of money, the educational, penal and legalistic vices of Victorian society, and he wished to have them changed. But he abhorred revolution and extremism, and fundamentally he had a deep reverence for the pieties of English life.

The word is surely reformer not subversive. This was a correction I had to keep constantly making as Mr Engel moved on to consider the novels themselves ; for he finds a subversive view of English society not only in *Oliver Twist* and *Bleak House*, but in the *Pickwick Papers*, where surely, even the reformer is forced to take a back seat to the dynamic buffoonery of the humorist.

Mr Engel is not insensible to the humour of Dickens, but he is more concerned with the darker side of his genius. He discerns in him a constant tension between his great social themes and his recurrent private themes with the symbols that embody them. There is the river, which Swinburne claimed was the real protagonist in *Our Mutual Friend* ; the grave and

resurrection symbols that operate on a comic and tragic level in *A Tale of Two Cities* (from the password 'Recall to life' to the burlesque of Gerry Cruncher, the 'Resurrection man'); the monetary symbolism of the dust-heaps in *Hard Times* and so on. (If only Miss Caroline Spurgeon knew what she was starting when first she opened her mouth on the symbols in Shakespeare!)

Against these pervasive symbols the Dickensian characters enact their tragedies and their comedies, their flickerings of joy and hope and elation gaining poignancy and meaning from the sombre back-drop. There is much, too, in this book about the technical evolution of Dickens's art; the influence of the different forms in which he had to write his episodes for the various magazines. It is all lucid, well argued and agreeably written. In short, it adds up to a substantial and valuable contribution to Dickensian criticism.

Beginning Mr Miller's book, Mr Patrick Kavanagh's dictum came to mind: 'Why be academic about laughter?' Mr Miller is extremely academic. His book has been expanded from a doctoral thesis and inevitably it carries over a great deal of the stuffy diligence of postgraduate endeavour. In its tone, its rather fussy attention to detail and in its occasional brandishing of the obvious, it reminds me almost uncannily of an equally stuffy essay by another American, Mr John E. Hardy, on Milton's 'Comus', also expanded from a university thesis. (Both seem to lack that control over their matter that would enable them to exclude what is unnecessary.)

What I mean is that many of the essays are too much in the nature of commentaries for unperceptive readers. The book is full of the most valuable insights, but in many cases they are spoiled by being made too much of. This is not true of all the book. In fact, *The Pickwick Papers* is analysed with a splendid dead-pan humour that conveys the critic's own enjoyment of this incomparable comedy. But Mr Miller—like Mr Engel—is more concerned with the sombre overtones of the novel, the fore-shadowings of that increasingly gloomy vision that is to pervade his later novels and that already has begun to take shape in the horrific world of *Oliver Twist*. The Fleet prison, the grotesque interpolated stories, the city with its Dodson and Fogg and its lack of equity; all these are deployed to suggest that Dickens was already turning from the innocent optimism of Dingley Dell to the crushing desperation of the Chancery. The point has already been made by Wilson, and it is reasonable enough. It was in Pickwick, too,—the book of Dickens's self-discovery—that he became occupied with the central theme of all his novels, the search for identity and status undertaken by all his subsequent heroes. Always he is to explore this problem of how it is possible for a man to establish salutary contact with his fellowman and with society. 'And, in probing this theme, he sought always to discover a relationship which would guarantee the uniqueness of each person, that is, would connect him with others in a way enhancing rather than absorbing and destroying his intrinsic identity.'

From this point of view it is a book that has a great deal to say that is new and incisive and penetrating. It never gives the impression of forcing its material to fit any pre-formed theory, and it really leaves little out in its full-length studies of the six pivotal novels. It should be of great help to serious students of Dickens.

Of course, it would be too much to ask the twentieth century to acknowledge its debts to the nineteenth. Mr Miller points out how *Bleak House* anticipates 'the discontinuous narrative techniques of Dos Passos, Faulkner and others!' But did it ever occur to anyone how many echoes of *The Pickwick Papers* there are in Wodehouse's verbal gymnastics. Or has it been noticed, for instance, how much Evelyn Waugh's ubiquitous Philbrick in *Decline and Fall* resembles Mr Jingle, or again, the extraordinary similarity of the prison scene in that novel and the digressive prison scene in *David Copperfield* ? But these are considerations for another context. It is enough, for now, to recommend both of these interesting books to all serious students of literature, whether or not they have allowed themselves, even temporarily, ' to forsake Mr Micawber '.

Augustine Martin

JAMES JOYCE. By Richard Ellmann. New York : Oxford University Press. 1959. pp. 800. 63s.

—But this prying into the family life of a great man, Russell began impatiently. Art thou there, truepenny ?

Ulysses, p. 177.

Mr Ellmann's work on James Joyce has been widely read and admired. The book is large and expensive, with a handsome dust-jacket. Mr Ellmann writes meticulously ; his text, elaborately annotated and indexed, generously illustrated, is evidence of diligence in research, collation and exposition. No previous book has so many and such intimate details of Joyce's life. From the accounts—extracts from letters, recorded events, gossip—a fuller portrait emerges and it is to the author's credit that the reader's ultimate view may not be Mr Ellmann's. *L'enthousiasme* Paul Valery has written *n'est pas un état d'âme pour un écrivain :* coldness, where it is an accident of impartiality, is, perhaps, admirable. Mr Ellmann's style has not quite the ' scrupulous meanness ' which Joyce proposed for himself : the snigger is barely perceptible at times. His knowledge of Dublin is so good that one is astonished, in his account of Mr John Joyce, to read of a meeting with ' . . . Sir Arthur E. Guinness—a more successful distiller than he himself had been . . . ' (p. 15). Despite his intimacy with the city, Mr Ellmann's assessment of Mr Joyce's friends and acquaintances has a quality of remoteness.

> Now as later, Joyce was much occupied with the personality of loud-mouthed burly men, among whom Corley, Gogarty and Fred Gallaher were the three he knew best. (p. 228)

Anyone who knew Dr Gogarty remembers him as a fast talker ; his voice was pleasant—he did not speak loudly. An athlete, agile, graceful, he was not burly.

When, in his analysis of *The Dead*, Dr Ellmann, a scholar, writes : ' For Gabriel's personality there is among Joyce's friends another model.[15]' (p. 256), one assumes that Note 15 gives good authority for the introduction of Doctor C. P. Curran's name. Mr Ellmann continues : ' He is a more distinguished man than Joyce allows, but Joyce was building upon, and no doubt distorting,

his memories of Curran as a very young man ', and one admires a gallant biographer defending Doctor Curran against his false friend. Note 15, at the back of the book, reads : ' Interview with S. Joyce, 1953 '. The minor trauma has been raised out of the recollections of an old man whose writings show him to be unreliable and who made no secret of his hostility not merely to his brother but also to Dublin and its people.

Again, Mr Ellmann's conception of the Joyces' social position is questionable. Those who were not then living in Dublin cannot readily form an idea of its social alignments at the time of the Boer War. Old Mr Joyce for instance, was not a successful man, but he was a man of character and education. Mr Ellmann's comment, (p. 349), that ' John Joyce clung to his conception of himself as a gentleman as to a last figleaf ' is more offensive than illuminating. The picture of James Joyce as a rustic in Paris is unconvincing. Mr Ellmann, having quoted some gossip, (p. 502), writes : ' Incidents of this kind helped to develop in him a kind of peasant scorn of Parisian sophistication : his literary life ' he adds, without quoting his authority, ' he lived at home, his outings he had to devote to borrowing beds, books, money or influence . . . ' As for Paris, wasn't it Mr Joyce who called the city ' a lamp for lovers lit in the wood of the world ' ? Mr Ellmann himself, some pages later, quotes Mr Joyce's remark that Paris is ' the last of the human cities ' (p. 523). Up to a short time before his father's death, Joyce was getting affectionate letters from him. Mr Ellmann's account of the reunion, in 1909, of father and son, Mr John Joyce suddenly sitting down at a piano in ' a village inn ' (p. 285) and singing to his son Germont's final aria from what Mr Ellmann, in a rare misprint, calls ' Triavata ', is amusing and touching. Of the letters from Mr Joyce to his wife that Mr Ellmann quotes some are those of a very young man, some are silly, some are anguished ; all are marked by devotion. Granted the necessity of publication, what is gained by the mocking editorial comments ? Here, as prelude to a particularly harrowing extract, is a typical chirrup :

> Set quite apart from his business with the Volta was another of Joyce's intense little dramas, conducted mostly with Nora (p. 315).

The account and analysis of Lucia Joyce's affliction add to the reader's understanding of Joyce ; he was constant in his attachment to and care of his daughter, distressed to the limits of endurance by her sufferings. Mr Ellmann sees it otherwise :

> If Lucia's malady had been curable, Joyce's jumpy supervision would have been reprehensible ; since it was incurable, his obstinate moving from doctor to doctor was at least proof of his affection (p. 674).

Many of Mr Ellmann's statements force one to re-read, thinking one has misread. Here one is held by his assurance about the curability of maladies, behaviour norms for afflicted parents, last, not least, by his use of ' at least '. And one is stifled by Dr Jung's gothic analysis of the relationship between Joyce, his daughter and his literary work :

> . . . She was definitely his ' femme inspiratrice ', which explains his obstinate reluctance to have her certified. His own Anima, i.e.,

> unconscious psyche, was so solidly identified with her, that to have her certified would have been as much an admission that he himself had a latent psychosis. It is therefore understandable that he could not give in . . . (footnote, p. 692).

That voice from the fortune-teller's tent has haunted the twentieth century. M. Malraux puts it another way :

> *Notre époque croit aux secrets dévoilés. D'abord parce qu'elle pardonne mal son admiration, ensuite parce qu'elle espére obscurément, parmi les secrets dévoilés, trouver celui du génie.*
>
> (*Les Voix du Silence*, p. 416).

Mr Ellmann, while joining other biographers in insistence on Mr Joyce's irreligion, gives instances of his admiration for the Church and of his morality.

> ' Look, Budgen ', he said once, ' in the nineteenth century, in the full tide of rationalistic positivism and equal democratic rights for everybody, it proclaims the dogma of the infallibility of the head of the Church and also that of the Immaculate Conception ' (p. 661).

And, in a public house, ' . . . when McAlmon proposed a toast, " Here's to sin ", Joyce looked up suddenly and declared, " I won't drink to that " , (p. 576).

One of the most important things in Mr Ellmann's book is his discovery that Joyce used the ending of a story of George Moore's as paradigm for the closing pages of *The Dead*. Both Moore and Joyce come badly out of the probe : ' The book Joyce was borrowing from was one that nobody reads any more, George Moore's *Vain Fortune ;* but Joyce read it, and in his youthful essay, ' The Day of the Rabblement ' overpraised it as ' fine, original work ' (p. 260). Joyce is more to be pitied than Moore : ' The method did not please Joyce very much because he considered it not imaginative enough, but it was the only way he could work ' (p. 259). The admiring reader perhaps forgets that Mr Ellmann is writing about one of the great stories of modern literature ; so does Mr Ellmann — he writes :

> ' Moore said nothing about snow, however '.

Mr Joyce would have memorized and used that wonderful sentence. Mr Ellmann nearly equals its splendour with the meditation which follows it : ' No one can know how Joyce conceived the joining of Gabriel's final experience with the snow ' (p. 260). Perhaps it wasn't Joyce, but that abominable snowman, James Moore, writer of the ' Confessions of the Author as a Young Man ' ? Mr Ellmann isn't sure and the transformation scene closes with the later footnote (p. 418) :

> It was fitting that Moore should wish to have written ' The Dead ', for in a sense he *had* written it . . .

Mr Ellmann recounts, to Joyce's discredit, various comical, contradictory versions of a meeting with Marcel Proust.

> 'If we had been allowed to meet and have a talk somewhere—' Joyce said later, a little wistfully. But it is difficult to see on what ground they might have met. Joyce insisted that Proust's work bore no resemblance to his own, though critics claimed to detect some (p. 524).

Basically, both men have a Homeric conception of their cities' lives and of the unaccountable splendour of intra-mural odysseys ! Both constructed their novels around two heroes whose careers touch tangentially, around a middle-aged man and a young man, each with similar destinies, in different keys. The tragedies of Dreyfus and Parnell, each with national reverberations, are echoed in each novel. In both cases, discarded youthful prototypes of the *magnum opus* (Jean Santeuil, Stephen Hero) were posthumously published.

In transitional art, the helpless comical Jew is almost a symbol of humanity haunted by industrialism. Charlie Chaplin and James Joyce independently, spontaneously contributed to the myth ; Charles Swann, friend of the Prince of Wales, of Oriane de Guermantes and her terrifying brother-in-law, Palamède, is also, despite his elegance and charm, a helpless comical Jew. Mr Ellmann who writes sensitively about Joyce's choice of hero does not advert to Proust's similar election. Bloom and Swann are odd, too, in that they are seen only against a Gentile background : one cannot imagine either in a prayer shawl, much less in a synagogue. Both are sensitive and affectionate, lovers of art and music ; one thinks of Swann listening to the Vinteuil sonata, Bloom in the Ormond hotel listening to old Dedalus singing. Swann and Bloom are haunted by jealousy ; each imagines himself to be a cuckold ; neither has the ' satisfaction ' of certainty. But Bloom and Swann are people—Molly Bloom is a sort of monster, more ' innocent ', less real than the terrible Odette. Joyce, a comic writer, did not achieve, perhaps did not want to achieve anything to equal the last prospect, in *Le Temps Retrouvé*, of Madame de Forcheville.

> *Si belle encore, elle était devenue—ce qu'elle n'avait jamais été—infiniment sympathique, car elle, qui avait trompé Swann et tout le monde, c'était l'univers entier qui maintenant la trompait* . . . (p. 114).

Joyce is never so ' moral ', so human—he does not write at that level.

Mr Ellmann writes : ' His passion for truth, however unpalatable, is a contagion which he would have his readers and his admirers share ' What truth ? Is Joyce's Mr Ellmann's ? Are either's Proust's ?

> . . . when Lewis objected to the cathedral at Rouen because of its heavily encumbered facade . . . Joyce remarked that he liked this multiplication of detail and added, ' As a matter of fact, I do something of that sort in words ' (p. 529).

The key to that, to his well-known admiration for the Book of Kells, is also in a remark he is reputed to have made to his friend Budgen : ' With me ', he said, ' the thought is always simple ' (p. 490). To Proust, the association of simplicity and thought would seem like some sort of intellectual perversion ! Yet Mr Ellmann's portrait of the artist (p. 5) might well be applied to the fascinated, articulate author of *À la recherche du temps perdu*.

> For Joyce, life *was* charmed ; nature was both stolid and magical, its ordinary details suffused with wonder, its wonderful manifestations permeated by the ordinary.

At his most Dantesque, in the not un-dreary Night-town scene in *Ulysses*, Joyce gives a classical representation of the hell of cities—is it any less appalling than the picture of war-time Paris in *Le Temps Retrouvé* and, in the second volume, of the reception for all the damned on the lowest, iciest floor of hell, in the hôtel de Guermantes ?

In analysing the character of Bloom, Mr Ellmann is at his most sympathetic —is he, perhaps, too ingenious, too ingenuous in seeing Mr Bloom's forbearance, humility and charity solely as avatars of masochism ? Proust and the little phrase from the Vinteuil sonata, etc., Joyce looking at the Ballast Office clock, are both waiting for what Joyce calls an epiphany ?

The excellent introduction to Mr Ellmann's book seems to have been written by someone other than the biographer and is perhaps best read last, but its theme, ' We are still learning to be James Joyce's contemporaries, to understand our interpreter ', reflects a misunderstanding, both in what it says and in the jolly, avuncular way it says it. Joyce, like Proust, was a man of the nineteenth century. The Great War separates ' us ' from them both. Neither had any use for modern art, the modern world—Albertine never gets her Rolls Royce. ' What other hero in the novel has, like Stephen Dedalus, lice ?' asks Mr Ellmann, but the louse is no newcomer to the brave new world. Ivan Karamazov's feet aren't very clean, Raskolnikov is no exquisite, Dickens's heroes are not immaculate, even Ferrante Palla is wild and dirty. Joyce knew where he stood : ' When Antheil, . . . asked what French or English novelists he should read, Joyce advised him to begin with Stendhal's *Le Rouge et le Noir* and *La Chartreuse de Parme* ' (p. 568).

Mr Ellmann (pp. 562, 563) gives a fine analysis of Mr Joyce's ' fictional method ', of his belief that the artist

> . . . has an insight into the methods and motivations of the universe. Samuel Beckett has remarked that to Joyce reality was a paradigm, an illustration of a possibly unstatable rule.

But Mr Ellmann states it : '. . It is not a perception of order or of love ; more humble than either of these, it is the perception of coincidence ' (p. 562). An Irish critic, himself a novelist, has dismissed Joyce as a writer with a talent for pastiche and mimicry : Mr Ellmann really puts him in his place—with the schoolboys, spotting motor-car registration numbers, (and the reviewers of biographies !).

NIALL MONTGOMERY.

SEAN O'CASEY : THE MAN AND HIS WORK. By David Krause. London : Macgibbon and Kee. 1960. pp. 340. 30s.

THIS is the first full-length study of Sean O'Casey to appear in English since Jules Koslow's insipid *The Green and the Red : Sean O'Casey—the man and his plays* (1950). It is also the first of several which will appear in the next few

years. Being the first, it is, perhaps, inevitable as well as fortunate that Mr Krause's method of criticism is descriptive and simply seeks to increase the reader's appreciation without raising questions of a more searching kind.

Before approaching O'Casey's work, Mr Krause sketches the political, social and labour background of Dublin at the turn of the century. Jim Larkin, Dr O'Hickey and Dr McDonald are singled out as crystallizing certain inimitably Irish experiences of the time which strongly affected O'Casey. Much of this part of the book can seem only hackneyed for the Irish reader. A few details in O'Casey's biography are correctly presented for the first time, but most of the material is derived from his autobiographies or sources not directly related to the dramatist. Mr Krause sees something Promethean in O'Casey's rise from severe poverty and illiteracy to fame as a world renowned dramatist. The epithet may seem a bit strong for some, but for others it will have an authentic sound.

The plays are divided for appreciation in the following manner : The Tragi-Comic Muse (*The Shadow of a Gunman, Juno and the Paycock, The Plough and the Stars*), The Playwright's Not For Burning (*The Silver Tassie*), The Playwright as Prophet (*Within the Gates, The Star Turns Red, Oak Leaves and Lavender, Red Roses For Me*), and The Comedies : A Catharsis and a Carnival (*Purple Dust, Cock-a-Doodle Dandy, The Bishop's Bonfire, The Drums of Father Ned*). This is a thematic rather than a technical division of the work, and it serves Mr Krause's purpose very well. At the same time, the division gives a certain shape to O'Casey's development as a dramatist and as a man.

The final sections of the book are given over to a consideration of the autobiographies and to O'Casey as a poet. The section on the autobiographies is the least satisfactory in the book. The poetic aspect of O'Casey's work receives a more detailed criticism and is consequently one of the better chapters in the book. The copious notes are both readable and interesting.

It must be extremely pleasing for O'Casey to read a criticism of his work which is not forever looking back to the acknowledged greatness of *Juno and the Paycock* and *The Plough and the Stars* while lamenting over a falling off in the plays written since he left Ireland. Mr Krause's approach gives the later plays a fair chance by removing them from the far-reaching shadow of the earlier ones. He does not damn with faint praise, readily admitting the badness of *The Star Turns Red* and *Oak Leaves and Lavender*. He also concedes that there are weaknesses in the more successful of the later works. Parallel with this forward looking appreciation is the author's refusal to shift his attention away from the later work in order to place greater emphasis upon O'Casey himself. His treatment is extended to both subjects with the result that the book has a definite balance.

In the early plays, Mr Krause asserts that O'Casey was creating something of a revolution in the theatre of the time by reacting against prosaic realism and returning ' to an old but impure theatrical principle : make 'em laugh and make 'em weep. He also made 'em think deeply and he makes 'em feel passionately '. Out of this principle of sensibility arose the great tragi-comic vision of O'Casey. The mixture of tragedy and comedy has since become quite familiar in the American and French theatre, but O'Casey was its first major exponent in serious drama since the seventeenth century.

As O'Casey 'gained more confidence and control of his craft with each play, he dared to set himself greater aims in his next work'. One of the results of this experimenting was *The Silver Tassie*, 'not so much a departure from his past work as a continuation of his search for new methods of handling old and new material'. This is essentially correct and should be evident in any critical comparison of acts one and four of *Juno and the Paycock*, acts two and four of *The Plough and the Stars* and the structure of *The Silver Tassie*.

After this latter play, O'Casey 'was now ready to assume the role of a visionary poet and chastising prophet in the struggle for the new Jerusalem of the world'. In this role, Mr Krause links O'Casey with Blake, Shelley, Byron, Carlyle, Ruskin, Dickens, Morris, Shaw and the Fabians. This is a proper tradition in which to view the work of O'Casey's middle period, and it helps to give the plays of this time a just perspective. The intentions of O'Casey are elucidated, but Mr Krause remains a little too detached from the text in demonstrating his conclusions. This has the effect at times of making the reader uneasy or suspicious of the critic.

In his latest phase, O'Casey is seen as 'scourging the apes' as they manifest themselves in the Irish countryside. The form of these plays is one of satirical and fantastical entertainment which allows O'Casey to 'continue his protest and his vision in a mood of ripening humour'. *Purple Dust* and *Cock-a-Doodle Dandy* are judged the best works of this new style.

With regards to O'Casey's achievement since leaving Ireland, Mr Krause works from the playwright's metaphor of himself as the green crow who cannot keep its 'big beak shut'.

> There is a double moral in this beast-fable, and it is also revealed in his career as a dramatist, for we see in his plays that in order to live, he must laugh and he must take his stand. The crow and the artist are motivated by these two essential impulses. The first, the mock-heroic, could be called his aesthetic impulse to create a tragi-comic image of the world as he saw it; the second, the heroic, could be called his ethical impulse to create a prophetic image of the world as it might be.

This is perhaps the nexus of O'Casey's conflict between art and opinion. Whatever his detractors may say, however, the 'Promethean' eagle of the early plays never metamorphosed into the green crow. Still we may agree with Blake that 'the eagle never lost so much time as when he submitted to learn of the crow'.

The defects in this book are due to the author's trying to do too much in such a short space. There is also too much time spent retelling the narrative of the plays and the autobiographies and in describing O'Casey's various clashes with the powers that be in Ireland. However, the book remains a good introduction to O'Casey as a dramatist and as a man.

ROBERT W. CASWELL

HISTORY

THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY, 1307–1399. By May McKisack. Clarendon Press : Oxford University Press. 1959. Pp. xix, 598. 35s.

Professor McKisack's book has been eagerly awaited, for it is a long time since a full general history of this complex century has been attempted. Three reigns only cover the whole period and Edward III's has usually been considered by modern historians as the least interesting of the three. Professor McKisack's rehabilitation of the warrior king comes therefore as a refreshing novelty. She admits that as a statesman and even as a military leader Edward was unoriginal ; but she contends that this very fact gave him a control over ' the loyalty of his people and the affection of his magnates ' (p. 270) which the more eccentric Edward II and Richard II failed to achieve. Where Edward offended, in his sexual morality or in his reckless love of warfare, he did so in company with the aristocratic *homme moyen sensuel* of his age. The author very nearly (but not quite !) persuades us of the wisdom of the Hundred Years' War : '—Edward's subjects, for the most part, acquiesced in the necessity ; for they saw him as the pattern of chivalry and the maker of England's fame— ' (p. 271).

If Professor McKisack redresses the balance in favour of Edward III, it might be argued that she is less than fair to Richard II. It is by no means certain, as some modern historians, including Professor McKisack, seem to assume, that Richard was virtually a psychopathic case. For most of his adult reign Richard made no attempt at all to challenge the traditional governmental structure of his kingdom. His interpretation of the royal prerogative was backed up by the highest contemporary legal opinion (that of the judges) in 1387, and even his arbitrary behaviour in the last two years of his reign could have been justified at a pinch by deduction from the same principle. Possibly too, Professor McKisack does not give Richard sufficient credit for his effort to end the long conflict between France and England on terms acceptable to both countries.

The fourteenth century was the period of the adolescent growth of Parliament, and one might have expected on this topic more help than Professor McKisack actually gives. On the whole she seems to incline to the view that Stubbs was after all right in emphasizing ' the growing importance of Parliament as a political assembly ' (p. 104). The challenge to Stubbs, now represented chiefly by Messrs. Richardson and Sayles, is not perhaps given as full a hearing as its importance merits, and there is a tendency on Professor McKisack's part to avoid awkward questions such as the discussion of the dating of the *Modus Tenendi Parliamentum*.

The chapters on ecclesiastical, rural and urban affairs are by contrast satisfying. The author brings out well the complicated administrative structure of the later medieval English Church, resting as it did on one fundamental factor—the relations between Papacy and Crown. Here Professor McKisack cannot resist another stricture on Richard II, this time for the Concordat of 1398 which established what was virtually joint control by Pope and King over Church benefices, by contrast with the attempts of Edward III and his Parliaments to vindicate ordinary patronal rights. This was because,

says Professor McKisack, Richard 'judged papal support indispensable to realization of his dreams of unrestricted power.' (p. 283) It should surely have been pointed out, however, that a policy of Papal-royal agreement over the head of provincial ecclesiastical and lay interests was by no means peculiar to Richard II's England. The same technique, encouraged by the Papal need for secular support in the troubled days of the Great Schism, was applied in other countries such as France and Germany.

Professor McKisack rightly emphasizes the danger in exaggerating current theories that the fourteenth century was a period of economic 'contraction'. A decline in population (chiefly because of the Black Death and similar pandemics) certainly took place, but in some ways this was a blessing, as there was now more land and food to go round : '—if the area of land under cultivation was smaller, so was the number of mouths to be fed.' (p. 347) It might be added that individual distress may actually have been greater in the sixteenth century, when population rose again and the subsequent pressure on the food supply caused prices to soar. Furthermore the fourteenth century was an age of considerable industrial advance. The rapid growth of a native cloth industry has often been pointed out, but Professor McKisack fills in the details of this in her description of the transformation of the industry from the town to the countryside as a result of the use of the fulling-mill, a mechanisation 'which has been described as being as decisive in its way as the mechanization of spinning and weaving in the eighteenth century' (p. 365). The towns, though still a secondary factor in the country's economy, maintained a reasonable level of prosperity, while their internal constitutional conflicts, particularly in London, mirrored the issues which were being fought out in the nation as a whole.

In her last and unhappily named chapter, 'Learning, Lollardy and Literature', Professor McKisack is frankly disappointing. Literature receives an allowance of only some eight pages ; it would almost have been preferable to leave it out altogether rather than submit it to this perfunctory treatment. In the intellectual field Professor McKisack writes at length on Wyclif, though not very adequately on his philosophy and theology. and has some useful points to make on the universities ; but her remarks on other thinkers, particularly Ockham and Duns Scotus, are neither sufficiently full nor sufficiently accurate. The statement, for example, that '—it was consistent with the trend of his (i.e. Ockham's) thought that at the court of Louis IV he should have developed a fully secularist theory of the State' (p. 509) is misleading and begs too many questions about the political thought of a mind which had rather more influence on the later Middle Ages than that of Wyclif.

Despite such adverse reflections one has in the end to conclude that this volume occupies a worthy place in the great series (the *Oxford History of England*) of which it forms a part. It would be untrue to say that it is in the same rank as the medieval masterpieces in the same series by Sir Frank Stenton and Sir Maurice Powicke, but to have gained by comparison with these champions even what examination jargon would term 'Second Class Honours' is no small distinction.

JOHN B. MORRALL

THE REIGN OF ELIZABETH, 1558–1603. By J. B. Black. Second edition. Clarendon Press : Oxford University Press. 1959. Pp. xxvi, 539. 35s.

In this new form of his authoritative and readable book (first published in 1936) Professor Black has not hesitated to make radical revisions as well as additions on points of detail. The most interesting changes are in the treatments of Mary Queen of Scots and the Earl of Essex, the most brilliant failures of the age. In the case of Mary, Professor Black hardly explains the reasons leading him to what amounts to a *volte-face* in the question of the authenticity of the Casket Letters, which he is now disposed to challenge. The state of the debate on Darnley's murder remains much the same as in 1936 ; no new evidence or arguments for either side have come to light. Yet writings by defenders of the Queen such as Andrew Lang and R. M. Mahon, which Professor Black rejected as implausible in 1936, are declared by him in 1959 to embody the truer verdict. It would surely have been in order for Professor Black to have informed his readers what it was that led him to change his mind.

Professor Black has become more sympathetic to Essex also. His discussion of Essex's much maligned Irish expedition puts the Earl in a comparatively favourable light. He points out that the decision in 1599 to defer an attack on Hugh O'Neill in Ulster in favour of a preliminary campaign in the south of Ireland was not, as has been usually assumed, a stupid blunder. Essex acted on the advice of the military men and officials on the spot ; the project received the unanimous consent of the Irish Council and met with no opposition from the English Privy Council until after the event. Essex's real mistake was the pointless truce with O'Neill at Bellaclinthe in September 1599, which gave the Earl's enemies at court the opportunity to play upon the intransigeance of an aging and increasingly unrealistic Queen. Even for the truce there was some justification ; Essex was too weak in troops and provisions to hope for a successful military encounter with O'Neill. Professor Black does not seem to know of the valuable articles by L. Henry in *Irish Historical Studies* and the *Bulletin of the Irish Committee of Historical Sciences*, which have revised in some detail the history of Essex's stay in Ireland. In passing it must be mentioned with regret that Professor Black's bibliography makes no attempt to keep abreast of the valuable work done by a number of Irish scholars in recent years on this period. This omission is a serious one and detracts from the overall value of the book.

The position of Catholics in the later years of the reign is dealt with more fully than in the earlier edition. Professor Black gives interesting details of the project of the English secular priests (in opposition to the more militant Jesuits led by Fr Robert Persons) for an agreement with the Government by which a measure of religious toleration would be granted to Catholics in return for an expression of political allegiance to the Queen. Though the project had the backing of Robert Cecil, it finally came to grief on the refusal of Elizabeth herself to think of anything but unconditional Catholic surrender. The bid of the Infanta of Spain for the succession to the English throne is fully described and one realizes how far from inevitable it was that the Tudors should have been replaced by the Stuarts.

In the sphere of economic history Professor Black has noted the recent controversy on the extent and nature of the Elizabethan ' agrarian revolution '. Here again, however, the book does not keep up fully with important suggestions made by various historians, in particular the documented contentions of scholars such as G. R. Fisher and Lawrence Stone that the age was one of economic stagnation.

JOHN B. MORRALL

PROCEEDINGS OF THE IRISH CATHOLIC HISTORICAL COMMITTEE. 1955, 1956, 1957, 1958, 1959. Dublin : M. H. Gill. 2s. each.

THESE five modest booklets, which vary in size from 26 to 38 pages, are the result of a very praiseworthy effort to promote the study of Irish local history. The Irish Catholic Historical Committee was formed, largely through the energetic action of Professor R. D. Edwards of University College, Dublin, some years ago. Since Easter 1954 annual conferences have been held in Newman House, the first (of which no published *Proceedings* exist) being noteworthy for an exceedingly helpful and stimulating paper on the experiences of an Irish diocesan historian, which Dr Dermot F. Gleeson read to a large and very representative gathering of local historians. Since Easter 1955 it has been the custom to issue a small booklet containing the text of papers read at these annual conferences. The most ambitious was the conference of 1955, at which His Eminence Cardinal D'Alton presided over a session at which four papers were read concerning the history of the diocese and county of Armagh. In the afternoon of that same day three short papers were read by Father Canice Mooney, O.F.M., Father Joseph Ransom (Ferns) and Father T. J. Walsh (Cork) on Spanish and French archives as a source for Irish history. In 1956 Father J. O'Connell (Tralee), Father Patrick K. Egan (Ballinasloe) and Father Denis Buckley (Cloyne) read papers on diocesan organization in their respective areas, whilst Mr Geoffrey Hand read a short paper on medieval cathedral chapters in Ireland. In the afternoon session two Franciscan scholars from Killiney, Fathers Benignus Millett and Cathaldus Giblin, read papers on the archives of Propaganda and the Nunziatura di Flandra in Rome, which gave those present some notion of the great mass of material which still needs searching and calendaring, if Irish ecclesiastical history is to be studied scientifically.

In 1957 Father P. J. Corish of Maynooth, who has taken a very active part in all these sessions, read an important paper on the reorganization of the Irish Church under Counter-reformation influences between the years 1603 and 1641, whilst Father John Brady (Meath) read a paper on the Irish Colleges abroad during the same period. In the afternoon Father Cathaldus Giblin gave an account of the Irish Franciscan mission to Scotland in the mid-seventeenth century, whilst Father Patrick Gallagher (Clogher) read an exceptionally stimulating and enlightening paper on the sources available for the history of the clergy in his native diocese. In 1958 interest was centred on the Middle Ages, in both morning and afternoon sessions. Father P. J. Dunning, C.M., read a paper on the letters of Innocent III as a source for

Irish history ; whilst Father Urban Flanagan, O.P., gave an account of the papal letters which are available for the fifteenth century in the published volumes of the *Calendar of Papal Letters*, and explained the administrative reasons which account for the contrast between these later papal letters and the earlier letters of Popes such as Innocent III, Honorius III or Innocent IV. In the afternoon session Father Colmcille Conway of Mellifont Abbey read a valuable paper on the sources for Irish Cistercian history ; whilst Father Aubrey Gwynn, S.J., gave an interim report on the work being done by Mr Neville Hadcock and other scholars on the preparation of a new *Monasticon Hibernicum*. In this connection it may be mentioned that the Irish Ordnance Survey has recently (March 1960) published a very fine ' Map of Monastic Ireland ', which was prepared by Mr Hadcock and printed in admirable form and style by the staff of the Ordnance Survey in Phoenix Park. The published price is 7s. 6d.

The most recent issue of this series, which has just been published, contains four papers read at the sessions of Easter 1959. Mr John A. Watt of University College, Dublin, writes on papal policy in relation to episcopal appointments in Ireland in the thirteenth century ; Mr Geoffrey Hand on problems concerning the Church and English Law in medieval Ireland ; and Father Peter Birch on some queries which arise from the study of Catholic education in Ireland under the system of the Penal Laws. Mr T. P. O'Neill of the National Library also contributes a valuable paper on sources now available for a history of Catholic life in Ireland, 1780-1850. The papers which were read at the Easter conference of 1960 will be published in the same series within the next few months ; and we end this notice by wishing all those who have collaborated in this venture the success, financial and otherwise, which they deserve.

AUBREY GWYNN

PHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHY

PHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHY. Werner Heisenberg. London : Allen and Unwin. 1959. Pp. 176. 15s.

THE HOLLOW UNIVERSE. Charles de Koninck, D.Ph. London : Oxford University Press. 1960. Pp. 127. 12s. 6d.

HEISENBERG's book appears in the ' World Perspectives ' series, the aim of which is to overcome the effects of the atomization of knowledge, to demonstrate the kinship and interdependence of all branches of human knowledge, and its value for the unity of life itself.

In *Physics and Philosophy* we have the views of a pioneer of modern physics on the interpretation of quantum physics, on the relation of physics to philosophy and on the significance of physics in human affairs in general.

The author begins by giving a short but clear account of the early development of quantum theory, from the days of Planck's hypothesis to the late twenties, when the ' Copenhagen interpretation ' of the theory first appeared. He then turns to a consideration of this interpretation and indeed it forms the main theme of the book, around which many of his ideas are centred.

According to this interpretation of quantum theory, from a probability function based on a set of observations at an initial time, one can calculate the probability function relevant to the system at any later time. This latter probability function, however, does not in itself represent a course in events: it represents a tendency for events and our knowledge of events. It contains objective and subjective elements: statements about possibilities and statements about our knowledge of the system. The probability function can be connected to reality only if a new measurement is made. The vital point is that there is no description of what happens to the system between the initial observation and the next measurement. To ask, then, what happens to the system between measurements has no meaning: the word 'happens' can apply only to the observation, not to the state of affairs between two observations. At the instant of observation there is a discontinuity in our knowledge of the system which has its image in the discontinuous change of the probability function.

Such an interpretation, the author claims, has little resemblance to the materialistic philosophy which dominated physics during the nineteenth century.

For purpose of comparison he traces the development of Greek philosophy towards the concept of atom, bringing out clearly that the central differences between such theories and modern physics is the modern stress on verifiability and detailed experiment. The changes in philosophical ideas since Descartes are then discussed, and Heisenberg emphasizes the fact that Cartesian dualism led natural science to concentrate on the 'res extensa'. This concentration led to what the author calls dogmatic realism which claims that there is no statement concerning the material world that cannot be objectivated. He goes on to point out that the position in classical physics is that of dogmatic realism: that from such a basis spring criticisms of the quantum theory, which theory has shown that exact science is possible without that dogmatism.

After a valuable consideration of the relation of quantum theory to the other parts of natural science, and to the theory of relativity, the author proceeds to examine and reject counterproposals to the Copenhagen interpretation. In doing so, not only are the criticisms clearly considered, but also further light is thrown on the nature of the Copenhagen interpretation. It is, for example, distinguished from positivism, which is based on the sensual perceptions of the observer as the elements of reality, while the former regards things and processes which are describable in terms of classical concepts. Also we are told that the statistical nature of the laws of microscopic physics cannot be avoided, since any knowledge of the actual is—because of the quantum-theoretical laws—by its very nature an incomplete knowledge.

The closing chapters contain much fine thinking, especially on the nature and difficulties of a more unified view. An analogy between the Aristotelian notion of matter as 'potentia' and energy is suggested, and the relation of mathematical formulation to 'forms' of matter is pointed out. The complete understanding of the unity of matter would mean that the forms of matter in the sense of the Aristotelian philosophy would appear as solutions of a closed mathematical scheme representing the natural laws for matter. In discussing language in its relation to reality the author enlarges on a

point on which he has already touched : the distinct ways in which science uses both ordinary concepts, whose meaning remains somewhat vague, and scientific concepts, which enjoy mathematical formulation. Finally, because the ultimate decisions about the value of scientific work lie with nature itself, he sees potentialities in it both for uniting different cultures and for opening the door to a wider outlook on the relation between the human mind and reality.

Undoubtedly then Heisenberg's book is of importance : it is perhaps itself an opening of the door to a wider outlook. Moreover what that wider outlook is seems, from the book itself, to be clear. In so many places in it brilliant and worthwhile suggestions are made, yet for all that one feels that there is something inadequate about the considerations. The root of this dissatisfaction lies in the fact that the discussion proceeds largely in a philosophical vacuum. There is overmuch obscurity about the nature of science, about the significance of the notion of cause. In brief there is so much talk about concepts, and so little about their source : to this problem we will return in the conclusion.

It may be added that the Copenhagen interpretation in the context of a clearer understanding of the human mind cannot be considered adequate. In such a context failure of the classic theories appears not as the failure of materialistic thinking, but as the triumph of the abstract, and statistical theory, whether classical or quantum, is shown to be related to the inevitable reaction of the human mind to an object immersed in the prime potency of Aristotle.

The Whidden lectures, of which *The Hollow Universe* contains the fourth series, aim at helping students to cross the barriers existing among the various academic departments—already a worthwhile purpose. The present series, delivered by Charles de Koninck, Professor of the Philosophy of Nature at Laval University, Quebec, is a rather novel treatment and refutation of the approach of analytic philosophers to problems related to his own subject. The volume contains three lectures dealing with the situation as it appears in discussions of mathematics, the inorganic sciences, and biology respectively, and concludes with an epilogue in which Dr de Koninck ' reckons with the computers' in a more general fashion. The method of treatment is novel in that it consists not in the presentation of a coherent viewpoint but in a rather good-humoured, refreshing, yet telling consideration of the analytic viewpoint, in which the logical conclusions of that viewpoint are brought out in full fantasy.

In the first lecture we do not, as the author says, pass much beyond $2 = 1 + 1$: the ancient problem of the nature of such a mathematical judgment. Professor de Koninch discusses the consequences of the analytic conception of a number as a mere collection or aggregate, as a symbolic construction : the most obvious being that it makes it exceedingly difficult to establish mathematics as anything but a labyrinth of elaborated tautologies. The construction of the integers is also treated, and the consequent problem of the continued possibility of $n + 1$ if n is given. From the analytic point of view this problem could be nothing but a pseudo-problem, since the symbolic expression, $n + 1$, already lies before us. At this stage the author

rises above his critique to give a stimulating positive account of the basis of mathematical induction, in which he compares Poincare's ' power of the spirits ' Weyl's ' intuition of ever one more ' and Aristotle's illumination of intellect, and in discussion intellect's capacity for self-reflection, reveals a foundation not only for a potential infinity, but even for the transfinite.

In the second section the author considers that attitude which fosters the view that mathematical physics reveals the world of nature only to the extent to which it can be caught in the selective screen of symbolic construction. All through this lecture a certain dichotomy is emphasized : between measurement and nature, between operational definition and real definition, between factual wonder and what one might call Aristotelian wonder. Many worthwhile points are touched on in the pursuit of the main theme, the consequence of intellectual nihilism : ' Hollow men rejoicing in a hollow world '. However the discussion smacks a little of Whitehead's ' bifurcation of nature ' theory and betrays the same absence of an adequate positive attempt at unification. A more sympathetic treatment of the opposing school of thought might have been more helpful here. Instead, for example, of contrasting length as ' what is extended in one dimension ' with the operational definition, one might bring out the value of the operational definition as being more expressive of the relational nature of length. Instead of emphasizing the difference between non-linguistic constructs and nature as intrinsic to things one might point out the relation—present if not admitted—of symbolic construction to non-imaginable intelligibility. Finally, instead of pointing to two extremes in wonder, one might clarify the successive levels of intelligibility which open out before the single wonder of intelligence. However, the author can hardly be criticized for not departing from his method of treatment to this extent, especially considering the length and scope of the lecture.

The third part, entitled ' The lifeless world of Biology ' treats in characteristic style of the oddness of biologists in seeking the nature of life on the confines of the animate, disecting amoeba instead of inspecting horses. The author's purpose in doing this is not, however, to restrict the science, but to emphasize relatively clear cases of what we mean by alive, and to show that the recognition of the horse or the cat as living things is far less fictitious than to dismiss them as machines. Here also the question of finality as a necessary complement of intelligibility is stressed ; not indeed that it requires methodical inclusion, but that it cannot reasonably suffer methodical rejection.

In the epilogue, Dr Koninck treats briefly of the notion of ' thought ', applicable now apparently to machines, and consequently subjected now to the standards of rigour demanded by the computor-philosophy which excludes all philosophy. He concludes suitably by drawing to its logical conclusion the interpretation of Mr Smith—or Lord Russell—as a ' bundle of events ', legion therefore, who to be consistent must surely speak in the plural, and then certainly not in expressions of dismay at world events. If the world of bundles of events terminates abruptly, why call it a catastrophe ?

We have then two books with a common purpose : that of breaking down the barriers of specialization. Certainly they enjoy partial success. Partial only, because the first work lacks foundations, the second abounds in negations. They resemble a little the present effort, of like purpose, to

emphasize the history of science as a source of sympathy between scientist and humanist. They miss the point—but they are not, let it be said, so wide of the mark. And the point is, that genuine sympathy springs properly not from a glimpse of a structure, either in process or in completion, but from an appreciation of foundations, of common ground : and the common ground of all knowledge is human understanding : and the appreciation of common ground requires an understanding of understanding. Which understanding is the nucleus of a philosophy, positive, invariable—for it cannot be revised without the reviser revising himself. If then specialists are to escape intellectual isolation, a more consistent approach to the problem is necessary. It is not enough to group together a spectrum of opinions, whether historically or geographically distributed. The quest for unity must go deeper : indeed is gradually being driven deeper by the problems of science. A re-orientation of so-called philosophical thinking is required—this indeed is Dr de Koninck's point—and is in fact imminent. Thinkers will have to end their speculations about meaningful statements, metamathematics and symbolic language, and admit that for all their scepticism, relativism or positivism, they, and even more their scientific fellows, persist in making acts of understanding. They will have to turn from their statements to the source of their statements. Such a change will perhaps be slow—for the rot began before Ockam—but come it must. For scientists are gradually appreciating that their success has solid foundations, and that such foundations require explanation : and indeed not a few are beginning to realize that the explanation was given by the portly friar of Rocca Secca many years ago.

PHILIP MCSHANE

RELIGION

THE SECRET BOOKS OF THE EGYPTIAN GNOSTICS. With an English translation and critical evaluation of the Gospel according to Thomas. By Jean Doresse. London : Hollis and Carter. 1960. xvii and 445 pages. 42s.

'THE GNOSTICS pride themselves on their name, which means possessing excellent knowledge. They do in fact surpass all who went before them, but in empty-headedness and obscenity.' This was St Augustine's summing up of the impression which three hundred years of Gnosticism had left on the Church. The first comments on it, in the Epistles to Timothy and Titus, had struck the same note. 'Have nothing to do with godless and silly myths.' 'Avoid the godless chatter and contradictions of what is falsely called knowledge' (*gnosis*). Gnosticism appeared first and foremost as something silly, but with a silliness which upset the moral order. The Church Fathers held that here at any rate loose thinking went with loose habits. In fact, Gnosticism was a secret knowledge which made the possessor feel superior to rational law. The Gnostic could do things of which other men would be ashamed, but he could still feel free from stain, because his inner superiority absolved him from the limits which bound ordinary men.

That was the testimony of the ancient Church writers. Modern historians have naturally treated them as hostile witnesses, and M. Doresse, having quoted St Jerome in one of his more satirical moments (' Twaddle ! Read them out loud in the taverns, and you will make block-heads drunk all the quicker ') asks with some justice : What kind of impartiality can we expect from such impassioned polemics ? His first chapter is Gnosticism as seen by the Fathers, and it is put there just to whet our appetites for the first-hand accounts of Gnosticism which are now to be had from the Gnostics themselves.

In his second chapter he deals with ' original texts and monuments ', mainly the three Coptic documents known for a century as ' Pistis Sophia ' etc., and after the sceptic note struck in the first chapter, we are a little surprised to find that they confirm the Patristic testimony. Even the iconography of Gnosticism ' corresponds with what the *Philosophoumena* (a third century work ascribed to Hippolytus) tells us of Gnosticism.' (p. 93) Most astonishing of all—it sounds like a ' dead give-away '—we find the Gnostics accusing each other of ' abominable practices '. M. Doresse writes them off as maybe mere calumnies, or perhaps ' merely orgies signifying an utter contempt for the physical nature created by an " evil " god.' (p. 115) But the traditional picture still stands, no matter how high-minded were the Gnostic orgies.

We come in the third and succeeding chapters to the Gnostic documents found in 1945 at Hag Namadi, some 60 miles north of Luxor. M. Doresse played a large part in identifying and saving the discoveries, and all must be grateful for his vigorous and enlightened action. There were thirteen codices, in various formats and hands, which allow their dating to the fourth and fifth centuries. Forty-four new Gnostic treatises are described by M. Doresse, of which only two have been published so far, the *Gospel of Truth* and the *Gospel according to Thomas*. The general picture which emerges from M. Doresse's description hardly changes the traditional one, except that the ' myths and endless genealogies ' of which the Epistle to Timothy complained have been further complicated. By the end of this section, our faith in the Fathers has been fully restored. ' One has only to glance through the new writings to recognize, for instance, the reliability of such an account as that given in the *Philosophoumena*, for it is now clear that the texts it summarizes are authentically Gnostic.' (p. 249) Earlier he had said, ' This text of Irenaeus is especially valuable to us, since the discovery, half a century ago, of one of the very few original Gnostic scriptures so far available, the *Secret Book of John*, has enabled us to see that Irenaeus in this case has followed sometimes word for word the text of a revelation undoubtedly in use by the Gnostics'. (p. 37)

A long appendix gives a translation of the *Gospel according to Thomas*, with introduction and brief notes. The text is enhanced by the addition of the fragments from the Greek papyri of Oxyrhynchus which now turn out to correspond to parts of the Thomas Gospel. The commentary is often helpful, but on the whole, it fails to do justice to the Gnosticism of the Thomas Gospel. M. Doresse reduces its peculiarities to ' philosophical and mystical notions inherited from hellenic philosophy and particularly from Platonism '. That suggests that it could have been written by any of the Platonist Church

Fathers, which is quite impossible. M. Doresse says that the Thomas Gospel is merely ' a very ancient form of Christianity ', presumably such as could have been proposed by a second century apologist, intent on showing the harmony of Christian and Hellenic thought. M. Doresse has perhaps missed many of the implications of the Thomas Gospel. He seems even to have missed the force of his own note, p. 373, where he rightly says, ' Our text is an exhortation to invert all those values—cosmic, human and moral—which have been established since the fall of the first man '. But it was precisely this inversion of moral values that the Fathers stigmatized in Gnosticism, and it puts the Thomas Gospel outside the pale of Platonism, let alone Christianity. But we must be grateful to M. Doresse for the fund of information which he has provided in his book, information not yet accessible elsewhere. The very mass of the items offered, often in mere catalogue form, makes the book somewhat confusing to read, but that is to some extent the fault of the subject, which remains, as M. Doresse says, a phantasmagoria. Even the closest reading will not justify the statement of Dr Cullmann, quoted on the jacket, that these documents are ' comparable in importance to the Dead Sea Scrolls and of even greater significance to students of the New Testament '. No man is on oath in a lapidary inscription, or, apparently, on a book blurb.

KEVIN SMYTH

NANO NAGLE AND THE PRESENTATION SISTERS. By T. J. Walsh. Dublin : M. H. Gill & Son. 1959. 40s.

MERCY UNTO THOUSANDS. By Sister M. Bertrand Degnan. Dublin : Browne & Nolan, Ltd. 1959. 25s.

GOD WILLS IT : CENTENARY STORY OF THE SISTERS OF ST. LOUIS. By Sister M. Pauline. Dublin : Browne & Nolan, Ltd. 1959. 15s.

THE lives of the three foundresses, Nano Nagle, Catherine McAuley, and Genevieve Beale, cover the 160 years between 1718 and 1878. After the Treaty of Limerick, when ' the Wild Geese spread the grey wing upon every tide ', one of Nano Nagle's grand-uncles sailed for France with James Stuart. The Catholic Emancipation Bill was going through the House of Lords when Catherine's Congregation of Our Lady of Mercy was coming into being. Mother Genevieve Beale died in Monaghan in 1878, the year that saw Parnell become leader of the Irish party in the House of Commons.

Father Walsh's book records the life story of Nano Nagle, the subsequent history of the Sisterhood founded by her, and the contribution of the Presentation Sisters to education in Ireland and elsewhere. Covering as it does almost 250 years, his book suffers somewhat from its scope. One excellent chapter, that on education by nuns, is rather overshadowed by the nature of the work into which it has been incorporated, and strikes an irrelevant note, being general in nature whereas the whole is specific. This particular chapter might, with profit, have been omitted from the book and published as a separate thesis.

Nano Nagle, born in Co. Cork in 1718, was educated in Paris. Returning to Cork about 1750,[1] the total lack of educational facilities for the poor moved her to do something to remedy matters. She founded small schools which she managed to keep staffed and functioning—without coming into conflict with the authorities—for more than fifteen years. In 1771 she welcomed to Cork some young Irish girls who had entered the Ursuline Order in Paris and for whom she built a convent, intending that they should take over her ragged schools. But she had overlooked the fact that the Ursulines were an enclosed Order and could not go out to teach in the streets and back lanes where these little schools were situated. There was nothing for it but to build another convent. So, to Nano Nangle's *felix culpa* Ireland owes not merely its first Ursuline foundation, but the Presentation Sisters.

Originally the Sisters of the Presentation of the Blessed Virgin Mary were known as Sisters of the Charitable Instruction of the Sacred Heart of Jesus. When the foundress made her profession in 1777 she was in her sixtieth year. Seven years later she died. Today Nano Nagle's daughters, so well known in Ireland, are spread throughout England, the United States, Newfoundland, Australia and New Zealand, Rhodesia, India and Pakistan. Early this year four Presentation Sisters left the Kilkenny convent to make a foundation in the Philippines.

Catherine McAuley was a child in Dublin at the time of Nano Nagle's death in Cork. In 1822 she inherited an estate worth almost a quarter of a million pounds in present-day values and at once decided to spend herself and her fortune on the needy and underprivileged of her native city. The provision of schools for poor Catholic children and of shelters for destitute and homeless girls were her first objectives. She had no intention of entering religion ; in fact the religious life seems to have held little attraction for her. With the help of a few companions she founded a House of Our Lady of Mercy in Baggot Street ; more than one Dubliner was puzzled at seeing Miss McAuley and her ladies, who were not nuns and yet lived according to a rule. It was only when Catherine realized the uneasiness of the Arch-

[1] Father Walsh mentions that, apart from the years when she resided in Paris (1728–1746), Nano Nagle returned there after 1748 to test her vocation. After some time, her confessor, convinced that her call lay elsewhere, advised her to return to her own country which had need of her. One wonders which Paris convent she entered. In a very old Life of Madame Louise of France there is a description of the Carmel of St Denis where that Princess entered and persevered until her death in 1787. All the nuns were Irish. When Louis XV called to visit his Carmelite daughter he told his equerries to wait outside, ' For ', he said, pointing to the door of St Denis Carmel, ' in here I have my Irish bodyguard '. The Prioress, a Creagh, entered in 1728 ; her niece was a Dillon ; the Mistress of Novices, a MacMahon, did not hesitate to advise her royal postulant ' not to be a half and half Carmelite ', and handed out rebukes, undeserved as well as deserved, to the Daughter of France as often as she thought fit. This Carmelite convent was in the true Irish tradition, being " the poorest and strictest of all the Carmels of France, so much so that it is called with justice la Trappe du Carmel '. The nuns of St Denis, like their Prioress, were most of them young nuns during the years when Nano Nagle was in Paris ; as the Irish colony formed a distinct coterie in the French capital at that time it is more than likely that Nano knew this convent and the Carmelites, and the other Carmel in the rue de Grenelle which also had many Irish nuns in the community. During the Revolution the Carmel of St Denis was converted into a barracks and the nuns banished. After various vicissitudes they found a refuge in Autun ; the archives of the Autun Carmel yielded the materials for the Carmelite years in the Life of Madame Louise. It is a fascinating conjecture to wonder whether the same archives contain any information on the Irish Carmelites of St Denis—or on Nano Nagle.

bishop, Dr Murray, regarding their status, that she agreed to become a religious. Thus began the Sisters of Mercy.

Mother McAuley was well past middle age when she set about consolidating and extending her congregation. She worked among a people not yet accustomed to the relaxation of the Penal Laws, much less to the novel spectacle of unenclosed nuns. Her experiences as a travelling foundress, now in Carlow, now in Birr, now in London, back to Limerick and Galway, resemble those of St Teresa of Avila when founding the convents of her reform in Spain. Teresa, who knew what it meant for a woman in her fifties to ride a *burro*, or jolt in a stifling wagon on rough roads, must have sympathized from heaven with the first Sister of Mercy travelling in a chaise and pair, or by mail coach, or canal packet or steam packet.

Sister M. Bertrand, in her book *Mercy Unto Thousands*, has aimed at revealing ' the personality and character of Catherine McAuley spiritualized through her vocation as a Sister of Mercy '. The author, an American, did the most thorough research for her task and her work is scholarly and well-documented. Keeping in mind, no doubt, her American reading public, she has had to explain several matters obvious and familiar to readers this side of the Atlantic. These explanatory passages are very well done ; it would have been easy to err by superfluity on the one hand or inadequacy on the other. The publishers are to be congratulated on the excellent format.

Sister M. Pauline, a young Irish Sister of St Louis, has chosen the St Louis motto, *God Wills It*, as title for her excellent and most readable study of the origins and history of the Congregation to which she belongs—a study which includes the biography of Genevieve Beale, foundress of the first St Louis convent in Ireland. Written for the recent Centenary Celebrations of the Sisters of St Louis, the book forms a fitting memento of that occasion, recording as it does a hundred years of splendid initiative and solid achievement. In 1859 three Sisters of St Louis arrived in Monaghan from France to take charge of a girls' reformatory. The foundation then made is now Mother house to almost fifty convents in Ireland and abroad.

Mother Genevieve Beale, leader of the trio sent to Monaghan in 1859, was a convert to Catholicism. Born of a London Quaker family, Mary Priscilla Beale came to Cork in 1841 to take up a business position there. The happy, exemplary life of the Catholic family with whom she lived, and her meetings with the Franciscans Father Hogan and Father Mathew who were friends of that family, resulted in her reception into the Church. Later, on the advice of Father Mathew—the Apostle of Temperance was her confessor—she went to Paris and entered the convent of the Dames of St Louis at Juilly.

The nuns of Juilly were founded by the Abbé Bautain, a former lecturer of Strasbourg University. Dedicated to the pursuit and propagation of truth, Louis Eugène Bautain was a man of great personal holiness and of wide experience as a director ; he was well equipped not merely to guide others in educational fields but to indicate the paths to perfection. In an exhortation to the nuns at Juilly he requests them ' to cultivate learning as much as piety, without however injuring piety in any way, but in such a manner as to strengthen and exalt it '.

Thirty-seven 'poor, ragged children' presented themselves when the three Sisters of St Louis opened a small National School at Latlurcan, half a mile outside Monaghan, early in 1859. A fortnight later there were eighty-one ; a month later a hundred. By midsummer there were two hundred on the roll and a change was imperative. So they moved to the first available premises, the old brewery beside Sparks's Lake at the southern end of the town ; there they started a Reform School, running it so successfully that the Govermental Inspectors reported most favourably upon it. The author is at her best in dealing with this period of Mother Beale's life ; if anything she tends to understatement, but her selection is so unerring and apposite that it is more convincing than pages of the most glowing narrative. We glimpse the want the first Sisters endured by the laconic record of their gratitude for the Bishop's gift of 'some fine pictures, potatoes and a promise of bacon'. She lets the Governmental Reports, most of them from non-Catholic Inspectors, speak for themselves. Accounts of the first occupants of the Reform School make a significant commentary on social conditions in Irish cities at that time. One Belfast girl of eleven had had eight court convictions; this child's companions included twenty others under sentence for larceny, shopbreaking, arson and similar offences ; five of them, barely fifteen, were already on the streets, two of them sent to make their living thus by their mothers. Mother Genevieve was a century ahead of her time in her methods of reform. One Report states :

> Mrs Beale does not hesitate to take some of the most refractory girls I have ever seen, and has succeeded in changing not only their conduct, but to all appearances their nature . . . . There are none so wicked, so violent, so, to all human judgment, lost, as to be beyond the scope of her zeal and sympathy.

Yet, at the time this Report was being written, Mother Beale was undergoing the distressing trial of a cleavage between Monaghan and Juilly. The separation was not of her making and there was nothing she could do to prevent Monaghan from being cut away from the French houses of the Congregation. Neither she nor the French Superiors foresaw the day when Monaghan would welcome nuns expelled from France by 'enlightened' governments whose policies included the suppression of Catholic schools and the expulsion of religious. Still less could they foresee the day at the end of 1952 when the French and Belgian convents of St Louis, sadly depleted through lack of vocations, amalgamated with the Irish convents—the day when Monaghan, once the daughter of Juilly, became the motherhouse, sending out young Irish Sisters to renew and make live again the convents of St Louis in France and Belgium.

To read these three books one after another in their chronological order is to marvel at the vast amount of material—most of it of the very stuff of history—available in so many Irish diocesan and convent archives, a source up to now largely by-passed by our historians. It is also a tonic. Not every nation has come so far or had so much of real worth to show for the past two hundred years.

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